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Overview
Its advice is structured around three main sources: outside (the opponent); inside (the player's own thought process); and the stimulus itself (the board position). The author, an Israeli psychologist and FIDE Master, shows players how to identify actual and potential hazards and how detecting them can be used not only to bolster defense but also as an attack strategy.
Includes 24 black-and-white figures.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780486143071 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Dover Publications |
| Publication date: | 07/16/2012 |
| Series: | Dover Chess |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 128 |
| File size: | 17 MB |
| Note: | This product may take a few minutes to download. |
Read an Excerpt
DANGER IN CHESS
How to Avoid Making Blunders
By Amatzia Avni
Dover Publications, Inc.
Copyright © 1994 Amatzia AvniAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-486-14307-1
CHAPTER 1
The Sense of Danger – Its Meaning and Importance
In the chess literature of recent decades there are references to what is called a sense of danger. The purpose of this sense is: "to be aware of impending danger in time, and to avoid it"—Alexander Kotov. This probably means that certain signs—perhaps at a subconscious level—act as alarm signals for the chessplayer, indicating that he must raise his vigilance.
The usual indicators of control systems provide us with feedbacks, that is they pin-point something that has already gone wrong. Here we are dealing with signals whose aim is to provide us with feed-forward; to point out the probability of future failures. A feed-forward system "is a means of seeing problems as they develop and not looking back—always too late—to see why a planning target was missed."
Drawing an analogy with real battle, here is "something" that distinguishes between routine and emergency, between a relatively peaceful situation and the outbreak of hostilities.
One example of a variable related to the sense of danger is correct timing:
"The player feels, for example, that the moment has come when delay will mean death, that it is exactly now and not later that he must begin the counterattack ... This sense of of timing is manifested for instance in the feeling of danger, which is familiar to many players ..."—Nikolai Krogius.
Also, this sixth sense is related to the skill of "entering the opponent's mind". Annotating a game lost by Bobby Fischer, GM Edmar Mednis wrote: "White is dreaming of his attack, completely oblivious to the fact that it is Black who is doing the attacking!"
Such a mistake stems from focusing too much on what we plan, while ignoring the other side's intentions. A developed sense of danger means orienting one's own thoughts towards perceiving the rival's train of thought.
As many authorities advise, it is useful to put oneself in the opponent's place, to think from his point of view.
Descriptions of the sense of danger sometimes appear in connection with the terms "critical position" or "critical moment". For instance, British trainer John Littlewood writes:
"We have to learn to detect critical moments in play ... In a real game situation we learn to develop, with practice, a sixth sense about such critical moments."
Acquiring a developed sense of danger apparently helps us to spot critical moments in the game. The trouble is that both terms are rather vague, and leave the student wondering how to recognise critical moments, whatever that means, before they arrive.
The most detailed characterisation of the sense of danger and its working mechanism during a chess game is given by Mark Dvoretsky, widely regarded as the number one chess trainer in the former USSR:
"The opponent makes an apparently innocent move, but for some reason or another he rouses our vigilance and promptly we discover the cunning that is concealed. Another instance: We abandon serious consideration of a move that at first sight looked tempting, because we feel that there must be a refutation. Or: the variations that we work out are all to our advantage, but a "feeling for danger" forces us to check and recheck repeatedly; and we discover an error somewhere in the calculation.
"Clearly in such a situation there is a connection between pure chess information ... and psychologically influenced decisions."
It is quite common for players to treat this mysterious intuitive sense as something very realistic/ materialistic, and to attribute errors in games to "failures" of the danger-detector. "The reason for my awful oversight was that over-confidence sapped my sense of danger," writes Kotov.
Let's have a look at a few examples that demonstrate the importance of a danger instinct.
The preceding diagram is a modified version of a position played in 1982 between two Israeli junior players.
A brief study of the diagram brings out the weakness of Black's isolated and doubled e-pawns. Asked to choose a White move, the majority of strong players would probably single out 1 0-0.
Although 1 [??]xe6 + wins a pawn, experienced tournament players would not seriously contemplate this move. They would rule out the possibility on the grounds that "it does not smell good" to grab pawns before completing development, and would reach a decision without concrete calculation.
In fact, a refutation of 1[??]xe6+ does exist:
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
Surprisingly, White now cannot save himself from heavy losses: 3 0-0 [??]e4 [??], or 3 [??]c3 [??]e4! (still!) 4 [??]b5 [??]d1+
The point, however, is that a White player can reach the right conclusion on the basis of his awareness of danger, without the necessity for precise analysis. Diagram 2 presents a further demonstration of the common use of the "feeling for danger".
Diagram 2 presents a further demonstration of the common use of the "feeling for danger".
Shvidler-Stisis Ramat Hasharon 1989
A sharp-eyed player would notice the possibility 1 [??]xe4 +. A concrete calculation has a lot to say for this move: 1 ... [??]xe4+? 2 [??]xe4 [??]xe4 3 d7; or 1 ... [??]xe4? 2 [??]d5+ [??]f6 4 d7 are in White's favour.
Still, self-pinning the white bishop whilst the rook is also under attack looks very suspect. This feeling prompted IM Shvidler to recheck the variations, and his doubts were soon verified: 1 [??]xe4+? actually loses to 1 ... [??] e6!! , temporarily unpinning, but 2 d2 d7 renews the pin with decisive effect.
Usually it is not at all easy to spot the critical moment, or identify an approaching danger. Diagram 3 shows an innocent-looking position in which Black should apparently feel safe, having neither structural deficiencies nor any obvious reason to worry about his king's position.
Quinones-Silva Tel Aviv O1 1964
However, in the actual game Black went rapidly downhill:
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
What were Black's mistakes? The position after 5 [??]e7 is won for White, so we have to look for improvements at earlier stages. One commentator blamed 1 ... [??] xf3, suggesting 1 ... [??]fd8, but this is surely wrong, on account of 2 [??]xa6! [and if 2 ... [??]xe4 then 3 h4 f5 4 [??]xa8 xa8 5 [??]d7 – Ed.].
2 ... e8 with the intention of 3 ... [??]c7, 4 ... [??]e6 looks better (e.g. 3 b4 [??]c7 with 4 ... f6 to regroup), as does 4 ... [??]h8. But it seems that Black's biggest error was that he was not aware that he was in danger! That is, until it was too late to do something about it.
Even more confusing is the next diagram.
Keres-Penrose Hastings 1958
Black's queen and two knights appear to be a threatening force, while White also has to reckon with an advance of the h4 pawn;
Strangely, and contrary to first impressions, it is White who holds the initiative:
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
2 ... [??]h6!.
Now, if 3 ... hxg2 (crushing?) 4 [??]d7+ [??]g8 5 [??]e8+ [??]g7 6 [??]e7+ and White is the first to deliver mate!
So Black had to settle for an ending, but without success:
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
Chessplayers may fail to recognise a danger even long after it has landed on the board, screaming "Here I am!".
Veteran IM J.Porath recalls the following incident:
(diagram 5)
"White's only chance is to 'run' with his king to the centre. Analysing the adjourned position, I came to the conclusion that the king is too slow, and my only hope was that my adversary would play imprecisely and would fail to discern a latent saving possibility."
Porath-Walther Havana O1. 1966
The game continued:
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
3 ... [??]g5 wins.
"Here my opponent continued with the expression of a winner 6 ... [??]d5 [??]7 [??]g5 [??]xf6 "—says Porath—"and it was only after 8 [??]h6! that he realised that he was in one of the no-win positions of a knight and pawn vs pawn!" Draw.
True, it is not always so baffling. In certain positions the warning signals are evident.
Thiman-Felbecker corr. 1968
Instead of the solid 1 d3 White chose 1 [??]d2?! which was strongly countered by 1 ... [??]b6! getting out of the pin and threatening to win the queen by discovered check. Such a nasty surprise would be enough to wake up most players, but White remained asleep, falling for the same trick once more!
2 [??]c4.
The threat of discovered check, formerly appearing on a rank, now re-emerges on a file. Probably White should now have given up his queen (4 [??]xc3 [??]h2+ 5 [??]xh2).
And in view of the continuation 13 [??]g7 [??]d8 White resigned.
However, frequently a certain measure of intuition is required to recognise the looming danger.
Alekhine-Lasker Zürich 1934
Black was feeling confident enough in this position to play 1 ... [??]b6?, intending to challenge control of the d-file. Had he played 1 ... g6 he would have obtained a satisfactory position, but the queen sortie enabled the great attacking player of the white pieces to launch a powerful offensive:
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
2 ... [??]g6? 3 [??]h6+.
8 ... h6 9 [??]f5+ h7 10 xh6 11 [??]f5!! brings a similar finish.
Hug-Biyiasas Haifa Ol. 1976
In this position too Black has, apparently, no cause to feel uneasy. True, White intends to gain the upper hand with 2 g5, but this positional threat can be parried, for instance, by 1 ... [??]f6.
That is how Black played. The rationale is correct, but the chosen move is a grave error.
Question 1: What was the danger that eluded Black?
Tukmakov-Karpov Leningrad izt 1973
White is a whole exchange behind, with no compensation whatsoever. His last move, 1[??]1-f1, seems pointless. The rook under attack has three respectable options: d2, b2 and e4. They all look good enough to clinch the win.
Question 2: Are they?
In the course of a chess battle a player wavers. Is everything going well? Is my position strong? Will I be able to carry out my plans?
The answers to these questions are compared with hints the player gets from various sources. Signals may originate from inner feelings, or from the opponent's behaviour, or from factors such as the conduct of spectators. But first and foremost, the player continually tests what he thinks and feels against what his evaluation and analysis of the board situation tell him. A player builds for himself, mostly unknowingly, a system of signals whose aim is to broadcast to him the presence of dangers, real or potential. The system forms, grows and stabilises with accumulated experience.
The idea is that each signal, independently, can press the 'alarm' button, thus calling for concrete calculation of variations on top of general strategic reasoning.
It must be pointed out that signals suggest the possibility of a dangerous situation, but do not constitute a testimony of its existence.
In chess, it is never possible to prove in advance that something will occur. Still, to own a good sense of danger is undoubtedly a valuable asset.
Let us observe the danger-signal system at work.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from DANGER IN CHESS by Amatzia Avni. Copyright © 1994 Amatzia Avni. Excerpted by permission of Dover Publications, Inc..
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Title Page,Copyright Page,
Acknowledgements,
Symbols and Abbreviations,
Introduction,
1 The Sense of Danger – Its Meaning and Importance,
2 Obvious Dangers,
Common Failures in the Sensing of Danger,
3 Common Failures in the Sensing of Danger: Opponent-Related Factors,
4 Common Failures in the Sensing of Danger: Position-Related Factors,
5 Common Failures in the Sensing of Danger: Thought-Process-Related Factors,
6 Combining Various Signals: The Concept of Discrepancy,
7 Developing a Sense of Danger,
8 The Art of Deception,
9 Instead of an Epilogue,
Answers to Questions,
Answers to "Do You Smell a Rat?" Quiz,
Bibliographical References,
Index of Players,
DOVER BOOKS ON MAGIC, GAMES AND PUZZLES,