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Overview
Saad-Ghorayeb explores the nature of the party’s struggle against the West by studying its views on the use of violence against Westerners. Crucially, she also addresses the question of whether Hizbu’llah depicts this struggle in purely political or civilisational terms. The existential nature of the movement’s conflict with Israel is analysed and the Islamic roots of its anti-Judaism is unearthed.
The author explores the mechanics and rationale behind the party’s integration into the Lebanese political system, and sheds light on how it has reconciled its national idenitity with its solidarity with the Muslim umma.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780745317922 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Pluto Press |
| Publication date: | 03/12/2001 |
| Series: | Critical Studies on Islam Series |
| Pages: | 264 |
| Sales rank: | 860,089 |
| Product dimensions: | 5.32(w) x 8.46(h) x 0.60(d) |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
Political Accommodation and Violence in Non-Islamic States
The cornerstone of Hizbu'llah's intellectual structure is the Islamic state ideal. However, the realisation of this fundamental tenet is not actively pursued by the party regardless of its feasibility as a political scheme. Due to the absence of certain social and political circumstances, Hizbu'llah has adopted a strategy of self-preservation, which entails indefinitely postponing the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Accordingly, much of Hizbu'llah's political thought focuses on the religious and moral bases for political accommodation and political violence in non-Islamic states.
While the concept of political violence refers to a wide range of politically motivated violent acts, which are perpetrated by states as well as groups and individuals, the form of political violence I refer to here is insurgency. This chapter, therefore, deals with Hizbu'llah's views on revolution, coups d'état, guerrilla warfare and various forms of terrorist violence practised by groups against secular and unIslamic domestic regimes.
Despite the debate over whether all violent acts which target unarmed civilians constitute acts of terrorism, for simplicity's sake, terrorist violence will be treated as one strategy of insurgency which is distinguished from other strategies by its deliberate attempt to terrorise a civilian population for political ends. Accordingly, Hizbu'llah's views on all forms of insurgency, both terrorist and otherwise, will be examined.
The Oppressors versus the Oppressed
Central to Hizbu'llah's notion of political action is the division of the world, formulated by Khumayni, into 'oppressors' (mustakbirin) and 'oppressed' (mustad'afin). So pivotal is this conceptual dichotomy to Hizbu'llah's political thought that it is invoked in almost every official's speech. Moreover, both the Open Letter of 1985 and Hizbu'llah's 1992 electoral programme are addressed to the 'oppressed'. Borrowed from Marxist theory and the Qur'an, Khumayni's theoretical construction is infused with a sense of moral dualism and millenarianism in its division of humankind into good and evil forces which are pitted against each other in an apocalyptic battle, from which the oppressed emerge victorious. However, a clear distinction must be made between Khumayni's dichotomy and the division of the world by other Islamic theorists into 'Dar al-Islam' (the Abode of Islam) versus 'Dar al-Harb' (the Land of War) which sets Muslims against non-Muslims. This is precisely the error committed by James Piscatori, who confuses this peculiarly Sunni formulation with the Shi'ite oppressor/oppressed division. The oppressors do not represent the non-Muslims and the oppressed the Muslims, but rather those who are socially and economically deprived, politically oppressed and culturally repressed vis-à-vis those who practise this oppression, regardless of their religious identity. More apposite would be the analogy between Dar al-Islam and the Shi'ite notion of 'Hizbu'llah' (the party of God) and Dar alHarb with 'Hizbu'shaytan' (the party of Satan), which has some religious connotations as well as humanistic ones. Nevertheless, this classification of Hizbu'llah's does not constitute the basis of its theory on political action, which is based purely on humanistic criteria.
Although the concept of oppression is derived from the Qur'an, its usage in the Qur'anic context is essentially humanistic and does not refer to the Muslim believers as such but to all 'those who were being oppressed on earth' (28:5). While this religious reference is devoid of any economic implications, it is conjoined with the secular designation of the oppressed as Frantz Fanon's 'wretched of the earth', whose exploited status as Third World peoples adds a secular class dimension to the concept. Thus, the juxtaposition of exploitation with oppression renders the concept applicable to poor Muslims and non-Muslims, especially those belonging to the oppressed non-Western world.
However, the secular origins of the class criterion are underplayed in Khumayni's and Hizbu'llah's conceptualisation of oppression, resulting in the Islamicisation of class analysis whose defining elements, exploitation and poverty, become Islamic virtues. As articulated by Khumayni, 'Islam originates from the masses not from the rich.' More significantly, the Prophet Muhammad valued 'the sweat of a worker' more than 'the blood of a martyr'. The glorification of the underdog is echoed by Hizbu'llah's characterisation of Imam 'Ali as one who 'loved the poor and deprived'.
Not only is deprivation a moral asset for those who happen to be afflicted with such a status, it is apotheosised as a virtue to be emulated by religious leaders. Against this backdrop, Imam 'Ali is claimed to have abstained from life's luxuries and chose instead to lead a humble life like his followers. So ubiquitous is this theme in Hizbu'llah's political thought that it has become institutionalised as a norm to which Hizbu'llah officials must adhere. Thus, asceticism is a predominant feature of the lifestyles of Hizbu'llah's leadership, in accordance with the party's self-designation as 'the first party to oppose deprivation' and as the champion of the 'peasants and farmers, the labourers and the poor, the oppressed and deprived, the workers and homeless'.
It is important to note, however, that the homeless Hizbu'llah is referring to are those who have been displaced by the Israeli occupation – the Shi'ite southerners. At first glance, this appears to contradict the aforementioned distinction between the Muslim believers and the oppressed. Hizbu'llah's depiction of the Islamic umma (community of Muslim believers) as 'oppressed, poor and deprived', only underlines this apparent contradiction. On closer inspection though, two qualifications can be made regarding the conjunction of Shi'ites and oppressed. First, the inclusion of Shi'ites or Muslims in Hizbu'llah's oppressed category does not ipso facto exclude other religious groups from this category.
Second, the classification of the Shi'ites as oppressed does not stem from the Qur'an but from the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and the cultural division of labour typifying Lebanese society, whereby class and community overlap. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Shi'ites constituted a 'community-class' by dint of their low educational, occupational and economic status. Therefore, any designation of the Shi'ites as oppressed necessarily emanates from a class analysis perspective as opposed to an Islamic one.
This observation is substantiated by Hizbu'llah's identification of the Muslims, and more specifically the Shi'ites, with the oppressed who, prior to the early 1980s, did not have access to the 'elite' universities in the country which were monopolised by the 'wealthy classes'. This reference not only reveals the class origins of Hizbu'llah's concept of oppression, but also demonstrates the humanistic aspect of the concept which is unrelated to class.
According to Hizbu'llah, those privileged enough to attend elitist universities such as the American University of Beirut and the Saint Joseph University – presumably the Christians – desperately try to imitate the West in all spheres of their lives. This mimicry extends to the realm of thought, as evidenced by their espousal of 'arrogant, materialistic ideas'. Through this myopic Western vision, they view their oppressed Muslim counterparts with disdain. Accordingly, economic status alone does not seem to be a sufficient criterion of oppression. Only those who identify with the West are deemed oppressors. The fact that they generally belong to the upper classes of society is coincidental, as is their religious identity.
It is not poverty per se which determines whether one is oppressed, but deprivation and exploitation. It is only when poverty is the result of state discrimination, negligence and abuse that it becomes synonymous with oppression. Otherwise, poverty is merely a social description. Furthermore, economic deprivation and exploitation are not the only criteria of oppression, as attested to by Khumayni's and Hizbu'llah's significant middle-class support base. The incorporation of all social classes into the oppressed category is based on the Qur'anic portrayal of the oppressed as those who are economically, politically or culturally 'weak' vis-à-vis the 'arrogant' oppressors, a bifurcation which is enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Since neither weakness nor arrogance is intrinsic to any religious community, it follows that the Qur'anic notion of oppression is even more universal than the Marxist one. Not only do all social classes represent the oppressed, but all religious denominations too. Moreover, the category of oppressors includes Shi'ites, as well as other Muslims and Christians. As expressed by al-Sayyid Ibrahim alAmin al-Sayyid at the height of the civil war: 'We do not discriminate between Muslim and Christian in our rejection of oppression.'
The common denominator between the oppressed Muslims and Christians is their 'humanitarianism' and their rejection of oppression as reflected in their political stands, behaviour and intellectual identity. More specifically, it is the attitude to Zionism and the West – America in particular – that differentiates the oppressors from the politically and culturally oppressed. Anyone who is 'free', who 'resists Zionism' and who 'may be exposed to danger' as a result of his beliefs, qualifies as an oppressed person. Conversely, all those who side with the 'greatest abominations in our era', America and the Zionist 'enemy', are the oppressors who must be confronted by Hizbu'llah. Even the initial stages of the Lebanese civil war are perceived through the oppressor/oppressed lens. Rather than a conflict between leftist Muslims and rightist Christians, the war is construed by Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid as 'a conflict between oppressed and oppressor', in view of the latter's association with Israel and America.
In light of America and Israel epitomising oppression according to Hizbu'llah, the prioritisation of the party's abominations by some scholars appears markedly disordered. The ordering of the 'infidel Satans' (America and Israel) at the bottom of the execration scale flies in the face of Hizbu'llah's notion of oppression. Moreover, the vanguard of the 'sinful world' is definitely not represented by the 'secularised Shi'ite Muslims', and the Sunni Muslims are certainly not considered sinful by the party, let alone the second most sinful category.
Unlike many Islamic 'fundamentalist' groups who, according to As'ad Abu Khalil, deem those Muslims who do not subscribe to their Islamic vision as 'infidels', and who view secularist Muslims as 'apostates' who ought to be punished by death, Hizbu'llah has no such 'takfir' (declaring the infidelity of adversaries) discourse. Above all, it is the oppressors who are anathematised, regardless of their religious identities, political leanings or religiosity. Furthermore, the party does not equate secularism with oppression or sin. As underlined by Hizbu'llah MP Muhammad Fnaysh, only the secularist who 'disavows Islamic principles and sanctities' or who enforces secularism as a state religion is considered hostile to Islam and an oppressor.
The distinction between the Sunni Islamist deprecation of secularism as a profanity and Hizbu'llah's more tolerant view is also exemplified by their perspectives on secular Syrian Ba'athism. While Sunni Islamists depict the Ba'ath Party as a 'Crusader party ... hellbent upon subverting Islam', Hizbu'llah tries to mitigate the sacrilege associated with Syrian secularism by claiming that Hafez al-Assad 'is not an atheist'. But more significantly, it is Syria's unyieldingness towards Israel and its safeguarding of Arab rights, which not only indemnify it from Hizbu'llah's rebuke, but also render it an oppressed state. The same case can be made for the PLO whose secularism did not prevent Hizbu'llah from condemning Amal's 'War of the Camps' against the organisation or from actively intervening on behalf of the Sunni Palestinian refugees – a course of action which also refutes Hizbu'llah's alleged odium for Sunni Muslims.
Lest this be construed as an indication of Hizbu'llah's countenance of Arab secularists only, on account of their stance towards Israel, it must be stressed that any oppressed secular group or state is not only condoned but also morally supported by the party. Hizbu'llah sympathises with secular Christian and even Marxist Third World Leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Daniel Ortega and Fidel Castro because of their countries' oppressed status. Castro, for example, is 'respected' for preserving Cuba's independence from US influence and for confronting the US' hegemony over South America.
Mandela is esteemed for his role in resisting the oppressive apartheid regime in South Africa. This sympathy extends to non-Third World movements such as Northern Ireland's Republicans (though not to the IRA as such) whose resistance to Britain's 'oppression, aggression and occupation' is reminiscent of the Palestinian and Lebanese situation. So oppressed are the Irish Catholics perceived to be, that Khumayni even went so far as to name a Tehran street after imprisoned IRA hunger-striker Bobby Sands.
Occupation of one's land by Israel or any other foreign power emerges as a principal determinant of oppression and, like all oppressed people, those whose land is occupied will be afforded Hizbu'llah's 'automatic' support. But even an oppressed people whose land has been subjected to foreign occupation does not win Hizbu'llah's total sympathy if its rejection of oppression hinges on Western support. According to this logic, the Afghan mujahidin's recourse to American aid in their resistance to the Soviet occupation detracted from their moral integrity as an oppressed people. By compromising their independence, they became the 'American mujahidin', a highly pejorative epithet in Hizbu'llah's lexicon.
It is upon this basis that Hizbu'llah's address to the 'Free Downtrodden Men' is made, the operative word being 'free'. Also employed by Husayn al-Mussawi in his delineation of the oppressed, the term refers to the refusal of the downtrodden to succumb to American domination, even if this means that the rule of their indigenous oppressors will continue indefinitely. As tyrannical as the Saddam Husayn regime is, the Iraqi opposition should not rely on American support, or it will remain politically indebted to the US.
Apart from Israel, whose demonisation by Hizbu'llah renders it the ultimate oppressor, the US occupies the most 'sinful' category of Hizbu'llah's enemies. The second most oppressive are the various occupiers of the lands of the oppressed, but whose occupation cannot be compared with Israel whose very existence is perceived as illegitimate. Third are the tyrannical regimes governing the oppressed whose subservience to the West, and the US especially, in addition to their inherent injustice as dictatorships (regardless of the foreign powers which bolster their rule) translates into oppression. Accordingly, the 'oppressed of the world' are the victims of these three classes of oppression, which fall under the Qur'anic designation of 'the arrogant'. Along with those whose economic deprivation is thrust upon them by a neglectful state, these 'friends' of Hizbu'llah are urged to form a common 'international front' to fight oppression. Thus, Hizbu'llah fundamentally strives for the 'unity of humanity'.
Justifications for Political Violence and Accommodation in Relation to State Oppression
The exemplary just state for Hizbu'llah is the Islamic republic. However, with the exception of Iran, where such a state exists, the realisation of such an ideal by Shi'ite Islamists has been virtually impossible. Moreover, when the appropriate circumstances for the establishment of the Islamic republic do not obtain, any revolutionary activity that strives in this direction will result in chaos – a much abhorred outcome for both Sunni and Shi'ite Islamists. In view of this likelihood, and bearing in mind Hizbu'llah's conceptualisation of oppression, the conditions under which Islamists may resort to political violence or political accommodation with un-Islamic Muslim and secular states can be readily discerned.
Contrary to 'Abbas Kelidar's assertion that the Shi'ite community is predisposed to rebellion because of its 'belief that the authority of Muslim rulers, with the exception of Imam 'Ali's, could not be recognised as legitimate', only rarely has the denial of legitimacy actually translated into rebellion or revolution. As noted by Sartori, anti-system is not equivalent to outside the system or revolution. And legitimacy has not been withheld from regimes not related to 'Ali's descendants. In fact, legitimacy has been conferred on secular states (such as post-Ta'if Lebanon) and withheld from Muslim ones (such as Saudi Arabia). It follows that the overthrow of secular states is not the underlying purpose of jihad (holy war).
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Hizbu'llah"
by .
Copyright © 2002 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb.
Excerpted by permission of Pluto Press.
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Table of Contents
AcknowledgementsIntroduction
1: Political Accommodation And Violence In Non-Islamic States
2 : The Islamic State And Democracy
3: The Concept Of The Guardianship Of The Jurisprudent
4: Islamic Universalism And National Identity
5: The Struggle With The West
6: The Resistance To The Israeli Occupation Of South Lebanon
7: Anti-Zionism And Israel
8: Anti-Judaism
Conclusion
Appendix 1: Miladi Equivalents To Hijri Years
Appendix 2: List Of Hijri Months
References
Glossary
Index