Duns Scotus on Time and Existence: The Questions on 'De Interpretatione'

by Buckner Edward (Editor), Zupko Jack (Editor)

Overview

Translated, with Introduction and Commentary, by Edward Buckner and Jack Zupko

Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) is one of a handful of figures in the history of philosophy whose significance is truly difficult to overestimate. Despite an academic career that lasted barely two decades, and numerous writings left in various states of incompletion at his death, his thought has been profoundly influential in the history of western philosophy.
The Questions on Aristotle's 'De interpretatione' is an early work, probably written at Oxford in the closing decade of the thirteenth century. The questions, which have come down to us in two sets ('Opus I' and 'Opus II'), most likely originated from Scotus's classroom lectures on Aristotle's text, a work now known by its Latin name, De interpretatione.

The De interpretatione (or Perihermenias in the original Greek) was understood in the medieval university as a work of dialectic or logic, although the text itself deals with subjects we would nowadays consider to belong to the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of language: the semantics of time, existence, modality, and quantification. At its heart is the important and still philosophically relevant question of how we can talk about things which no longer exist, or which do not yet exist. The topics covered include reference and signification; existence and essence; truth and its relation to things. What is the relationship between existence in reality and existence in the understanding? Does the meaning of a name depend on the existence of the objects falling under it? Is the present time all that exists? If a proposition about the future can be true now, what now makes it true?

The English translation includes an extensive commentary explaining and elaborating on some of the more difficult ideas Scotus develops in the work, placing them in the context of the teaching of logic and metaphysics in late-thirteenth century Europe.

ABOUT THE TRANSLATORS

Edward Buckner is an independent scholar. Jack Zupko is at the University of Alberta, Canada.

PRAISE FOR THE BOOK

"An extremely significant contribution to the study of Scotus, and, in particular, to the background concepts/sources for some of his more important philosophical positions." —Mary Beth Ingham, Franciscan School of Philosophy, Berkeley

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780813226033
Publisher:	The Catholic University of America Press
Publication date:	09/09/2014
Pages:	376
Product dimensions:	6.20(w) x 9.20(h) x 1.10(d)

About the Author

Jack Zupko is at the University of Alberta, Canada

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Abbreviations xi

Introduction 1

Translation

Opus I 25

Question 1 What Is the Subject of On Interpretation? 25

Question 2 Do Names Signify Things, or Species in the Mind? 28

Question 3 Does a Change Occur in the Signification of an Utterance Given That a Change Has Occurred in the Thing Signifies? 39

Question 4 Does Aristotle Designate an Appropriate Difference between Inscriptions and Utterances, and Affections and Things? 43

Question 5 Is a Common Term Said Univocally of Existing Things and Non-Existing Things? 45

Question 6 Are There Any Supposita Belonging Simpliciter to a Common Term Signifying a True Nature, apart from Things That Exist? 47

Question 7 Are the Propositions 'Caesar is a man' and 'Caesar is an animal' True When Caesar Does Not Exist? 49

Question 8 Are the Propositions 'A man is a man' and ' Caesar is Caesar' True When Neither of Them Exists? 52

Question 9 Does a Common Term Suppositing with a Present-Tense Verb Supposit Only for Presently Existing Things? 67

Question 10 In a Past-Tense Proposition, Does the Subject Stand Only for Things That Were, and in a Future-Tense Proposition, Only for Things That Will Be? 70

Question 11 Is a Common Term Distributed for Any of Its Supposita Simpliciter in Every Proposition in Which Some Immediate Contracting Term Is Not Added to It? 71

Question 12 Is 'Caesar is a man' True When Caesar Does Not Exist? 83

Question 13 Can a Common Term Be Restricted? 87

Opus II Questions on the Two Books of Perihermenias: On Book I 96

Prologue 96

Question 1 Does a Name Signify a Thing or an Affection? 98

Question 2 Does a Name Signify a Thing Univocally When the Thing Is Existing and When It Is Not? 106

Question 3 Do Truth and Falsity Only Concern Composition and Division? 110

Question 4 Does an Indefinite Name Posit Something, Such That the Predication of the Being of That Thing Is Required? 113

Question 5 Is the Verb 'Is' Only a Copula of the Predicate with the Subject? 119

Question 6 Is a Present-Tense Verb a Copula for the Present 'Now' or Indifferently for Anything Present? 121

Question 7 Is a Proposition about the Future Determinately True or False? 131

Question 8 Is 'a will be' Now Determinately True? 132

Question 9 Is It Possible 'That Neither Part of a Contradiction Is True? 133

Opus II Questions on the Two Books of Perihermenias: On Book II 142

Question 1 Does an Indefinite Verb Remain Indefinite in a Sentence? 142

Question 2 Does 'This is not just; therefore, this is non-just' Follow? 147

Question 3 Does a Consequence of This Sort Hold for Relational Terms? 149

Question 4 [Does a Consequence of This Sort] Hold with Past-Tense Verbs: First, Would 'It was non-white; therefore, it was not white' Follow? 149

Question 5 Conversely, [Does a Consequence of This Sort] Follow, Assuming the Constant Existence of the Subject? 150

Question 6 Is 'A white man runs' One? 153

Question 7 Is 'A white thing is musical' One? 155

Question 8 Is 'A white man is a musical man' One? 156

Question 9 Is 'A man, who is white, runs' One? 157

Commentary

Opus I 169

Question 1 What Is the Subject of On Interpretation? 169

Question 2 Do Names Signify Things, or Species in the Mind? 172

Question 3 Does a Change Occur in the Signification of an Utterance Given That a Change Has Occurred in the Thing Signified? 187

Question 4 Does Aristotle Designate a Proper Difference between Inscriptions and Utterances, and Affections and Things? 194

Question 5-8 Summary Outline 197

Question 5 Is a Common Term Said Univocally of Existing Things and Non-Existing Things? 197

Question 6 Are There Any Supposita Belonging Simpliciter to a Common Term Signifying a True Nature, apart from Things That Exist? 202

Question 7 Are the Propositions 'Caesar is a man' and 'Caesar is an animal' True When Caesar Does Not Exist? 206

Question 8 Are the Propositions 'A man is a man' and 'Caesar is Caesar' True When Neither or Them Exists? 213

Question 9-11 Summary Outline 230

Question 9 Does a Common Term Suppositing with a Present-Tense Verb Supposit Only for Presently Existing Things? 231

Question 10 In a Past-Tense Proposition, Does the Subject Stand Only for Things That Were, and in a Future-Tense Proposition, Only for Things That Will Be? 238

Question 11 Is a Common Term Distributed for Any of Its Supposita Without Qualification in Every Proposition in Which Some Immediate Contracting Term Is Not Added to It? 241

Question 12 Is 'Caesar is a man' True When Caesar Does Not Exist? 254

Question 13 Can a Common Term Be Restricted? 260

Opus II Questions on the Two Books of Perhermenoas: On Book I 274

Prologue 274

Question 1 Does a Name Signify a Thing or an Affection? 276

Question 2 Does a Name Signify a Thing Univocally When the Thing Is Existing and When It Is Not? 283

Question 3 Do Truth and Falsity Only Concern Composition and Division? 288

Question 4 Does an Indefinite Name Posit Something, Such That the Predication of the Being of That Thing Is Required? 292

Question 5 Is the Verb 'Is' Only a Copula of the Predicate with the Subject? 299

Question 6 Is a Present-Tense Verb a Copula for the Present 'Now', or Indifferently, for Anythhing Present? 302

Question 7-9 Future Propositions and Truth 317

Question 7 Is a Proposition about the Future Determinately True or False? 320

Question 8 Is 'A will be' Now Determinately True? 321

Question 9 Is It Possible That Neither Part of a Contradiction Is True? 323

Opus II Questions on the Two Books of Perihermenias: On Book II 331

Question 1 Does an Indefinite Verb Remain Indefinite in a Sentence? 331

Question 2-5 On Inferential Relations between Propositions Containing Definite versus Indefinite Terms 335

Question 2 Does 'This is not just; therefore, this is non-just' Follow? 340

Question 3 Does a Consequence of This Sort Hold for Relational Terms 343

Question 4 [Does a Consequence of This Sort] Hold with Past-Tense Verbs: First, Would 'It was non-white; therefore, it was not white' Follow? 344

Question 5 Conversely, [Does a Consequence of This Sort] Follow, Assuming the Constant Existence of the Subject? 345

Question 6-9 The Unity and Complexity of Propositions 349

Question 6 Is 'A white man runs' One? 350

Question 7 Is 'A white thing is musical' One? 352

Question 8 Is 'A white man is a musical man' One? 353

Question 9 Is 'A man, who is white, runs' One? 354

Bibliography 365

Index of Names 377

General Index 381