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Overview
The intellectual legacy of Confucianism has loomed large in efforts to understand China's past, present, and future. While Confucian ethics has been thoroughly explored, the question remains: what exactly is Confucian political thought? Classical Confucian Political Thought returns to the classical texts of the Confucian tradition to answer this vital question. Showing how Confucian ethics and politics diverge, Loubna El Amine argues that Confucian political thought is not a direct application of Confucian moral philosophy. Instead, contrary to the conventional view that Confucian rule aims to instill virtue in all members of society, El Amine demonstrates that its main aim is to promote political order.
El Amine analyzes key aspects of the Confucian political vision, including the relationship between the ruler and the people, the typology of rulers, and the role of ministers and government officials. She also looks at Confucianism’s account of the mechanisms through which society is to be regulated, from welfare policies to rituals. She explains that the Confucian conception of the political leaves space open for the rule of those who are not virtuous if these rulers establish and maintain political order. She also contends that Confucians defend the duty to take part in government based on the benefits that such participation can bring to society.
Classical Confucian Political Thought brings a new understanding to Confucian political theory by illustrating that it is not chiefly idealistic and centered on virtue, but rather realistic and driven by political concerns.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781400873944 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 09/01/2015 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 232 |
| File size: | 7 MB |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
Classical Confucian Political Thought
A New Interpretation
By Loubna El Amine
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2015 Princeton University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-4008-7394-4
CHAPTER 1
Ruler and Ruled
* * *
How should we describe the relationship between ruler and ruled in Confucian political thought? How is it best to understand the aims of Confucian government? The literature on early Confucianism largely involves two related sets of claims pertaining to these questions. On the one hand, it is argued, as I mentioned in the prologue, that Confucian government aims at the development of virtue in the populace. On the other hand, the concern with the people's well-being, physical and moral, is also used to argue for (proto-)democratic tendencies in early Confucianism. One large, interpretive problem burdens both sets of claims: the portrayal of the common people. Indeed, this portrayal suggests both that they are unlikely to become virtuous and that their role in choosing the ruler, or in having him removed from the throne, does not properly indicate consent.
This chapter sets the stage for the overarching thesis of the book by showing how the interpretive difficulties with the claims just mentioned can be solved by replacing the language of virtue and the language of democracy with the language of political order. What is meant by political order here, as will become clearer in what follows, is a simple idea: the administration of people who live together in a given territory for the sake of security and cooperation. I argue therefore, with Heiner Roetz, that "in general, the Confucians legitimize political rule as a precondition of a safe, peaceful, and civilized living together of men." This explains why, as I argue in the third part of this chapter, they countenance, even at points approve of, hegemons.
A concern with political order is usually recognized of Xunzi, but it is precisely because of this recognition that commentators set him apart from his predecessors, Confucius and Mencius, who are thought to be concerned only with virtue in government. Although there is no denying the differences in the thought of the three Confucian thinkers, my aim in this chapter, and the book more generally, is to emphasize the similarities.
The chapter proceeds as follows: I show, in the first section, that the qualities expected of the common people are not full-fledged Confucian virtues, but qualities pertaining to orderliness. I contend that the low level of expectations from the common people arises from viewing them as a "mass," as part of a perspective on politics that focuses on social groups, rather than on distinct individuals. In the second section, I show that the significance of the common people is not so much in choosing or removing a ruler, but in signaling the ruler's ability to maintain order. They so signal not by expressing individualized opinions, but by their physical movement, again as a "mass," away from, or in the direction of, the ruler. In the last part of the chapter, I turn to the Confucian discussion of hegemons, and I show that, contrary to received wisdom, the Confucians countenance hegemons because of the latter's ability to maintain political order.
The Virtue Argument
On the reading of early Confucianism presented in the prologue, in which Confucian politics is read through the lens of Confucian ethics, the aim of Confucian government is, as Hsiao Kung-chuan puts it, to make the common people "noble and virtuous in character and deed." In other words, its end is "transformation through teaching." Schwartz draws a comparison between the Confucians and Plato and Aristotle, arguing that, like the early Greeks, Confucius views the political community as an ethical society aimed at promoting morality. This explains, according to him, why it is the virtuous who are supposed to rule, and why providing for the welfare of the common people, a theme I will return to in the next chapter, is important: they can be hindered by adverse circumstances from achieving moral education. Schwartz cites Mencius on this: "Nowadays, the means laid down for the people are sufficient neither for the care of parents nor for the support of wife and children. In good years life is always hard, while in bad years there is no way of escaping death. Thus simply to survive takes more energy than the people have. What time can they spare for learning about rites and [rightness] (yi [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII])?"
The thought that Confucians view political life as geared toward promoting virtue in the common people appears to be the logical continuation of their emphasis on virtue, and the idea that all persons are equally capable of becoming virtuous: told that he was being spied on with the purpose of seeing whether he was the same as everyone else, Mencius retorts, "In what way should I be different from other people? Even [sage kings] Yao and Shun were the same as anyone else." Xunzi also believes that any person can become a Yu, Yu being the third sage king of antiquity, since, according to him, it is possible for all men to understand and to be able to practice ren, rightness, and regulations (fa [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]).
There also appears to be direct evidence in the Confucian texts for the view that Confucian government aims at the moral improvement of the common people. Consider, for example, Confucius's response to the question put to him by Ji Kangzi, one of the heads of the Ji family of the state of Lu, about the best way to govern. Confucius says, "To govern (zheng [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) is to correct (zheng [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). If you set an example by being correct, who would dare to remain incorrect?" The same Ji Kangzi asks for Confucius's advice about getting rid of thieves. Confucius answers, "If you yourself were not a man of desires, no one would steal even if stealing carried a reward." When asked by Ji Kangzi again about how to inculcate in the common people the virtues of reverence (jing [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), of dutifulness (zhong [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), and of enthusiasm (quan [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), Confucius answers, "Rule over them with dignity and they will be reverent; treat them with kindness and they will do their best; raise the good and instruct those who are backward and they will be imbued with enthusiasm." When asked by Zilu about government, he responds, "Encourage the people to work hard by setting an example yourself."
All of these passages indicate that it is possible for the ruler, by providing for the people, setting himself as a model (of correctness and lack of desires), treating the people with dignity and kindness, and promoting the worthy, to encourage the people toward moral reform. But what is also clear, and no less significant, about these passages and other similar ones is that they reveal that the qualities expected of the common people are not the cardinal Confucian virtues of ren [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], rightness (yi [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), and wisdom (zhi [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) that Confucius expects of himself and his disciples. In fact, I could only find two examples (in the Mencius) that associate the common people with one of these virtues.
That high virtue is not expected of the common people should not actually be surprising if one considers Confucius's view of the common people's intellectual abilities, expressed in his statement that "the common people can be made to follow it [i.e., the Confucian Way], but they cannot be made to understand (zhi [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) it." Similarly, Mencius says that the multitude (zhong [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) do not realize (zhu [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) what it is they practice, do not examine (cha [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) what they repeatedly do, and do not understand (zhi [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) the path they follow all their lives. For Xunzi, the virtue of the common people merely consists in following custom, treasuring material possessions, and nurturing their lives.
Even Hsiao admits that some people cannot actually be educated, and these "probably are not a minority," hence the Confucians' inevitable resort to punishment at times. For Yuri Pines, the reason why the Confucians' concern for fulfilling people's needs and reaching their hearts did not result in an institutionalized form of political participation from below (more on this in the next section) is due to the identification of commoners with petty men (xiaoren [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). He cites in this regard Mencius's approval of the common saying: "There are those who use their minds and there are those who use their muscles. The former rule (zhi [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]); the latter are ruled."
I suggest, based on the preceding, that people's dispositions are indeed meant to be improved by Confucian government, but that such improvement does not amount to the full-fledged pursuit of virtuousness. Instead, it is more accurate to see the dispositions sought for the common people (to refrain from stealing, to work hard, and to be "correct") as dispositions relating to orderliness, rather than virtuousness. The qualities expected of the common people can be elicited in statements that establish the effect virtuous rulership has on the former, and that reveal that there is in fact no expectation of a one-to-one correspondence between the virtue of the ruler and the qualities attained by the people. Thus Confucius argues, "When those above are given to the observance of the rites, the common people will be easy to command." Infuriated by Fan Chi's questions about growing crops, he answers, "When those above love the rites, none of the common people will dare to be irreverent (bujing [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]); when they love what is right, none of the common people will dare to be insubordinate (bufu [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]); when they love trustworthiness, none of the common people will dare to be insincere (buyongqing [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). In this way, the common people from the four quarters will come with their children strapped to their backs. What need is there to talk about growing crops?" Ritual propriety, rightness, and trustworthiness are thus matched with obedience and reverence, subordination, and sincerity, respectively. The latter set of qualities is also emphasized by Mencius and Xunzi. Thus Mencius contends that if the people are not provided for in times of plenty, then in times of need, when the ruler needs them to fight on his behalf, they could refuse to do so. Xunzi says that the common people should be filial, respect their elders, be honest and diligent, and not dare to be indolent or haughty.
In short, the qualities expected of the common people are qualities like reverence, subordination, honesty, diligence, and correctness. There is no talk here of ren, rightness, or wisdom. What is at stake, then, in statements to the effect that the people should learn about rites and duties, or that the ruler should teach (jiao [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and instruct (hui [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) them, is not a full-blown moral education, but instruction in qualities favorable to an orderly society. One can even understand the idea of "reform" in Confucius's famous statement that the goal of government should not be merely to keep people out of trouble, but also to encourage them to have a sense of shame (ITLχITL [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and to reform (ge [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) themselves, to simply mean the acquisition of the qualities listed above. Indeed, Schwartz recognizes this when he argues that the people are to be educated "to live up to the moral norms which should govern their lives within their families and communities. This does not mean that they must achieve the highest levels of knowledge or achieve the highest realization of ren."
But if this is true, then what should we make of the tension between the Confucians' insistence that anyone can become virtuous and the reluctance to describe the common people as being able to do so? To deal with this tension, David Hall and Roger Ames argue for "a perhaps blurred yet significant contrast between the amorphous, indeterminate mass of peasants (min [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), in themselves having little by way of distinguishing character or structure, and particular persons (ren [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII])." The depiction of the common people as an "amorphous, indeterminate mass," I contend, stems from the Confucians' adoption of what can be called an "external" or "sociological" point of view, which looks at society as a whole, thus considering social groups, rather than individuals, as units of analysis. This perspective can be contrasted with an "internal" or "individual-oriented" one that looks at moral development from the standpoint of each and every (socially embedded) individual. From the internal point of view, the theoretical possibility of becoming virtuous is emphasized because the Confucians do not believe that endowments of birth are different between individuals. In their position within society as a whole, however, individuals are part of social groups with distinguishing lifestyles. The common people, as Hall and Ames point out, were mostly peasants, and were thus engaged in daily manual labor. As such, they did not enjoy the leisure needed to invest their time in the mental and social activities required for moral perfection. Instead, they devoted their days to communal agricultural practices, and their worries were naturally related to their livelihood, which accounts for the passivity and lack of differentiation with which they are described.
This does not mean that individual peasants cannot, in theory, break out of their social group; it just means that they are, as a matter of fact, unlikely to be able to do so. This is indeed how I understand Mencius's claim in 1A.7: as opposed to taking it as conditional — if the common people lack constant means, then they lack constant hearts — I take it as descriptive — the common people lack constant means, therefore they lack constant hearts (in contradistinction to men of service [shi [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]] who have constant hearts without necessarily having constant means). Whether the common people would have constant hearts if they had constant means is in some sense beside the point, since it is not envisaged by Mencius or the early Confucians; as I argued in the prologue, the lens of an ideal theory in which hypothetical scenarios are envisioned is not the most obvious way to approach early Confucian political thought.
To reiterate my argument, the obstacle to the common people's moral and intellectual cultivation arises not from their ascriptive qualities, or their pedigree at birth, but from the social demands of the material life associated with the social group into which they are born. In other words, their limitation is not inborn but socially and economically imposed. There is therefore no contradiction between the Confucians' insistence on equal potential among all human beings, and their recognition that the common people, from the standpoint of their status as peasants, are unlikely to develop their potential for virtue. It is indeed telling that the only two anecdotes in which Mencius does associate the common people with ren and rightness are aimed at underscoring the importance of providing for them and ensuring their livelihood, exceptions that prove the rule that the emphasis should be on the latter, not the former.
To conclude, I have argued in this section that the idea that Confucian government aims at instilling virtue in the common people is unsustainable because the early Confucians very rarely associate the common people, viewed as a group, with virtue. I have also shown that the qualities expected of, and encouraged in, the common people are qualities worthy of an orderly society. In the following section, I further my discussion of the conception of the people in early Confucian thought by elucidating their role in the choice and removal of a ruler.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Classical Confucian Political Thought by Loubna El Amine. Copyright © 2015 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ixNote on Translations and Transliterations xi
Prologue 1
- Ethics and Politics in Classical Confucianism 2
- The Thesis of This Book 9
- Historical Background 16
- Chapter Outline 26
Chapter 1. Ruler and Ruled 29
- The Virtue Argument 30
- The People—Continued 37
- Hegemons 51
- Conclusion 61
Chapter 2. Rules and Regulations 62
- Security 63
- Welfare 68
- Promoting the Worthy 73
- Conclusion 80
Chapter 3. A Harmonious Society 82
- The Case against the Mohists 84
- Rituals 91
- Filiality 107
- Conclusion 114
Chapter 4. Rulers and Ministers 117
- Xunzi’s Vision 118
- Insubordinate Ministers 124
- Revisiting the Question of Virtuous Rulership 135
- Conclusion 140
Chapter 5. Political Involvement 143
- Biographical Preliminaries 144
- The Virtue of Political Involvement 145
- Dilemmas of Political Life 151
- Conclusion 174
Chapter 6. Heaven in Politics 176
- Heaven’s Allotments 180
- Uncertainty and Political Involvement 184
- Heaven’s Patterns 190
- Conclusion 193
Epilogue 194
Bibliography 197
Index 207
What People are Saying About This
"Combining deep scholarship, theoretical imagination, and lucid prose, El Amine gives us a more complex and yet more accessible Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi than they are ordinarily taken to be. This book brings their distinctive and subtle voices to the fore and is political philosophy at its best."—Stephen G. Salkever, Bryn Mawr College"Clarifying a Confucian conception of the political, this book contends that early Confucians were cognizant of the need for political order and counseled Confucian scholars to assume office with this in mind. El Amine marshals history and a sensitive and informed reading of the texts to make a forceful argument. Her book fills a significant hole in the scholarship of this subject area."—David Wong, Duke University"Showing that the relation between ethics and politics in Confucianism is not as straightforward as is often assumed, El Amine argues that early Confucian political thought aims primarily to produce political order for the whole society, not virtue in the populace as is commonly understood. A real contribution to the study of early Confucian political philosophy, her thought-provoking book altered my considered views by its final chapter."—Aaron Stalnaker, Indiana University