Defining Knowledge: Method and Metaphysics
Post-Gettier epistemology is increasingly modalized epistemology – proposing and debating modally explicable conditionals with suitably epistemic content (an approach initially inspired by Robert Nozick's 1981 account of knowledge), as needing to be added to 'true belief' in order to define or understand knowing's nature. This Element asks whether such modalized attempts – construed as responding to what the author calls Knowing's Further Features question (bequeathed to us by the Meno and the Theaetetus) – can succeed. The answer is that they cannot. Plato's and Aristotle's views on definition reinforce that result. Still, in appreciating this, we might gain insight into knowing's essence. We might find that knowledge is, essentially, nothing more than true belief.
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Defining Knowledge: Method and Metaphysics
Post-Gettier epistemology is increasingly modalized epistemology – proposing and debating modally explicable conditionals with suitably epistemic content (an approach initially inspired by Robert Nozick's 1981 account of knowledge), as needing to be added to 'true belief' in order to define or understand knowing's nature. This Element asks whether such modalized attempts – construed as responding to what the author calls Knowing's Further Features question (bequeathed to us by the Meno and the Theaetetus) – can succeed. The answer is that they cannot. Plato's and Aristotle's views on definition reinforce that result. Still, in appreciating this, we might gain insight into knowing's essence. We might find that knowledge is, essentially, nothing more than true belief.
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Defining Knowledge: Method and Metaphysics

Defining Knowledge: Method and Metaphysics

by Stephen Hetherington
Defining Knowledge: Method and Metaphysics
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Defining Knowledge: Method and Metaphysics

Defining Knowledge: Method and Metaphysics

by Stephen Hetherington

Overview

Post-Gettier epistemology is increasingly modalized epistemology – proposing and debating modally explicable conditionals with suitably epistemic content (an approach initially inspired by Robert Nozick's 1981 account of knowledge), as needing to be added to 'true belief' in order to define or understand knowing's nature. This Element asks whether such modalized attempts – construed as responding to what the author calls Knowing's Further Features question (bequeathed to us by the Meno and the Theaetetus) – can succeed. The answer is that they cannot. Plato's and Aristotle's views on definition reinforce that result. Still, in appreciating this, we might gain insight into knowing's essence. We might find that knowledge is, essentially, nothing more than true belief.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781009090278
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 11/10/2022
Series: Elements in Epistemology
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
File size: 3 MB

Table of Contents

Preface; 1. A Quest; 2. An Hypothesis; 3. Modalized Epistemology; 4. Knowing's Further Features Question; 5. Knowledge and Luck; 6. An Aristotelian Strengthening of the Argument; 7. Knowledge-Minimalism; References.
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Related Subjects

Philosophy
Major Branches of Philosophical Study
Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge)
Philosophy
Major Branches of Philosophical Study
Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge)

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