Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics)

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems.

After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

This audio edition is skillfully narrated by Kathleen Godwin.

Produced and published by Echo Point Books & Media, an independent bookseller in Brattleboro, Vermont. ©1990 Cambridge University Press (P)

1116812733
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics)

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems.

After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

This audio edition is skillfully narrated by Kathleen Godwin.

Produced and published by Echo Point Books & Media, an independent bookseller in Brattleboro, Vermont. ©1990 Cambridge University Press (P)

34.99 In Stock
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics)

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics)

by Elinor Ostrom

Narrated by Kathleen Godwin

Unabridged — 10 hours, 25 minutes

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics)

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics)

by Elinor Ostrom

Narrated by Kathleen Godwin

Unabridged — 10 hours, 25 minutes

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Overview

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems.

After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

This audio edition is skillfully narrated by Kathleen Godwin.

Produced and published by Echo Point Books & Media, an independent bookseller in Brattleboro, Vermont. ©1990 Cambridge University Press (P)


Product Details

BN ID: 2940191117683
Publisher: Dreamscape Media
Publication date: 08/26/2024
Edition description: Unabridged
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