Fukuyama’s concept of the End of History has been one of the most widely debated theories of international politics since the end of the Cold War. This book discusses Fukuyama’s claim that liberal democracy alone is able to satisfy the human aspiration for freedom and dignity, and explores the way in which his thinking is part of a philosophical tradition which includes Kant, Hegel and Marx. Two new chapters in this second edition discuss the ways in which Fukuyama’s thinking has developed – they include his celebrated and controversial criticism of neoconservatism and his complex intellectual relationship to Samuel Huntington, whose Clash of Civilization thesis he rejects but whose notion of political decay is central to his more recent work. The authors here argue that Fukuyama’s continuing fundamental contributions to debates concerning the spread of democracy and threat of global terror mark him out as one of the most important thinkers of the twenty-first century.
Fukuyama’s concept of the End of History has been one of the most widely debated theories of international politics since the end of the Cold War. This book discusses Fukuyama’s claim that liberal democracy alone is able to satisfy the human aspiration for freedom and dignity, and explores the way in which his thinking is part of a philosophical tradition which includes Kant, Hegel and Marx. Two new chapters in this second edition discuss the ways in which Fukuyama’s thinking has developed – they include his celebrated and controversial criticism of neoconservatism and his complex intellectual relationship to Samuel Huntington, whose Clash of Civilization thesis he rejects but whose notion of political decay is central to his more recent work. The authors here argue that Fukuyama’s continuing fundamental contributions to debates concerning the spread of democracy and threat of global terror mark him out as one of the most important thinkers of the twenty-first century.
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Fukuyama’s concept of the End of History has been one of the most widely debated theories of international politics since the end of the Cold War. This book discusses Fukuyama’s claim that liberal democracy alone is able to satisfy the human aspiration for freedom and dignity, and explores the way in which his thinking is part of a philosophical tradition which includes Kant, Hegel and Marx. Two new chapters in this second edition discuss the ways in which Fukuyama’s thinking has developed – they include his celebrated and controversial criticism of neoconservatism and his complex intellectual relationship to Samuel Huntington, whose Clash of Civilization thesis he rejects but whose notion of political decay is central to his more recent work. The authors here argue that Fukuyama’s continuing fundamental contributions to debates concerning the spread of democracy and threat of global terror mark him out as one of the most important thinkers of the twenty-first century.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781783168781 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | University of Wales Press |
| Publication date: | 07/20/2016 |
| Series: | Political Philosophy Now |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 288 |
| File size: | 580 KB |
About the Author
E.Gwynn Mathews has taught philosophy in the Department of Lifelong Learning and also lectured in philosophy of religion in the School of Theology and Religious Studies at the University of Wales, Bangor.
David Sullivan is former head of the School of Lifelong Learning and a senior lecturer in the School of Philosophy and Religion at Bangor University.
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Francis Fukuyama and the End of History
By Howard Williams, David Sullivan, E. Gwynn Matthews
University of Wales Press
Copyright © 2016 Howard Williams, David Sullivan and E. Gwynn MatthewsAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-78316-878-1
CHAPTER 1
Kant: History and the Moral Imperative
Introduction: the nine propositions
Kant is one of the first modern philosophers for whom the idea of the end of history has a central place in an account of history and society. This, along with Kant's enormous influence in the development of modern philosophy generally, is a prime reason for beginning our discussion with him. Yet as soon as we begin to examine his use of the term 'the end of history' we find an important ambiguity within it. In English, the notion of the end of history is frequently used to refer to the idea of the completion of history, or of history coming to a close. This is the sense in which it is most often used in the current debate, and many commentators on Fukuyama write as if this were the only significant way in which the term can be used. There is, though, a very important second sense which the term can have. This speaks about the end of history in terms of purpose, of a significance which is immanent in the process of history and which enables human beings to find a meaning in their lives as they experience them in the present, without the necessity of waiting for an ideal future. For Kant, it is this second sense which is most important. He thinks it an open question whether or not history, in the sense of the temporal progress of human life, will ever come to an end. Indeed he claims that this question cannot be decided either by science or metaphysical speculation. However, he is in no doubt that in moral terms, or more broadly still in aesthetic terms, the actions of men within history can be made purposeful. We cannot claim empirically to have any certainty that history is developing towards a just society, but as rational, morally active beings we ought to act as if it is, and in acting this way we may well help to bring it about.
Kant deals with the idea of the end of history in a number of his shorter writings. Perhaps the most important of these are the essay completed in 1784 on the 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', and the best-known of his political writings, Perpetual Peace, published in 1795. He also entered into a controversy with his former pupil Herder on the nature of history, and wrote two significant reviews of Herder's book Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind. Finally, Kant also deals with history in a systematic way in his Critique of Judgement published in 1790, and his final discussion, which clarifies some of his earlier views, is found in The Contest of the Faculties published in 1797.
Kant uses the essay on the 'Idea for a Universal History' to put forward nine propositions about the nature and objective of human history. These nine propositions, translated afresh for this book, are:
1. All the natural dispositions of a creature are destined to evolve completely and in accord with their purpose.
2. With the human individual (as the only rational creature on earth) those natural capacities which are intended for the use of his reason are to be fully developed in the race, and not in the individual.
3. Nature has wished that the human being should produce from himself everything that goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should enjoy no other happiness or perfection than that which he himself, independently of instinct, has created by his own reason.
4. The means employed by nature to bring about the development of all the capacities of human individuals is their antagonism in society in so far as this is, ultimately, the cause of a lawful order among men.
5. The greatest problem for the human species, to the solution of which nature drives the species, is the achievement of a universal civil society administering law.
6. This problem is the most difficult one, and the one which will be solved last by the human species. A human being is an animal who when he lives among his own species requires a master. But where does he get this master? From nowhere else other than the human species. Yet this master is just as much an animal who requires a master.
7. The problem of establishing a perfect civic constitution is dependent on the problem of a lawful external relation among states, and cannot be solved without a solution to the latter problem.
8. The history of the human species can be seen in the large as the realization of nature's secret plan to produce an internally, and also – for this purpose – externally perfectly constituted state as the only condition in which the capacities of mankind can be fully developed.
9. A philosophical attempt to work out a universal world history according to a plan of nature directed at achieving the civic union of the human species must be regarded as possible and, indeed, as furthering this intention of nature.
The nine propositions examined
It can be seen from these nine propositions that not only does Kant have very high expectations of world history, but he also has high expectations of the philosophy of history. The grounds for these high expectations are to be found in Kant's philosophy as a whole. In his general philosophy, particularly his moral and religious philosophy, Kant takes a dualistic view of the human individual whom he sees as divided between an empirical or natural part and an intellectual or intelligent part. In a sense this is the classical division between body and mind, or spirit and flesh. Yet Kant does not see this as an insoluble antagonism. He thinks body and mind can be mediated from both the standpoint of matter and the standpoint of intellect. However, this will not be an immediate process. We cannot simply bring nature and mind into harmony with each other; it is a process of mediation which will take place over time. The demands of our intelligent side and the demands of our instinctual side can be reconciled only through a process of development. This is the process of human evolution in which our talents and abilities improve from one generation to another. But this conflict between body and mind, nature and reason is not from Kant's point of view an unproductive or negative one. Indeed it is through the conflict between intellect and nature that the human individual is gradually civilized. In battling with our natural, instinctual side in our relations with others, we slowly develop the skills with which to live in peace and harmony.
The nine propositions which Kant puts forward in the idea for universal history move out from the individual to the nation and the international situation, and then back to the individual in the form of the philosopher of history. The first proposition claims that no individual on his own can fully realize the ends of history, and the second proposition argues that this naturally can only be achieved by the species as a whole. The third thesis emphasizes that this process of development of the species is not going to be an easy one. Indeed, it stresses the extent to which it will demand effort from the human individual.
Nature does nothing in vain, and in the use of a means to a goal she is not prodigal. Her giving to man reason and freedom of will which depends upon it is a clear indication of her purpose. Man accordingly was not to be guided by instinct, nor nurtured and instructed with ready made knowledge; rather, he should bring forth everything out of his own resources.
The first proposition seeks to demonstrate the extent to which man's powers are not only in conflict with nature but also in conflict with other men. According to Kant the human individual is an asocial, sociable individual.
Man has an inclination to associate with others, because in society he feels himself to be more than a man (i.e. as more than the developed form of his natural capacities). But he also has a strong propensity to isolate himself from others, because he finds in himself at the same time the unsocial characteristics of wishing to have everything go according to his own wish.
This associability is both good and bad. It is bad in the sense that it prevents individuals from getting along with others, but it is good in the sense that it forces individuals to develop their own powers and abilities. The fifth proposition argues that this asocial sociability is best harnessed within a developed civil society, which for Kant means a society with laws enforced by a republican constitution.
But the problem of creating a perfectly just republican constitution is a very difficult one for a society to master. It is, indeed, a difficult one for the human race as a whole and Kant goes so far as to claim that it is the most difficult problem which humanity has to resolve. So the sixth proposition is concerned with the resolution of the problem proposed by the fifth, that is how in fact is it possible to create a society where individuals live under law? Kant thinks that this can only be achieved by human individuals first acquiring a master. We have to move from submission to a master to the creation of a civic and just constitution. We cannot expect a just constitution to evolve from the people themselves; it has to be gradually imposed upon them, perhaps partly by their own wish and partly against their wishes. The seventh thesis or proposition deals with the same problem, because Kant believes that the creation of a perfect civic constitution is not possible in isolation. One state on its own cannot hope to create a perfect civic constitution. The condition of international society for Kant mirrors that of individuals without the rule of law. They live in an antagonistic relationship with one another, and this means that a proper peaceful civic constitution is difficult to realize. The insecurity of nations threatens domestic law. This means for Kant that the legitimate domestic authority of a state cannot be achieved without there first of all being a settled and peaceful international order.
For Kant, the problem of war and the problem of domestic politics are intertwined. There is no solution to the difficulties of internal politics without there first of all being a resolution to the problems of war itself. This brings us to a crucial passage in Kant's essay on the 'Idea for a Universal History':
All wars are accordingly so many attempts (not indeed in the intention of man, but in the intention of nature) to establish new relations among states, and through the destruction or at least the dismemberment of the old to create new political bodies, which, again, either internally or externally, cannot maintain themselves and which must in turn suffer similar revolutions; until finally, partly through the best civic constitution and partly through common agreement and legislation in external affairs, a state is created which, similar to a civic commonwealth, can like an automatic machine maintain itself.
Kant here sets an extraordinarily ambitious agenda for history. Not only has history to bring to an end the divisive problems of domestic society; it has also to bring to an end the principal conflicts of international society. Kant does not see these as utopian goals – rather they are the goals which it is necessary to achieve in order for conventional or normal human society ultimately to proceed. Human individuals have to learn virtue if they are to live in peace and harmony with one another, and if they do not do it of their own natural inclination they will be brought to do it by development of human society. As Kant sees it, both the tendencies of the empirical world and those of the intelligible (or intellectual) world press in the same direction.
This brings us to Kant's eighth proposition which sees human history as a realization of a secret plan by nature to bring forth a perfectly constituted state. The disorder of international society has severe lessons to teach the human race. First of all it teaches us the futility of war itself. War brings with it such human suffering and loss of revenue and income that those who are engaged in it at present will, from their own experience, conclude that it was an unwise undertaking. As Kant puts it, 'in the end, war itself will be seen as not only so artificial, in outcome so uncertain for both sides, in after effects so painful in form of an ever growing war debt (a new invention) that cannot be met, that it will be regarded as a most dubious undertaking.' Crucially, the ninth proposition recognizes that we cannot expect to have this process occur automatically. Philosophers will have to make human beings aware of the shortcomings and the folly of war. At a factual level the relations among states will never cease to be ones of conflict and war unless the moral consciousness is awakened in us that this is a mistaken state of affairs. This is where the philosopher of history and the conception of an end of history can play a significant role. In the ebb and flow of day-to-day events the philosopher can possibly discover a tendency towards improvement. It is the task of the philosopher to point out this tendency and to encourage the political leaders and citizens to work with it rather than against it. Kant's argument is that necessity forces mankind to seek to remove war from the scene. However, the process of removing war from the scene can be greatly accelerated if humankind becomes conscious of the need to take steps in that direction. So Kant sees a harmony of purposes between the necessary development of human and international society and the role the philosopher can play. The philosopher can map out those steps towards improvement which are already occurring and possibly accelerate the process. There is no end to history in the temporal sense: humankind can continue to struggle with itself to produce wars and lead itself to the brink of disaster. However, there is an end to history from the philosophical or moral point of view in that humankind can become gradually sufficiently prudent and rational to avoid the consequences of its own shortcomings of character and behaviour.
Kant's view of history questioned
This philosophical sketch of the development of history raises some important questions. Kant's stress upon the need first of all to establish firm and lasting peaceful international relations before then turning to the domestic situation is highly problematic. To begin with, it seems to take away from the individual responsibility for bringing about progressive change in human life. Kant appears to overlook the contribution that good citizenship might play in bringing about the process he seeks to achieve. It is as if he believes that individuals within states cannot be trusted to work for a sensible civic constitution and that they have to wait upon international events before this goal can be achieved. But what if international events are always negative and prevent a favourable state of affairs coming into being? Are then citizens impotent in the face of such hostile conditions? There is a gap in Kant's reasoning here, but it is a gap which is partially filled by the later (1795) essay on Perpetual Peace. In this essay, Kant puts more emphasis on the role that states themselves can play in the development of world harmony. The first definitive article of the essay on perpetual peace requires states to bring about republican constitutions. A republican constitution for Kant is founded upon three principles: 'firstly, the principle of freedom for all members of a society (as human beings); secondly, the principle of the dependence of everyone on a single common legislation (as subjects); and thirdly, the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)'. In the essay on Perpetual Peace Kant seems to envisage progress occurring both at the level of the state and at the international level among states. This is a more hopeful prospect from the standpoint of individual citizens. By working towards a republican constitution within their states they can contribute to the gradual development of a peaceful world situation. And outside the state their leaders can work towards a worldwide civil society.
The other question that the idea for universal history raises is: How is it possible for international progress to be achieved? The essay on the idea of universal history seems to rely too much upon the accidental and the contingent – what Kant calls nature. Kant impresses upon his readers in the essay the dangers brought about by war and suggests that insecurity itself may lead to the development of a peaceful international order. But this does not seem to us to be sufficient. If excessive insecurity were all that was needed, then peace may well already have been instituted. Kant has to find some other mechanisms to lead to a more peaceful international order. These are nowhere to be found in the 'Idea for a Universal History', but the essay on Perpetual Peace seeks to fill the gap. Here we have the notion of improved civil states which are able to set an example for other states to follow. Kant sees this as coming about through a loose federation of states which have republican constitutions or are developing them. In such a loose federation some states which are already well towards developing the perfect constitution can set an example. Kant may have hoped that the United States and France, with their constitutions based upon popular sovereignty, would help to set the tone for such a development.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Francis Fukuyama and the End of History by Howard Williams, David Sullivan, E. Gwynn Matthews. Copyright © 2016 Howard Williams, David Sullivan and E. Gwynn Matthews. Excerpted by permission of University of Wales Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Foreword by Series Editor to the Second Edition, vii,Preface to the Second Edition, ix,
Introduction, 1,
1 Kant: History and the Moral Imperative, 7,
2 Hegel: Spirit and State, 26,
3 Marx: Communism and the End of Prehistory, 53,
4 Fukuyama I: Reinventing Optimism, 70,
5 Fukuyama II: Recognition and Liberal Democracy, 87,
6 Fukuyama III: International Dimensions, 112,
7 Popper: A Liberal Critic of the End of History, 128,
8 Religion and the End of History, 150,
9 Rewriting Modernity: History, Progress and Identity, 165,
10 Fukuyama After the End of History, 184,
11 Philosophies of History, 215,
Notes, 235,
Bibliography, 253,
Index, 261,
What People are Saying About This
“This engaging second edition-which includes new material—contextualizes Fukuyama within the broader trends of ‘the philosophy of history,’ including such seminal giants in the field as Kant, Hegel, and Marx. The authors argue clearly and insightfully in favour of Fukuyama’s relevance—perhaps under-appreciated in the academy—as well as for the timeliness of his ideas. The new material features Fukuyama’s contributions over the past decade, moving from ‘the end of history’ and debates over ‘the clash of civilizations’ towards present-day concerns with the complex ingredients of nation-building and the unsure fate of liberal-democratic values.”