Communism and Nationalism in India: M.N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920-1939
416
Communism and Nationalism in India: M.N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920-1939
416Hardcover
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Originally published in 1971.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780691647432 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 04/19/2016 |
| Series: | Princeton Legacy Library , #1483 |
| Pages: | 416 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.20(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.40(d) |
Read an Excerpt
Communism and Nationalism in India
M.N. Roy and Comintern Policy, 1920-1939
By John Patrick Haithcox
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1971 Princeton University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-08722-1
CHAPTER 1
The Second Comintern Congress
* * *
The Indian Brahmin Narendra Nath Bhattacharya, alias Manabendra Nath Roy, made his debut in the international communist movement at the Second World Congress of the Communist International (Comintem), which was held in Moscow from July 19 to August 7, 1920. Lenin had prepared in advance a draft thesis on the national and colonial question, which he circulated among the delegates with a request for comments and criticisms. As a result of Roy's response, Lenin invited him to write an alternative draft. Both Lenin's and Roy's theses were later submitted to the National and Colonial Commission for its consideration. In the subsequent debates within the commission, a distinction evolved between different kinds of "bourgeois-democratic movements" in dependent areas — between those of a truly revolutionary and those of a merely "reformist" character-based on differences in their class composition. In countries where "reformist" nationalist movements prevailed, Roy argued before the commission, the Comintern should eschew alliances with nationalist leaders who were bound to desert to the imperialist camp in a revolutionary situation, and should instead assist exclusively "the institution and development of the communist movement" and "the organization of the broad popular masses for the class interests of the latter."
After some modifications were made in the theses prepared by Lenin and Roy, the congress took the unusual step of adopting both. In the revised version of Lenin's thesis, the Comintern was counseled to support only "revolutionary movements of liberation," rather than all "bourgeois-democratic liberation movements," as stated in the original draft. In this way the distinction Roy made between different types of bourgeois-democratic liberation movements was incorporated into Lenin's thesis. As Lenin explained to the congress: "It was argued that if we speak about the bourgeois-democratic movement all distinctions between reformist and revolutionary movements will be obliterated; whereas in recent times, this distinction has been fully and clearly revealed in backward and colonial countries." Elaborating on this distinction, Lenin continued:
Very often, even in the majority of cases perhaps, where the bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries does support the national movement, it simultaneously works in harmony with the imperialist bourgeoisie; i.e., it joins the latter in fighting against all revolutionary movements and all revolutionary classes. ... In the [National and Colonial] Commission this was proved irrefutably, and we came to the conclusion that the only correct thing was to take this distinction into consideration and nearly everywhere to substitute the term "nationalist-revolutionary" for the term "bourgeois-democratic." The meaning of this change is that we Communists should, and will, support bourgeois liberation movements in the colonial countries only when these movements are really revolutionary, when the representatives of these movements do not hinder us in training and organizing the peasants and the broad masses of the exploited in a revolutionary spirit.
It is important to note that this was Lenin's first attempt to formulate in a systematic manner his ideas on the problems of promoting communist revolution in Asia. Robert C. North and Xenia J. Eudin have contended that "Roy ranks with Lenin and Mao Tse-tung in the development of fundamental communist policy for the underdeveloped ... areas of the globe." This study does not attempt to defend this view, but it does support the position that Roy played a highly significant role in the formulation and conduct of Comintern policy on the national and colonial question in the 1920's.
In the early years of his Comintern career, Roy had felt that a united front policy, which called for communist support for nationalist movements in colonial and semicolonial areas, was inappropriate for India. When he warned of the possible betrayal of "bourgeois-democratic" nationalist leaders, he had the Indian National Congress in mind. Lenin, in contrast, felt that the national bourgeoisie could be a progressive force, particularly in the early stages of the nationalist movement when anticolonialist fervor was strong, but he agreed with Roy that continued alliance with this group, once its revolutionary potential had been exhausted, would be self-defeating.
But how was the point at which communists must abruptly shift from a policy of "revolution from above" to a policy of "revolution from below" to be determined? What would be the sign that the time was ripe for a communist party to break away from the nationalist movement and seek support directly among the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie? Although never clearly formulated, it is evident that such a determination would require an assessment both of the relative strength of bourgeois and proletarian forces and of the class composition of the nationalist movement within the country in question. On both these points Lenin and Roy disagreed with respect to India.
Roy suspected the "reliability" of the leadership of the Indian National Congress. He had left India in August 1915,7 and this attitude was no doubt conditioned by his early acquaintance with the moderates. The moderates, partisans of British culture and institutions who had faith in the ultimate good will of their British overlords, stressed nonviolent, constitutional methods for securing measured progress toward self-government. The radicals, more firmly rooted in their own culture and more impatient and less trusting than the moderates, felt that extraconstitutional methods were required to secure relief from a repressive raj. At the annual Congress session at Surat in 1907, the two groups came to blows over their differences, but the moderates were able to assert their control over the party. The following year a new party constitution was adopted. It stated that the objectives of the Indian National Congress were "to be achieved by constitutional means, by bringing about a steady reform of the existing system of administration, and by promoting national unity, fostering public spirit and developing and organizing the intellectual, moral, economic, and industrial resources of the country." Party delegates were required to express in writing their acceptance of this creed. In this way the radicals — whose most prominent national spokesman was the Maharashtrian Bal Gangadhar Tilak — were effectively debarred from active participation in the Congress party.
In Bengal, radical nationalists were divided among themselves on the question of violence. Among the extremists were members of a number of secret, patriotic (or, as the British preferred to call them, terrorist) organizations, chief among which were Anushilan and Juguntar. As a youth in Bengal, Roy had participated in the nationalist activities of Juguntar during the period when the radicals were temporarily estranged from the Congress party. They did not return to the Congress fold until late 1915 — after Roy left India-when the ban against them was lifted. The year 1915 also marked Gandhi's return to India after twenty-three years in South Africa. In 1918 the moderates, now outnumbered, left the Congress party in a dispute with the radicals over the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals for constitutional reform to form the Liberal party. The following year Gandhi launched his first all-India campaign against British rule. In the course of a few years the Congress party had been transformed markedly from the upper-middle-class debating society with which Roy had been familiar to a broad-based, militant nationalist organization.
In his analysis of class forces in India, Roy greatly exaggerated both the numerical and ideological strength of the Indian proletariat. Estimating that India possessed five million workers, and an additional thirty-seven million landless peasants, he reported to the Comintem that, although the Indian nationalist movement rested for the most part on the middle classes, the downtrodden Indian masses would shortly blaze their own revolutionary trail. In his supplementary thesis, he claimed that "the real strength of the liberation movement is no longer confined to the narrow circle of bourgeois-democratic nationalists. In most of the colonies there already exist organized revolutionary parties."
Lenin did not share Roy's confidence in the strength of the Indian proletariat or peasantry. He lacked Marx's faith in a "spontaneous" development of class-consciousness. He saw, for example, an essential difference between the proletarian and the socialist, i.e., the class-conscious proletarian. Two years earlier Lenin had written that "workers have to work in the factory as if on a chain gang and neither time nor possibility remain for them to become socialists." "Spontaneity" represented for Lenin merely a nonrational opposition to society which might temporarily coincide with the interests of a class, but would in the long run oppose it. Lenin considered the development of genuine class-consciousness dependent upon party organization, discipline, and indoctrination. At the time of the Second World Congress there was no communist party in India. Lenin is reported to have pointed out to Roy that it would take some time before Indian workers and peasants could be mobilized effectively.
Their differing assessment of the Indian situation resulted in contrasting attitudes toward nationalist movements in general. Lenin urged "temporary relations and even unions" with such movements. 16 Roy spoke only in terms of "cooperation" with nationalist movements. Less trustful of the national bourgeoisie than Lenin, he laid greater stress on developing independent communist parties in dependent areas than on supporting existing nationalist movements. Although in his thesis he recommended a modified agrarian program of land reform, he also urged hat "peasants, and workers, soviets" be organized "as soon as possible."
In his fervent faith in the class-consciousness of the proletariat, Roy resembled Karl Marx before 1848. Marx had looked forward eagerly and with high optimism to the European revolutions which finally erupted in 1848, but each one failed. Following these events, Marx revised his views concerning the degree to which class-consciousness could arise spontaneously, solely as a result of "objective conditions." He came to realize the necessity of a longer apprenticeship for the proletariat than he had thought necessary heretofore. He also concluded that the development of proletarian class-consciousness should be facilitated by destroying those elements in the "objective" situation which tended to retard its growth.
To achieve this, Marx proposed a minimum program of action. His purpose was to remove all obstacles to the maturation of "bourgeois democracy" and the capitalist system — a stage whose attainment he considered a prerequisite to the advent of communism. It called for the promotion of democratic liberties and privileges, such as universal suffrage, to bring social grievances into the open and solidify class antagonisms. It also involved the exorcism of religious and patriotic sentiments, faith in reform via constitutional means, and other ideas which Marx regarded as ideological blinkers.
In conjunction with the minimum program, a maximum program, which aimed at the ultimate achievement of communism, was also to be pursued. Simultaneously, while working for the development of bourgeois democracy in its purest form, communists were to strive to weaken the bourgeois order by making ideological attacks on the capitalist system and by encouraging rebellions. It can be seen that this two-pronged attack, which sought to strengthen bourgeois democracy as a step in the direction of its overthrow, requires antennae acutely sensitive to a developing situation and a delicate sense of timing. One program must be balanced carefully against the other without aborting the ultimate goal, and the precise moment when the minimum program should be abandoned altogether, must be recognized.
In a sense, the debate between Lenin and Roy on the national and colonial question can be interpreted as reflecting a difference of opinion on the relative weight to be given to the maximum and minimum programs in the formulation of Comintern policy. In 1920 Roy shared the impatience of youth. Like Marx before 1848, he underestimated the task of mobilizing class unrest and forging an effective organizational weapon. Roy wanted to force the pace set by Lenin in order to liberate the masses at once from all oppressive relationships of both foreign and domestic hue.
In his supplementary thesis Roy stated that "the imperialist policy of preventing industrial development in the colonies" had restricted the growth of a proletarian class "until recently." But since the abandonment of this policy, he maintained, Indian industry had grown at a remarkable pace. Roy's stress on "revolution from below" was based on his assumption that India had already attained a stage of capitalist development in which proletarian class consciousness was beginning to solidify. Following the Second Comintern Congress, Roy attempted to buttress his thesis with a Marxian analysis of Indian society. This study was published in 1922, under the title India in Transition. A Russian version had appeared the year before. In his book, Roy maintained that as a result of a "spectacular" growth of Indian industry during World War I, the native bourgeoisie was now demanding a much larger share in the exploitation of India's natural and human resources. Moreover, in his view the government of India, to forestall an alliance between the native bourgeoisie and the Indian masses, had been obliged to placate the former by granting them increasingly larger concessions. The Indian bourgeoisie, according to Roy, shared the British fear of mass revolt, and though for a time they would use the strength of the masses to win still further concessions, they would eventually compromise with their rulers and settle for something less than complete independence.
It will be shown in subsequent chapters that Roy's views with respect to the revolutionary potential of the Indian proletariat altered considerably over the years. But the Roy-Lenin debate, nevertheless, has an important historical significance in that it marks the first attempt within the Comintem to formulate a policy which would successfully merge the revolutionary aspirations of nationalist anti-colonialism and communist anticapitalism. Disagreement over the degree of support to be given nationalist leaders as opposed to indigenous communist parties has continued to plague the international communist movement to the present day. The 1927 dispute between Stalin and Trotsky, and between Roy and Borodin, over the China policy provided dramatic evidence that these opposing views had not been reconciled at the Second World Congress. Stalin's campaign against Trotsky and the Left Opposition was followed by a struggle against Bukharin and the Right Opposition. Because of the prominent role played by the Russian communists in the Comintern, the struggle for power within the Soviet party inevitably spilled over into the international communist organization. The dispute between the Stalin and Bukharin factions within the party on domestic issues was reflected on the international level in the differences between the Comintem and the International Right Opposition, a group which emerged in 1928, over the attitude to adopt toward socialists in Western countries and nationalists in dependent areas. The opposition of Roy and his group to the strategy and tactics of the Communist Party of India (CPI) in the late 1920's and the early 1930's was a part of this latter controversy.
The conflict today between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China over the correct attitude to adopt toward nationalist regimes in underdeveloped areas, such as the Congress government in India, is the latest manifestation of the long-standing controversy, which dates back to the early days of the Comintern, over how to utilize nationalist movements for communist ends. This is recognized by Indian communists themselves. The communist leader and theoretician, Dr. Gangadhar M. Adhikari, in preparing a critique of E. M. S. Namboodripad's document "Revisionism and Dogmatism in the CPI," found it necessary to review the history of the debate within the international communist movement over the role of the national bourgeoisie. He takes as his starting point the 1920 Comintern Congress and argues that the roots of the present dispute between the Right CPI (the so-called "pro-Moscow" party) and the Left CPI (the so-called "pro-Peking" party) lie in the perennial controversy over the "role of the national bourgeoisie in our country, and in our national democratic revolution in its various phases." It is impossible to understand or evaluate the dispute which separates the two Indian parties without keeping in mind the context in which it is being carried on — the struggle for "national political independence (before liberation)," and its extension, the struggle for "national economic independence (after liberation)." The central problem, the author maintains, has always been, both before and after independence, how to unite with the national bourgeoisie, counteract its "compromising tendency" and, at the same time, build an independent communist party.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Communism and Nationalism in India by John Patrick Haithcox. Copyright © 1971 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
- Frontmatter, pg. i
- Table of Contents, pg. vii
- List of Illustrations, pg. xi
- Acknowledgments, pg. xiii
- Abbreviations, pg. 1
- Introduction, pg. 3
- 1. The Second Comintern Congress, pg. 11
- 2. The Dawn of Indian Communism, pg. 20
- 3. The CPI and the Workers′ and Peasants′ Party, pg. 37
- 4. The China Episode, pg. 58
- 5. The Radicalization of Indian Politics, pg. 80
- 6. The Sixth Comintern Congress, pg. 108
- 7. The Decline of Indian Communism, pg. 144
- 8. The Foundations of Royism in India, pg. 164
- 9. Left-Wing Unity and the Indian Nationalist Movement, pg. 215
- 10. Nationalism and Socialism, pg. 240
- 11. Twentieth-Century Jacobinism, pg. 259
- Notes, pg. 301
- Index, pg. 379