Table of Contents
List of Contributors vii
Foreword ixAlvin I. Goldman
Preface x
Part I Reliabilism, Internalism, and Externalism 1
1 Internalism, Reliabilism, and Deontology 3Michael Williams
Reply to Michael Williams
2 Goldman against Internalism 22Laurence BonJour
Reply to BonJour
3 Historical versus Current Time Slice Theories in Epistemology 43Thomas Kelly
Reply to Kelly
4 The Justification of Memory Beliefs: Evidentialism, Reliabilism, Conservatism 69Matthew McGrath
Reply to McGrath
5 Unreliable Testimony 88Elizabeth Fricker
Reply to Fricker
Part II Epistemological Trouble-Shooting and Social Epistemology 125
6 Process Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology 127Ernest Sosa
Reply to Sosa
7 Goldman on Evidence and Reliability 149Jack C. Lyons
Reply to Lyons
8 A Naturalistic Approach to the Generality Problem 178Erik J. Olsson
Reply to Olsson
9 Veritism and Epistemic Value 200Duncan Pritchard
Reply to Pritchard
10 The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Voter-Specific Truth 219Christian List and Kai Spiekermann
Reply to List and Spiekermann
Part III Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, and Metaphysics 235
11 Knowledge and Reliability 237Jennifer Nagel
Reply to Nagel
12 Goldman on Knowledge of Mind 259Christopher S. Hill
Reply to Hill
13 Under Influence: Is Altercentric Bias Compatible with Simulation Theory? 280Frédérique de Vignemont and Hugo Mercier
Reply to Vignemont and Mercier
14 Finding the Body in the Brain: From Simulation Theory to Embodied Simulation 297Vittorio Gallese
Reply to Gallese
15 Embodiment in Perception: Will We Know It When We See It? 318Chaz Firestone
Reply to Firestone
16 Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking 337Jonathan Schaffer
Reply to Schaffer
Appendix: Alvin Goldman’s Publications 369
Index 379