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Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture
192
by Nancy Birdsall, John Williamson, Brian Deese (With)
Nancy Birdsall
![Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture](http://img.images-bn.com/static/redesign/srcs/images/grey-box.png?v11.9.4)
Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture
192
by Nancy Birdsall, John Williamson, Brian Deese (With)
Nancy Birdsall
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Overview
This study brings readers up to date on the complicated and controversial subject of debt relief for the poorest countries of the world. What has actually been achieved? Has debt relief provided truly additional resources to fight poverty? How will the design and timing of the "enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative" affect the development prospects of the world's poorest countries and their people? The study then moves on to address several broader policy questions: Is debt relief a step toward more efficient and equitable government spending, building better institutions, and attracting productive private investment in the poorest countries? Who pays for debt relief? Is there a case for further relief? Most important, how can the case for debt relief be sustained in a broader effort to combat poverty in the poorest countries?
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9780881324457 |
---|---|
Publisher: | Peterson Institute for International Economics |
Publication date: | 04/17/2002 |
Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
Format: | eBook |
Pages: | 192 |
File size: | 2 MB |
About the Author
Nancy Birdsall currently serves on the Institute's Board of Directors and is the founding president of the Center for Global Development (CGD) in Washington, DC, USA. She is also the former executive vice-president of the Inter-American Development Bank. She co-founded CGD in November 2001 with C. Fred Bergsten and Edward W. Scott, Jr. Prior to becoming the President of CGD, Birdsall served for three years as Senior Associate and Director of the Economic Reform Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
John Williamson, senior fellow (retired), was associated with the Institute from 1981 to 2012.
Table of Contents
Foreword | ix | |
Preface | xi | |
1 | Introduction | 1 |
Group A versus Group B | 1 | |
Expanding Debt Relief | 4 | |
Reinventing the Aid Architecture | 6 | |
Appendix 1.1 | Ten Questions about Debt and Debt Relief | 8 |
2 | The HIPC Initiative: Background and Critiques | 13 |
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries | 19 | |
Recent Debt Relief Initiatives | 21 | |
The Enhanced HIPC Framework | 26 | |
Critiques of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative | 33 | |
3 | The Case for More | 41 |
Debt Sustainability | 41 | |
The Millennium Development Goals | 44 | |
4 | What Form of More? | 49 |
Political Resonance | 50 | |
Additionality | 55 | |
Redistribution | 61 | |
Efficiency | 66 | |
Country Selectivity | 75 | |
Summary | 78 | |
5 | Deepening and Extending Debt Reduction | 79 |
Deeper Relief | 80 | |
Making More Countries Eligible | 86 | |
A Contingency Facility | 91 | |
Financing More Debt Relief | 93 | |
6 | A New Aid Architecture | 101 |
The HIPC Procedure | 102 | |
Grants, Not Just Loans | 106 | |
Incremental Proposals to Increase Donor Accountability | 108 | |
Donor Incentives for Selectivity | 110 | |
Exploiting Multilateralism: The Common Pool | 113 | |
Sovereign Debt: Building on the HIPC Initiative | 114 | |
7 | Conclusions | 115 |
Whether to Extend More Debt Relief | 116 | |
How to Extend the HIPC Initiative | 117 | |
Cost of the Extensions | 117 | |
Toward a New Aid Architecture | 118 | |
Appendix A | Multilateral Institutions Participating in the HIPC Initiative | 119 |
Appendix B | Countries Classified by Income | 121 |
Appendix C | Odious Debt | 123 |
References | 147 | |
Glossary | 151 | |
Index | 153 | |
Tables | ||
Table 2.1 | Resource flows to HIPCs and all developing countries, 1980-99 | 18 |
Table 2.2 | Growth in HIPCs and other developing countries, 1980-99 | 19 |
Table 2.3 | Heavily indebted poor countries | 29 |
Table 2.4 | Debt statistics for HIPC countries | 30 |
Table 4.1 | Project versus nonproject activity: Commitments of bilateral ODA to the HIPCs, 1973-99 | 70 |
Table 5.1 | Additional reduction needed for post-decision point HIPCs that are above the 2 percent threshold | 82 |
Table 5.2 | Cost to bring all non-decision point HIPCs below the 2 percent debt-to-GNP threshold | 83 |
Table 5.3 | Cost of Eurodad proposal for limiting debt service | 85 |
Table 5.4 | Debt indicators for potential HIPCs, 1999 | 87 |
Table 5.5 | Debt statistics for other low-income countries, 1999 | 88 |
Table 5.6 | Cost to bring all low-income countries below the 2 percent threshold for debt service to GNP and 150 percent threshold for debt to exports | 90 |
Table 5.7 | Hypothetical cost of contingency procedure | 94 |
Table 6.1 | Continued aid dependence of post-completion point HIPCs | 105 |
Table C.1 | Odious debt: Commitments to countries considered "Not Free" and "Corrupt" | 124 |
Table C.2 | Resource flows and other indicators for the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1970-99 | 125 |
Table C.3 | Resource flows and other indicators for Kenya, 1970-99 | 129 |
Table C.4 | Resource flows and other indicators for Nicaragua, 1970-99 | 133 |
Table C.5 | Military and social spending by Nicaragua, 1979-99 | 137 |
Table C.6 | Resource flows and other indicators for Pakistan, 1970-99 | 140 |
Table C.7 | Resource flows and other indicators for Uganda, 1970-99 | 144 |
Figures | ||
Figure 2.1 | ODA loans to sub-Saharan Africa, 1970-99 | 16 |
Figure 2.2 | World Bank and IMF loan disbursements to low-income countries, 1970-99 | 17 |
Figure 2.3 | Debt ratios of HIPCs and other developing countries | 20 |
Figure 2.4 | Evolution of ODA disbursements from EU countries, 1980-99 | 22 |
Figure 2.5 | Breakdown of debt by creditor, nominal debt stock, 1999 | 24 |
Figure 2.6 | Realized and projected annual growth rates, 1980-2015 | 39 |
Figure 3.1 | Ratio of NPV of debt-to-export for HIPCs at the decision point, projections, and past export trends | 44 |
Figure 3.2 | "Group of Eight" by Dan Wasserman | 45 |
Figure 4.1 | Aid to low-income countries in per capita terms, 1990-99 | 57 |
Figure 4.2 | The increasing aid coordination challenge | 67 |
Figure 4.3 | Aid and debt, sub-Saharan Africa, 1977-87 and 1988-98 | 77 |
Figure 5.1 | Cost estimates to public sector | 95 |
Figure 5.2 | Authors' proposals | 100 |
Boxes | ||
Box 1.1 | The enhanced HIPC Initiative | 2 |
Box 2.1 | A short history of sovereign lending and default | 14 |
Box 2.2 | Debt initiatives | 23 |
Box 3.1 | The annual cost of achieving the Millennium Development Goals | 47 |
Box 4.1 | Aid accounting and debt relief | 56 |
Box 4.2 | The Central American Bank for Economic Integration | 60 |
Box 4.3 | The IMF's future role in development | 62 |
Box 4.4 | Aid does work--if... | 64 |
Box 6.1 | The PRSP challenge: Avoiding business as usual | 103 |
Box 6.2 | Assessing country performance: Selectivity using what measures? | 111 |
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