Table of Contents
Preface iii
Figures ix
Tables xi
Summary xiii
Acknowledgments xix
Glossary xxi
Introduction 1
What Drives al Qaeda's Choice of Targets? 5
The al Qaeda Targeting Process: Four Hypotheses 8
The Coercion Hypothesis 9
The Damage Hypothesis 11
The Rally Hypothesis 12
The Franchise Hypothesis 14
Some Observations on Rationality 18
Alternatives to Rational Action 19
Organization 21
Hypothesis Testing: Quantitative and Qualitative Measures 24
Measuring Intent 24
Quantitative Measures 25
Qualitative Measures 25
Modeling Intent 26
Coercion 26
Damage 29
Rally 30
Franchise 31
Testing Hypotheses Against Past Attacks 32
World Trade Center (WTC), New York, 1993 34
Khobar Towers, Riyadh, 1996 35
East Africa Embassy Bombings, Nairobi and Dar Es Salam, 1998 36
USS Cole, Yemen, 2000 37
WTC, New York, and Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia, 2001 37
Bali, 2002 39
Djerba, 2002 40
MV Limburg, Yemen, 2002 40
Mombasa, 2002 41
Casablanca, 2003 42
Istanbul, 2003 43
Madrid, 2004 43
Riyadh, 2004 44
Hilton Hotel, Taba, Egypt, 2004 45
Hypothesis Testing: Al Qaeda Statements and Expert Observations 49
Al Qaeda's Reading of History Suggests the Leverage of Terrorism 49
The Coercion Hypothesis 52
The Damage Hypothesis 57
The Rally Hypothesis 61
The Franchise Hypothesis 66
Conclusions 71
Ramifications for al Qaeda Attack Planning in the United States 73
Coercion 74
Soft Targets 74
Categorizing Potential Attacks 80
Damage 81
Radiological Releases 82
Biological Attacks on Agriculture 84
Categorizing Potential Attacks 86
Rally 86
Suicide Terrorism 87
Categorizing Potential Attacks 91
Franchise 91
Is the United States Off the Target List for the Time Being? 92
Conclusions 93
Bibliography 95
