The author finds that the USSR attributed no geostrategic importance to Indochina and did not want the crisis there to disrupt détente. The Russians had high hopes that the Geneva accords would bring years of peace in the region. Gradually disillusioned, they tried to strengthen North Vietnam, but would not support unification of North and South. By the early 1960s, however, they felt obliged to counter the American embrace of an aggressively anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam and the hostility of its former ally, the People's Republic of China. Finally, Moscow decided to disengage from Vietnam, disappointed that its efforts to avert an international crisis there had failed.
The author finds that the USSR attributed no geostrategic importance to Indochina and did not want the crisis there to disrupt détente. The Russians had high hopes that the Geneva accords would bring years of peace in the region. Gradually disillusioned, they tried to strengthen North Vietnam, but would not support unification of North and South. By the early 1960s, however, they felt obliged to counter the American embrace of an aggressively anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam and the hostility of its former ally, the People's Republic of China. Finally, Moscow decided to disengage from Vietnam, disappointed that its efforts to avert an international crisis there had failed.
Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963
296
Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963
296Hardcover(1)
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780804747127 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Stanford University Press |
| Publication date: | 03/19/2003 |
| Series: | Cold War International History Project |
| Edition description: | 1 |
| Pages: | 296 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d) |