Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action

by Joseph Raz

Overview

Engaging Reason offers a penetrating examination of a set of fundamental questions about human thought and action. In these tightly argued and interconnected essays Joseph Raz examines the nature of normativity, reason, and the will; the justification of reason; and the objectivity of value. He argues for the centrality, but also demonstrates the limits, of reason in action and belief. He suggests that our life is most truly our own when our various emotions, hopes, desires, intentions, and actions are guided by reason. He explores the universality of value and of principles of reason on one side, and on the other side their dependence on social practices, and their susceptibility to change and improvement. He concludes with an illuminating explanation of self-interest and its relation to impersonal values in general and to morality in particular. Joseph Raz has been since the 1970s a prominent, original, and widely admired contributor to the study of norms, values, and reasons, not just in philosophy but in political and legal theory. This volume displays the power and unity of his thought on these subjects, and will be essential reading for all who work on them.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780191519383
Publisher:	OUP Oxford
Publication date:	01/13/2000
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
File size:	486 KB

About the Author

Joseph Raz is Professor of the Philosophy of Law at the University of Oxford; and Visiting Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia University, New York. Before becoming a Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, in 1972 he was Senior Lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and an honorary foreign member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has been a visiting professor at Rockefeller University, the Australian National University, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Toronto, the University of Southern California, Yale Law School, and the University of Michigan, and a Visiting Mellon Fellow at Princeton University

Table of Contents

	Introduction	1
1.	When We are Ourselves	5
2.	Agency, Reason, and the Good	22
3.	Incommensurability and Agency	46
4.	Explaining Normativity: On Rationality and the Justification of Reason	67
5.	Explaining Normativity: Reason and the Will	90
6.	Notes on Value and Objectivity	118
7.	Moral Change and Social Relativism	161
8.	Mixing Values	182
9.	The Value of Practice	202
10.	The Truth in Particularism	218
11.	On the Moral Point of View	247
12.	The Amoralist	273
13.	The Central Conflict: Morality and Self-Interest	303
	Index	333