COSSAC: Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation OVERLORD
When Frederick Morgan was appointed COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander), in the spring of 1943, there was no approved plan for a cross-Channel attack and no commander. There was not even agreement about when the re-entry into the Continent would occur. The western Allies were in the midst of a great debate about the strategy or strategies to defeat Nazi Germany. COSSAC's primary task was to create a plan that would be approved by the inter-allied Combined Chiefs of Staff. To gain that authorization, Morgan had to decide where the attack was to take place, address the need for improvised shelters for the transport ships until a port could be captured; create all the structure necessary for a multi-national force that would liberate countries, not occupy them; and convince his superiors that it could be done with the limited forces they were willing to provide. COSSAC presents a new interpretation of Morgan's vital contributions to the development of the OVERLORD plan by exploring his leadership, his unorthodox approach to problem-solving, and his willingness to disregard or modify orders he thought wrong. By constantly taking the initiative to move the discussions forward, Morgan secured the needed political approval of a concept for the Normandy landings that Montgomery and Eisenhower would modify into the D-Day operational plan.
1132756317
COSSAC: Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation OVERLORD
When Frederick Morgan was appointed COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander), in the spring of 1943, there was no approved plan for a cross-Channel attack and no commander. There was not even agreement about when the re-entry into the Continent would occur. The western Allies were in the midst of a great debate about the strategy or strategies to defeat Nazi Germany. COSSAC's primary task was to create a plan that would be approved by the inter-allied Combined Chiefs of Staff. To gain that authorization, Morgan had to decide where the attack was to take place, address the need for improvised shelters for the transport ships until a port could be captured; create all the structure necessary for a multi-national force that would liberate countries, not occupy them; and convince his superiors that it could be done with the limited forces they were willing to provide. COSSAC presents a new interpretation of Morgan's vital contributions to the development of the OVERLORD plan by exploring his leadership, his unorthodox approach to problem-solving, and his willingness to disregard or modify orders he thought wrong. By constantly taking the initiative to move the discussions forward, Morgan secured the needed political approval of a concept for the Normandy landings that Montgomery and Eisenhower would modify into the D-Day operational plan.
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COSSAC: Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation OVERLORD

COSSAC: Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation OVERLORD

by Stephen Kepher
COSSAC: Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation OVERLORD

COSSAC: Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation OVERLORD

by Stephen Kepher

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Overview

When Frederick Morgan was appointed COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander), in the spring of 1943, there was no approved plan for a cross-Channel attack and no commander. There was not even agreement about when the re-entry into the Continent would occur. The western Allies were in the midst of a great debate about the strategy or strategies to defeat Nazi Germany. COSSAC's primary task was to create a plan that would be approved by the inter-allied Combined Chiefs of Staff. To gain that authorization, Morgan had to decide where the attack was to take place, address the need for improvised shelters for the transport ships until a port could be captured; create all the structure necessary for a multi-national force that would liberate countries, not occupy them; and convince his superiors that it could be done with the limited forces they were willing to provide. COSSAC presents a new interpretation of Morgan's vital contributions to the development of the OVERLORD plan by exploring his leadership, his unorthodox approach to problem-solving, and his willingness to disregard or modify orders he thought wrong. By constantly taking the initiative to move the discussions forward, Morgan secured the needed political approval of a concept for the Normandy landings that Montgomery and Eisenhower would modify into the D-Day operational plan.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781682475218
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Publication date: 05/15/2020
Series: Studies in Naval History and Sea Power
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 336
File size: 8 MB

About the Author

Stephen Kepher, a former U.S. Marine Corps officer and an independent scholar, received his MLitt (with distinction) in War Studies from the University of Glasgow and holds a BA in International Relations from the University of Southern California. He has presented papers on COSSAC at a Society for Military History’s annual conference and at Normandy 75, at the University of Portsmouth, UK.

Table of Contents

Preface ix

Acknowledgments xv

Prologue xvii

1 "A Common Bond of Danger" 1

2 "No Substantial Landing in France Unless We Are Going to Stay" 12

3 "For What Are We to Plan?" 26

4 To Plan the Reconquest of Europe 42

5 The Indian Army and Chasing Pancho Villa 60

6 "For the First Time I Really Believe in This Operation" 76

7 The Primary U.S.-British Ground and Air Effort in Europe 94

8 "A Passing Phase" 121

9 The Far Shore 145

10 "Your Army, Your General Marshall and Your Ambassador Biddle" 162

11 "The Supreme Operations for 1944" 186

12 "Monty Didn't Bring Anything New" 208

Epilogue 219

Appendix A British Chiefs of Staff (COS) and American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 227

Appendix B Structure of the British Army's Home Forces, 1940-44 229

Appendix C Outline OVERLORD Plan, Cover Letter, and Digest 230

Appendix D Organizational Charts of COSSAC, Initial Formation and as of January 1944 240

Appendix E Organizational Chart of Western Allies Command Structure 242

Appendix F Organization Chart of the Chain of Command from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander for OVERLORD 243

Glossary of Selected Code Names and Abbreviations 245

Notes 249

Bibliography 281

Index 291

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