Contractors and War: The Transformation of United States' Expeditionary Operations
352
Contractors and War: The Transformation of United States' Expeditionary Operations
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Overview
The U.S. military is no longer based on a Cold War self-sufficient model. Today's armed forces are a third smaller than they were during the Cold War, and yet are expected to do as much if not more than they did during those years. As a result, a transformation is occurring in the way the U.S. government expects the military to conduct operations—with much of that transformation contingent on the use of contractors to deliver support to the armed forces during military campaigns and afterwards.
Contractors and War explains the reasons behind this transformation and evaluates how the private sector will shape and be shaped by future operations. The authors are drawn from a range of policy, legislative, military, legal, and academic backgrounds. They lay out the philosophical arguments supporting the use of contractors in combat and stabilization operations and present a spectrum of arguments that support and criticize emergent private sector roles. The book provides fresh policy guidance to those who will research, direct, and carry out future deployments.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780804782937 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Stanford Security Studies |
| Publication date: | 07/25/2012 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 352 |
| File size: | 1 MB |
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Read an Excerpt
CONTRACTORS AND WAR
The Transformation of US Expeditionary OperationsStanford University Press
Copyright © 2012 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior UniversityAll right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-6991-4
Chapter One
Overview of American Government Expeditionary Operations Utilizing Private Contractors Robert Mandel
1. Introduction
The recent expanded reliance by the United States on private contractors in military operations overseas has reached unprecedented levels, so much so that "the scope of today's wartime contracting dwarfs that of past military conflicts." Indeed, today the United States seems to be totally unable to engage in expeditionary operations without using private contractors: in particular, in 2007, over 190,000 contractors worked in Iraq on US-funded contracts, making the number of private contractors roughly equal to that of American government soldiers; in 2008, the Department of Defense spent around 316 billion dollars on contracted services, about as much as the total amount it spent on weapons systems and equipment; and in 2009, private contractors outnumbered military personnel in Afghanistan and nearly equaled the number of military personnel in Iraq. No longer does the United States even attempt to achieve military self-sufficiency by maintaining enough government troops to fulfill its global security objectives.
This chapter's explicitly conceptual analysis provides an explanation of why the American government chose recently to rely more on private contractors, the controversies surrounding this reliance, arguments identifying the strengths and weaknesses associated with American government use of private contractors, and the future course of private contractors in American expeditionary operations. The central purpose is to provide a deeper and more balanced perspective on well-publicized trends. In the process, this chapter carefully situates the private contractor issue within the broader security context.
2. Motivation for American Government Use of Private Contractors
This escalating use of private contracting has many roots. The supply and demand changes surrounding military personnel after the Cold War, the foreign policy limitations associated with exclusive reliance on government forces, and the reluctance by the government to undertake operations that risk significant citizen casualties have combined to foster a groundswell of interest and activity in this area. Private contractors have been adept recently at realizing and taking advantage of opportunities presented.
One of the pivotal causes is the post-Cold War downsizing of the American military. Since the mid-1990s, "the Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly viewed contracted support as a 'force multiplier' that supplements existing U.S. force structure capacity and capability":
The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of relying on contractors to support troops during wartime and expeditionary operations. Generally, from the Revolutionary War through the Vietnam War, contractors provided traditional logistical support such as medical care, transportation, and engineering to U.S. armed forces. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a significant increase in contractors supporting U.S. troops—in terms of the number and percentage of contractors, and the type of work being performed. ... According to DOD, post-Cold War budget reductions resulted in significant cuts to military logistical and support personnel, requiring DOD to hire contractors to "fill the gap."
Between 1989 and 2002, the Department of Defense's total civilian workforce shrunk by 38 percent. Shortages of trained personnel still hamper American expeditionary operations, as the United States has assumed security responsibilities in multiple parts of the world without enough qualified government personnel to support these far-flung responsibilities. The post-Cold War downsizing of government military personnel, which occurred not just within the United States, released onto the global market sizable numbers of people with soldiering skills looking for employment, and thus provided private contractors with ready manpower and an ability to supply requisite services on the battlefield.
At the same time the American military has been downsizing, global disruptions and threats to US interests abroad have appeared to multiply and diversify. The end to the Cold War opened the door to different kinds of foreign threats, including an increasing number of domestic insurgencies, internal civil wars, failing states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, transnational organized crime, and violent acts perpetrated by transnational terrorists. Emerging threats have been typically covert, dispersed, decentralized, adaptable, and fluid, with threat sources relatively difficult to identify, monitor, target, contain, destroy, and with these sources' past actions not necessarily a sound guide to their future behavior. This pattern reflects "the 'de-massification' of threats in the world," where "a single giant threat of war ... is replaced by a multitude of 'niche threats'" in which "war will not be waged by armies but by groups we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers." Many of these dangers are asymmetric threats involving ruthless adversaries that call for strong coercive responses. Because of widespread anti-American sentiments in various parts of the world, the United States or American interests are frequently directly or indirectly a target of these disruptions. So the demand for expeditionary operations to promote or maintain international stability has increased.
Recognition of foreign policy limitations associated with the use of government forces in expeditionary operations also has contributed to private contractor reliance. The inability of the United States to achieve a ground force victory in Vietnam "persuaded a generation or more of American and Western generals that the use of Western and particularly American ground forces in foreign conflicts is a mistake"; indeed, the "mounting human and financial costs" resulting from helping to manage "seemingly intractable civil wars" overseas has created a kind of "intervention fatigue" among Western states. Moreover, "the unanticipated length and complexity of post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan" provided incentives to move away from reliance on uniformed government soldiers. Particularly in dealing with the elusive security challenges they face today, the use of conventional government military forces alone has not shown itself consistently to be the most efficient and effective way to manage the threat.
In a related manner, casualty aversion helps to explain the increased reliance on private contractors. American political leaders have to some extent become "quite terrified of taking casualties" through interventions overseas, and as a result private contractors have begun to look awfully attractive: several years ago an American ambassador in Europe confessed "that his country could no longer emotionally, psychologically or politically accept body bags coming home in double figures." When a government chooses to outsource to private contractors, the attraction may result from the state bearing little public accountability for undesired consequences, deaths of citizens, or moral and legal dilemmas about the legitimacy of an intervention. Moreover, when the US government wants to restrain its commitment in its international intervention, private security outfits give it a low-risk means to do so. Utilization of private contractors can capitalize on the vast numbers of trained, skilled former military personnel in foreign countries, many of which have depressed economies and have qualified people looking for work. As a result, missions that the United States would like to undertake for political or security reasons that do not warrant the loss of American lives or that do not enjoy substantial domestic political support (in Congress and the public) could then still be undertaken, since public concern would be much lower for the lives of foreign nationals who voluntarily sign a paid contract indicating a willingness to fight and die for American interests. Because the prevailing international security environment fosters considerable ambiguity in prioritizing areas for expeditionary operations, versatility in deployment options—facilitated by private contractors—becomes critical to cope with changing priorities.
3. Controversies Surrounding Private Contractor Use
Controversy surrounds the use of private contractors in recent American expeditionary operations. Areas of debate include (1) the level of corruption within private contractor activity; (2) the money savings (or lack thereof) associated with private contractor activity; (3) private contractors' loyalty and suitability to the security tasks assigned; (4) private contractors' level of adherence to high moral standards; (5) the proper balance between public and private support for expeditionary operations; (6) tensions between private contractors and government military personnel; and (7) the availability of appropriate policy options as alternatives to reliance on private contractors. Participating in this heated discussion are not just academic and policy experts but also members of the mass media and of antagonistic public interest groups.
Unfortunately, the character of this debate is far less than ideal. First, much analysis is polemical, evidencing a preconceived bias for or against the use of private contractors and simply attempting to find evidence supporting this prejudice. For opponents of American use of private contractors, the Blackwater scandal appears to be the primary—and in some cases the only—reference point. Second, many observers talk past each other because of the lack of specificity about what kind of private security in what context is being discussed. Specifically, the use of private contractors by the United States for expeditionary operations differs markedly from the use of private contractors by Third World countries to help with their own security or by international organizations for humanitarian assistance. Third, many analysts prefer to jump right to prescriptions about private contractors without first enhancing understanding of current and future opportunities and dangers. Lastly, many observers are exclusively concerned with the American use of private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, without considering the broader implications of articulated critiques beyond these specific ongoing conflict zones.
One key ongoing disagreement surrounds the accusation that military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has been "rife with fraud, waste, and abuse." As an example of alleged corruption, an October 2003 Center for Public Integrity study analyzing companies in Iraq and Afghanistan "matched $49 million from 70 companies doing about $8 billion in government business to political contributions that went almost two to one to Republicans over Democrats, President George W. Bush pulling in the most of all." The United States Congress is very worried about oversight and management of Department of Defense private contracting in Iraq, particularly about "a lack of accountability for large sums of money spent for Iraq contracts," due to "the expense and difficulty of managing logistical support contracts" and "questions regarding DOD's ability and capacity to manage such contracts." Deficient contractor management can keep vital support from getting to military troops and promote waste; and deficient contractor oversight can lead to contractor abuses that undermine security objectives. As with any incident of alleged misbehavior, the central bone of contention is how representative or widespread the dysfunctional activity is, and this is difficult to determine due to the lack of relevant reliable data.
A second major debate concerns whether using private contractors saves the American government money. On the surface, the answer would appear to be affirmative, for private contractors are not eligible for pensions, retirement benefits, and long-term health care the way government soldiers are. Popular news coverage has exaggerated the costs of private contractors, especially the salaries paid to contractors, and does not take into account benefits and compensation only regular military personnel—not private contractors—receive. Yet a recent Government Accountability Office report questions this conclusion:
A key assumption of many of the federal management reforms of the 1990s was that the cost-efficiency of government operations could be improved through the use of contractors. GAO recently reported that sufficient data are not available to determine whether increased service contracting has caused DOD's costs to be higher than they would have been had the contracted activities been performed by uniformed or DOD civilian personnel. GAO recently probed, in-depth, the cost of contractor versus government contract specialists at the Army's Contracting Center for Excellence and found that the Army is paying up to 26 percent more for the contractors as compared to their government counterparts.
Indeed, whether public or private security is more inexpensive may be situational:
It is not clear that outsourcing of military training saves the U.S. government any money.... Studies of privatization have found that cost savings depend on competition.... There is often collusion among competing firms, and long-term contracts lead to opportunistic behavior, such as firms bidding low, knowing that they can add on later. Further, the calculated costs of outsourcing rarely take into account the fact that the Pentagon must hire people to police the contractors.
Once again, complexities surrounding private contractors impede gauging their overall value.
A third controversy revolves around the loyalty and task suitability of private contractors. First, about 80 percent of the Department of Defense contracted employees in Iraq and Afghanistan are foreign nationals, who "may not be accountable to any American government authority." Some analysts have accused private contractors of participating in illicit activities, including drug-trafficking, illegal extraction of resources, and even international terrorism: this possibility received some vindication when a Mexican drug-trafficking organization hired mercenaries to train cartel security forces in advanced military tactics and surveillance techniques, and occasionally links emerge between private contractors and all the unruly perpetrators of global privatized violence—transnational criminals, warlords, rebels/ insurgents, and terrorists. Second, "the Rules of Engagement for the military differ significantly from the Rules for the Use of Force for private security contractors." These differences can mean that even an effective private contractor behaving abroad in an unexpected manner can create disruptive ripples. Third, the limited, short-term nature of much private contractor involvement may not match long-term mission needs. Fourth, the net result of heavy Department of Defense reliance on contractors whose mission fit is questionable can be devastating, as it "is developing a growing dependency on contracted services and the PMO [private military organization] industry to fulfill tactical, operational and sometimes strategic needs" to the extent that "many analysts now believe that DOD is unable to successfully execute large missions without contractor support."
Fourth, a critical debate centers on whether the moral and ethical standards of private contractors are high enough. Several analysts feel that the presence of privatized security increases the frequency and severity of human rights violations or other crimes against humanity. Concern frequently arises that "contractors are not subject to the same ethics rules as government even when doing the same job, and the government risks entering into an improper personal services contract if an employer/employee relationship exists between the government and the contractor employee. Suspicions abound that those choosing to work for private contractors may either be scoundrels or—at the very least—possess significantly lower standards of performance or desire to adhere to prevailing norms. This way of thinking would presume that private contractors would often be tempted to consider a situation a "no-holdsbarred" carte blanche to do whatever barbarous acts they deem necessary to achieve the objectives for which they are being paid:
There have been published reports of local nationals being abused and mistreated by some DOD contractors in such incidents as the shooting at Iraqi civilians by private security contractors and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Local nationals may not draw a distinction between government contractors and the U.S. military, and the abuses committed by contractors may strengthen anti-American insurgents, as evidenced by the public outcry following such incidents.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from CONTRACTORS AND WAR Copyright © 2012 by Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of Stanford University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction Christopher Kinsey Malcolm Hugh Patterson 1
Part I The Nature of Contractor Support in Future US Military Operations
1 Overview of American Government Expeditionary Operations Utilizing Private Contractors Robert Mandel 13
2 Attitudes on the Ground: What Soldiers Think about Civilian Contractors Ryan Kelty Darcy Schnack 36
3 Looking Beyond Iraq: Contractors in US Global Activities Renée de Nevers 60
Part II Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations: A Market Growth Area
4 The Elephant in the Room William J. Flavin 85
5 Sharing the Same Space: The Evolving Relationship between US NGOs, Battlefield Contractors, and US Armed Forces Samuel A. Worthington 112
6 PMSCs and Risk in Counterinsurgency Warfare Kateri Carmola 134
Part III Legal Aspects of Future US Operations
7 Contractors and the Law Geoffrey S. Corn 157
8 Contractors' Wars and the Commission on Wartime Contracting Allison Stanger 184
9 Private Contractors, Public Consequences: The Need for an Effective Criminal Justice Framework David E. Price 205
Part IV US Administrative Structures Required to Sustain Contractor Operations
10 How to Decide When a Contractor Source Is Better to Use Than a Government Source Frank Camm 233
11 Reforming the US Approach to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 255
12 Contractors Supporting Military Operations: Many Challenges Remain Jacques S. Gansler William Lucyshyn 278
Conclusion Christopher Kinsey Malcolm Hugh Patterson 297
Contributors 323
Index 327