In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of “two plus four” talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power.
Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.
In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of “two plus four” talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power.
Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.
Detente in Europe: The Soviet Union & The West Since 1953
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In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of “two plus four” talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power.
Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780822378488 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Duke University Press |
| Publication date: | 10/01/2012 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 510 |
| File size: | 702 KB |
Read an Excerpt
Détente in Europe
The Soviet Union and the West since 1953
By John Van Oudenaren
Duke University Press
Copyright © 1991 Duke University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8223-7848-8
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Soviet and Western scholars generally agree that the most intense phase of the cold war began in the late 1940s and lasted until Stalin's death in early 1953. This period was followed by a change in East-West relations that has been described as a thaw, relaxation of tensions, or détente. It did not eliminate the fundamental causes of hostility between East and West, and was in any case partly reversed by the Hungarian and Suez crises in the fall of 1956. Nonetheless, it set in motion a process leading to increased political, security, economic, and cultural contacts between the two parts of divided Europe. This book is about that process.
The dramatic developments of recent years—the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the accelerating pace of change in the USSR itself—were both a culmination and a negation of the process that began in the mid-1950s. The contacts that developed between East and West after 1953 no doubt helped to generate the pressures for change that led to the revolutions of 1989. Indeed, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's most reform-minded adviser, former Presidential Council and Politburo member Aleksandr Iakovlev, was himself a participant in one of the earliest Soviet exchange programs with the West.
At the same time, however, the upheavals of 1989 marked a sharp break with the pattern of East-West relations after 1953 and the beginning, as was generally recognized, of a new era in European history. Before 1989 few Western leaders expected the collapse of communism or the rapid reunification of Germany. Western countries pursued policies of détente precisely because they assumed that cataclysmic change was either unlikely or undesirable, and that the only realistic alternative was to seek gradual improvements in East-West relations and in conditions in the East, chiefly through dialogue and negotiation with the Communist authorities. Groups such as the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) were in fact embarrassed when, after they had spent years developing cordial contacts with the Communists on the assumption that they alone could change the system, power passed overnight to a group of virtually unknown dissidents.
Whatever miscalculations there were on the Western side (and clearly there were many, on both the right and the left of the political spectrum), they pale beside those in the USSR, where the political elite utterly misjudged the course of relations with the rest of Europe. In the 1970s Leonid Brezhnev declared that socialism was "irreversible" and that the German question was irrevocably "closed." He also suggested that détente would strengthen communism in the East, even as it encouraged "progressive" changes in the West. Gorbachev had a more realistic view of Soviet prospects in Europe, but he too underestimated the pressures for change and the vulnerability of Communist regimes. As recently as June 1989 he was telling West German audiences that "history" would decide the ultimate fate of the German nation, but that for the present the main practical task was to join with the Soviet Union in building the "common European home."
From the perspective of the 1990s there are two reasons why the study of détente after 1953 is important. The first is to contribute to what promises to be an ongoing discussion about the relationship between it and the revolutionary developments of 1989 and beyond. Some aspects of détente no doubt helped to "subvert" the Communist system (or, to put it differently, to convince a new Soviet leadership that what previous leaders had defined as "subversion" was precisely what the system needed). But other aspects may have helped to maintain the status quo for longer than might otherwise have been the case. This, at any rate, was the accusation leveled by critics against the SPD and others. The 1953-89 period thus is certain to merit ongoing study, as scholars attempt to understand which factors hastened and which might have delayed change in the East.
A second reason to study this period relates to the future. Although the old order was destroyed in 1989, a new order is being built out of institutions and patterns of cooperation that originated in the 1950s and 1960s and flourished in the 1970s and early 1980s. The role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) has been upgraded. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1969 has taken on a new significance with Germany's reunification, as have the military confidence-building agreements of 1975 and 1986, the agreements between the European Community (EC) and the USSR, and many other bilateral and multilateral agreements and institutions that grew out of very different political circumstances but that now are being adapted to the post-postwar situation.
Despite its importance, détente in Europe has not been extensively studied. There are no up-to-date surveys of Soviet-West European relations and few monographs on specific issues, countries, or historical episodes. In any case, much of the existing literature is not about policy but about "views," "images," or "perceptions," particularly on the Soviet side. The book thus attempts to fill a gap in the literature. It concentrates on the policies of the Soviet and to some extent Western governments, as well as deals with political parties, churches, trade unions, and other nongovernmental organizations active in international affairs. It stresses the interactive character of East-West relations, showing how relations gradually developed after 1953, how ideological, political, and other barriers set limits to their development, and how such factors as the Berlin crisis, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the missile controversy of the early 1980s affected the development of relations. It draws upon a variety of Soviet and Western sources, but especially the texts of agreements and accounts of how they were negotiated. It uses but does not rely heavily on the writings of Soviet institute researchers and political commentators.
The book deals primarily with Soviet-West European relations, with the U.S. role discussed where it is especially relevant, as in the chapters on four-power negotiations and arms control. Eastern Europe is discussed in contexts where it played a unique or pioneering role, but in general it is assumed that the foreign policies of the East European countries paralleled those of the USSR (internally, of course, developments in Eastern Europe were distinctive, but that is an altogether different subject).
Although the book is not intended to be an original contribution to international relations theory, it argues that détente after 1953 should be thought of not as a "code of conduct" or "rules of the game" (as is often done in the U.S. social science literature) but should be seen as an ongoing process governed by negotiated mandates and giving rise to permanent institutions. The role of process, mandates, and institutions is discussed in general terms in chapter two and demonstrated by example in subsequent chapters.
The organization of the book is as follows. Chapter two examines the legacy of the late Stalin period and the transition to détente after Stalin's death. It focuses on the two most important East-West institutions of the period, the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) and the United Nations Organization (UN) and their complete or partial breakdown in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Chapter three focuses on the partial revival, at the Berlin Conference of 1954 and the Geneva summit of 1955, of the four-power process that was mandated in the Potsdam agreement. It shows how this revival failed to result in progress toward German reunification (although it did produce the Austrian State Treaty), but helped to launch, in accordance with the "spirit of Geneva," improved bilateral relations and expanded political, economic, and cultural contact. This chapter also discusses the residual role of four-power rights and responsibilities after 1955 and the unexpected revival (in the form of the "two plus four" talks) of four-power negotiations in early 1990 following the collapse of the East German state.
Chapters four to nine document the post-1953 development of Soviet-West European relations in different spheres. Chapter four deals with three levels of diplomacy: summits and other high-level meetings, political consultations between foreign ministries, and regular contact through embassies and diplomatic channels. Chapter five examines parliamentary visits and exchanges, cooperation between political parties, and trade union ties. Chapter six discusses three areas of arms control: nuclear, conventional, and confidence-building. Chapter seven outlines the development of bilateral and multilateral economic institutions. Chapter eight deals with cultural exchange, contacts between churches, and contacts between the Soviet and West European peace movements. Chapter nine examines CSCE and the "all European process" from its origins in the 1950s to its new role in the post-1989 order.
The final chapter deals specifically with the changes in Europe since 1989. It begins with a discussion of the Gorbachev leadership's approach to Europe in 1985-89, describes its efforts to shape change in 1989-90, and concludes with an assessment of the long-term outlook for Russia as a European power.
CHAPTER 2From Stalin to Khrushchev
The Cold War
The history of the cold war in Europe is certain to be rewritten as the newly democratic countries of Eastern Europe open their archives and as conceptual frameworks are adjusted in light of new data and the collapse of communism in 1989. Nonetheless, it is possible, using the best scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s, to draw a reasonably accurate picture of Soviet policy and objectives in the late 1940s to the early 1950s and by implication of the changes that took place after Stalin's death.
In his Russia's Road to the Cold War, Vojtech Mastny showed that Joseph Stalin's wartime objectives were flexible and changed over time. In July 1941, one month after Hitler's attack on Russia, the Soviet government indicated to its British ally that its minimum aims were the retention of those territories gained in collusion with Germany after September 1939. By late 1943 Stalin had raised his expectations to accord with the approaching victory. He seemed to favor the formation of a continental security system in which there would be no sharp division between Communist and non-Communist spheres. Instead, Europe would be a differentiated collection of weak and pliable states stretching from Poland to the Atlantic, all of which would be subject to some degree of Soviet influence.
The attempt to create such a system involved a mix of unilateral actions and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. The Red Army and the Comintern (dissolved in 1943 but in fact continuing to function through the Soviet Communist Party) worked to establish Communist control or influence in various countries, while the Soviet government concluded treaties with Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia that laid the groundwork for a postwar security system in which the Soviet Union would have a significant voice. Stalin sought to gain immediate international recognition of a series of faits accomplis along the USSR's periphery, but to postpone the resolution of most other questions. In this way he could cement his hold on territories of vital interest or where the risks of confrontation were low, while holding open the possibility of future gains in more distant and riskier regions. Thus in 1944 he tried to obtain Charles de Gaulle's recognition of the proto-Communist Lublin Committee and of the future western border of Poland, but refused to come to any understanding on postwar arrangements between France and Germany, which "could be studied only in four-way negotiation."
This flexible approach to European affairs was maintained for as much as two years after the war, as was shown by Charles Gati in his Hungary and the Soviet Bloc. Gati argued the importance of a German and Polish trade-off in Soviet policy of the 1940s. Stalin's minimum and most vital war aims were the tight control of Poland (probably through the imposition of a Soviet-type system) and the extension of control over all or at least a part of Germany. He probably also assumed that Bulgaria and Romania could be transformed into Communist satellites with a minimum of friction between the wartime allies.
Elsewhere, however, Stalin took a more circumspect approach. He saw Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Finland as an intermediate region in which, for both internal and geopolitical reasons, Communist parties would exercise substantial power, but would refrain from immediate takeovers so as not to "scare the Anglo-Saxons." In the rest of Europe Communists would participate in but not dominate ruling coalitions. Eventual Communist seizures of power were not ruled out in such countries as France, Italy, or Greece, but for the moment they were not regarded as desirable. Stalin's objectives thus were both more and less ambitious than was often assumed in traditional and revisionist histories He was in less of a hurry than was sometimes suggested to Sovietize all of what would become known as Eastern Europe, but at the same time he did not preclude Communist expansion in countries that later were unambiguously thought of as part of the West.
The Council of Foreign Ministers and the United Nations
Stalin's flexible approach to the postwar order was reflected in Soviet behavior in the two main East-West institutions to emerge from the war, the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) and the UN. The former was proposed by President Truman at Potsdam and was accepted by Stalin and Churchill with relatively little debate, while the latter was the brainchild of President Roosevelt and figured heavily in the talks at Teheran, Yalta, and other wartime meetings.
As envisioned by Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, the CFM was to be "the continuous meeting ground of the five principal governments, on which to reach common understanding regarding the peace settlement." It was to formalize the procedures that evolved at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, at which the Council of Five had assumed responsibility for drafting the Treaty of Versailles on behalf of all potential signatories. Whereas in Paris the Council of Five met concurrently with the larger peace conference, the CFM was to finish its work before the convening of a conference, and thus avoid the complications arising from the presence of dozens of mostly small countries that had played some role in the war.
The only controversies regarding the CFM concerned its membership and its relationship to a provision in the Yalta agreement stipulating that the British, U.S., and Soviet foreign ministers would meet periodically for consultations. Truman favored making France and China full members of the CFM. Stalin had reservations about the great power status of both countries but went along, as did Churchill, who was skeptical about the role of China. In the end the equality of France and China was purely nominal, however, since the Potsdam agreement stipulated which countries would participate in the drafting of which treaties. There also was some question about whether the CFM would duplicate or supersede the consultation provision in the Yalta agreement. It was decided that the CFM would deal primarily with the conclusion of the peace treaties "and should not be burdened with current problems." In practice, however, the CFM superseded the Yalta arrangement, as only one consultative meeting of the foreign ministers was ever to occur.
The establishment of the other main postwar institution, the UN, was more controversial and required prolonged debate over organization, membership, and rules of procedure. Stalin was determined to secure guarantees that the new organization would not be used against the USSR as the League of Nations had been after the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939. He insisted, therefore, upon a unanimity rule in the Security Council and a limited role for the General Assembly. He also wanted a clear separation between the CFM and the UN. The latter was not to play a role in the peace settlement and its charter was not to qualify the rights of the victors in any way. In addition, the USSR favored a narrowly based organization that would concentrate on security issues and avoid involvement in economic and cultural affairs. Such questions were inseparable from ideology and in the prevailing Soviet view could not be made the basis for cooperation between antagonistic social systems. Therefore, the USSR chose not to participate in the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, and opposed the establishment of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It did not, however, go all out to block the U.S. effort to broaden the UN's range of activities, and by 1946 was itself participating in seven of the twenty-two specialized agencies that were then part of the UN system.
(Continues...)
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Table of Contents
Contents
Preface,Abbreviations,
1 Introduction,
2 From Stalin to Khrushchev,
3 Geneva and the Four-Power Process,
4 Diplomacy,
5 Parliaments, Political Parties, and Trade Unions,
6 Arms Control,
7 Economics,
8 Culture, Churches, and the Peace Movement,
9 CSCE and the "All-European Process",
10 Conclusion,
Appendix,
Notes,
Bibliography,
Index,