Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good

by Sergio Tenenbaum

Overview

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis — the view that desire (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780195382440
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	08/18/2010
Pages:	264
Product dimensions:	6.40(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

Sergio Tenenbaum is Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto.

Table of Contents

1 Introduction Sergio Tenenbaum 3

2 A Partisan's Guide to Socratic Intellectualism Matthew Evans 6

3 Plato on the Desire for the Good Rachel Barney 34

4 Aristotle's Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of the Good Jessica Moss 65

5 Sympathy for the Devil Kieran Setiya 82

6 On the Guise of the Good Joseph Raz 111

7 The Form of the Will Sebastian Rödl 138

8 Goodness and Desire Matthew Boyle Douglas Lavin 161

9 Good and Good For Sergio Tenenbaum 202

10 Aspects, Guises, Species, and Knowing Something to Be Good Philip Clark 234

Contributors 245

Index 247

Editorial Reviews

"The strength of this volume lies in the fact that it varies in the approaches to whether or not desire aims at the good. In this sense it is a collection of papers important both to the history of moral psychology and to moral psychology as such. Although the question whether or not we act always under the guise of good remains still open, the volume is worth reading by anyone interested in philosophical accounts of the relation between human desire and the good." —Bryn Mawr Classical Review

"This is an impressive collection. No one can seriously read the essays in this book without being struck both by the quality of the reflection that went into writing them and the depth and importance of the topic on which they focus." —Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

From the Publisher