Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief

by Colin Howson

Overview

Colin Howson offers a solution to one of the central, unsolved problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction. In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. No matter how many experimental tests a hypothesis passes, nothing can be legitimately inferred about its truth or probable truth. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes to many small places of decimals and within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory seems so remote that the possibility should be dismissed. This suggests that Hume's argument must be wrong; but there is still no consensus on where exactly this flaw lies. Howson argues that there is no flaw, and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion for relation between science and its empirical base.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780191520211
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	11/02/2000
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
File size:	507 KB

About the Author

Colin Howson is Professor of Philosophy at the London School of Economics.

Table of Contents

Introduction1. Hume's Argument2. Reliabilism3. Realism and the No-Miracles Argument4. Probabilism5. Deductivism6. The Naturalistic Fallacy7. A New Species of Logic8. The Logic of Scientific Discovery9. Chance and ProbabilityFinaleCoda of MiraclesReferencesIndex