Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe

by Stephen E. Ambrose

Overview

In the final months of World War II, with the Allied forces streaming into Germany on two fronts, a major decision had to be made: where to draw a stop line to prevent an accidental clash between the Russian and the Anglo-American armies.

Behind this decision lay another. Whose forces would be the first to reach Berlin? General Dwight David Eisenhower, supreme commander of the British and American armies, chose to halt at the Elbe River and leave Berlin to the Red Army. Could he have beaten the Russians to Berlin? If so, why didn't he? If he had, would the Berlin question have arisen? Would Germany have been divided as it was? Would the Cold War have assumed a direction more favorable to the West? In a narrative of steady fascination, Stephen E. Ambrose describes both the political and the military aspects of the situation, sketches the key players, explains the alternatives, and considers the results. The result is a sharply focused light on an important question of the postwar world. This paperback edition features a new introduction by the author.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780393320107
Publisher:	Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc.
Publication date:	05/17/2000
Series:	Norton Essays in American History Series
Edition description:	NORTON TRA
Pages:	122
Product dimensions:	5.50(w) x 8.30(h) x 0.40(d)

About the Author

The distinguished historian Stephen E. Ambrose is the author of several best-selling books on World War II and was an editor of the Eisenhower Papers.

Date of Birth:

January 10, 1936

Date of Death:

October 13, 2002

Place of Birth:

Whitewater, Wisconsin

Place of Death:

Bay St. Louis, Mississippi

Education:

B.A., University of Wisconsin; M.A., Louisiana State University, 1958; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1963

Table of Contents

	Introduction to the Paperback Edition	5
	Foreword	11
1	The Position, March 7, 1945	17
2	The Creation of the Zones	35
3	Eisenhower's Superiors and His Telegram to Stalin	47
4	The Military Situation and the Basis for Decision	66
5	Could Eisenhower Have Taken Berlin?	88
Appendix A	The Telegrams	99
Appendix B	Eisenhower's Directive	105
	A Note on Sources	107
	Index	113
	Maps
	The Position March 7, 1945	16
	Zones of Occupation	36
	The Position April 4, 1945	91
	The Position April 16, 1945	95