Chinese Nuclear Proliferation: How Global Politics Is Transforming China's Weapons Buildup and Modernization
198
Chinese Nuclear Proliferation: How Global Politics Is Transforming China's Weapons Buildup and Modernization
198Hardcover
-
PICK UP IN STORECheck Availability at Nearby Stores
Available within 2 business hours
Related collections and offers
Overview
As the gap between China's nuclear force and the forces of the nuclear superpowers narrows against the expressed interest of many nuclear and nonnuclear states, Chinese Nuclear Proliferation offers policy prescriptions to curtail China's nuclear growth and to assuage fears that the "American world order" presents a direct threat to China's national security. Presenting technical concepts with minimal jargon in a straightforward style, this book will be of use to casual China watchers and military experts alike.
Susan Turner Haynes is an assistant professor of political science at Lipscomb University in Nashville, Tennessee. Her work has appeared in Comparative Strategy and Asian Perspective.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781612348216 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Potomac Books |
| Publication date: | 07/01/2016 |
| Pages: | 198 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.80(d) |
About the Author
Susan Turner Haynes is an assistant professor of political science at Lipscomb University in Nashville, Tennessee. Her work has appeared in Comparative Strategy and Asian Perspective.
Read an Excerpt
Chinese Nuclear Proliferation
How Global Politics is Transforming China's Weapons Buildup and Modernization
By Susan Turner Haynes
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA PRESS
Copyright © 2016 Susan Turner HaynesAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-61234-844-5
CHAPTER 1
A Typology of Nuclear Strategies
China is often considered the most opaque of the declared nuclear weapon states owing to the ambiguity surrounding its nuclear stockpile, force structure, and fissile material holdings. Fortunately, however, rather than stymie academic research, this relative dearth of information has spurred additional curiosity and caused scores of scholars to probe more deeply for answers. These explorations have resulted in several competing theories regarding China's nuclear strategy. The primary debate involves whether China adheres to a strategy called minimum deterrence or whether it has transitioned to a more sophisticated strategy called limited deterrence.
Alastair Iain Johnston provides the best explanation of the difference between these two strategies. According to Johnston, minimum deterrence is characterized by the belief that deterrence can be achieved with only "a small number of warheads sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on a handful of enemy cities." Limited deterrence, by contrast, assumes nuclear weapons play a larger role in deterrence. This strategy, claims Johnston, requires that a state have "enough capabilities to deter conventional, theater, and strategic nuclear war, and to control and suppress escalation during a nuclear war." The goal is not to threaten damage ex post, but to limit damage in the ensuing attacks, matching enemy force at every level.
Since Johnston's writing, many scholars have contributed to the conversation, yet no one has chosen to situate China's nuclear position among the broader range of available strategies. This chapter aims to do just that by introducing five distinct types of deterrence. With a typology of nuclear deterrence strategies based on generalizable, identifiable, and measurable criteria, I am able to better explain China's nuclear strategy selection and compare it with the decisions of other nuclear weapon states over time. Only after I have explored which nuclear strategy China has chosen to employ, can I then examine how this affects China's nuclear force structure.
Deterrence Strategy
I begin this analysis by specifying what I mean when I refer to strategy. Though a ubiquitous term, "strategy" is not often well defined. In the Western lexicon, one of the most respected definitions originates with classic strategist Carl von Clausewitz, who defines military strategy as "the employment of battles to gain the end of war." Though laudable in its brevity, this definition fails to fully encapsulate the multifaceted nature of military strategy over time. More specifically, it fails to consider the military utility of actions other than force to advance a state's objectives. The definition adopted by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1987 illustrates a broader understanding of military means and ends. According to the JCS, military strategy is "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force."
The addition of threat to the definition of strategy is indicative of the larger shift in the international arena in the latter half of the twentieth century. Traditionally, states viewed the use of force as the preeminent means by which they could further their military and political objectives. After the introduction of nuclear weapons, however, some states began to challenge this presumption and perceive the use of threat as a viable strategic alternative. This is because states with nuclear weapons have the advantage of not just threatening harm, but threatening mass destruction and even mass annihilation within a shortened amount of time. The devastation that used to take days, weeks, or months can be achieved within minutes with nuclear weapons. This enables a state to have the ultimate leverage to manipulate an adversary's actions and achieve a specified objective. In most cases, the application of this concept led states to choose strategies of nuclear deterrence, where nuclear force was threatened in order to deter adversarial aggression.
Nuclear deterrence continues to be the strategic keystone of every nuclear weapon state. Yet as the number of nuclear weapon states has expanded and as the international environment has shifted, each state's practice of nuclear deterrence has evolved, resulting in a broad range of nuclear strategies. These strategies can vary greatly in their ends, ways, and means. In terms of objectives, for instance, a state can seek to use its nuclear forces to deter conventional aggression, deter nuclear aggression, deter nuclear coercion, deny military victory, or achieve military victory. The ways in which a state can achieve these objectives can also vary, with different parameters on nuclear use, different methods for force deployment, different levels of readiness, and different targeting tactics. These ways are influenced by a state's means, represented by the number and type of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles a state possesses.
The delineation of nuclear strategies in terms of ends, ways, and means is not far from the model adopted by Vipin Narang in his classification scheme of nuclear postures. Narang, for instance, differentiates nuclear postures on the basis of a state's number and type of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, the rules and procedures governing how and when weapons are deployed and released, the intended targets, and the command and control apparatus in place. His model, however, is incomplete because it does not address the fundamental assumptions or beliefs underlying each strategy. In contrast to conventional weapons, strategic nuclear weapons present state leaders with a unique ethical dilemma — forcing them to consider when, if ever, it is ethical to possess or use an innately indiscriminate weapon of war. Leaders responsible for shaping a state's nuclear strategy can have different answers to this question, and their answers often guide their strategic selection.
Oftentimes, these beliefs are expressed as unequivocal truths embedded in a state's nuclear discourse. This dimension of strategy is thus just as observable and measurable as ends, ways, and means. In fact, in some cases it is even more observable, since a state's nuclear capabilities — including the size and structure of its nuclear force — are often cloaked in secrecy. Adding this dimension to our classification of strategies thus enables researchers to observe signals of strategic shift before the advancement of a state's nuclear capabilities or a state's engagement in conflict. While an individual's beliefs may be intractable, beliefs over time across state leaders can change. The discussion that follows highlights the strategic choices available to the world's nuclear weapon states and the evolution over time of their decisions regarding which strategy to employ. Table 2 and figure 2 summarize this information.
Existential Deterrence
Existential deterrence is the least demanding of nuclear strategies and most often employed by nascent nuclear weapon states in an effort to avert nuclear or conventional war. States subscribing to this strategy generally assume that the mere possession of a nuclear bomb, regardless of its operability or method of delivery, is enough to deter aggression. The presumption in such cases is that a nuclear weapon is qualitatively distinct from a conventional weapon in terms of its destructive capacity. Nuclear weapons inflict violence of greater scope and with greater speed than any other weapon previously developed, and the corresponding assumption is that these weapons also generate greater fear. Under existential deterrence, this fear is viewed as capital.
Force Structure
Generally, to invoke this kind of fear, there must be evidence indicating that a state has the necessary means to create a nuclear weapon. This means, first and foremost, having access to either one of two key ingredients of a nuclear bomb: either plutonium (Pu-239) or highly enriched uranium (>90% U-235). Isotopes of Pu-239 and U-235 are distinct in that they can capture a low-energy thermal neutron, destabilize, split, and create a nuclear fissile chain reaction, producing enormous amounts of energy. When uncontrolled, this leads to a violent explosion. The difficulty is that this reaction requires a certain amount of each material, and this amount is not easily obtained. In the case of highly enriched uranium, for instance, mined uranium, which consists of less than 1 percent U-235, is enriched via a process of gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuges, or laser separation. Similarly, Pu-239 is the product of the intentional reprocessing of uranium spent fuel. These processes require considerable scientific and technical expertise. In particular, they require that a state have advanced metallurgists, chemical engineers, and nuclear engineers or physicists. Depending on a state's weapon of choice, a state must also have access to other resources, such as substantial amounts of nitric acid, electricity, and steel and iron. While a state's outright purchase of a nuclear weapon is not beyond the realm of comprehension (and a state can certainly claim as much), in most cases existential deterrence depends on a state's demonstration of indigenous nuclear weapon capability. This makes the threat more open-ended and ongoing.
Conditions of Use
States with less developed nuclear weapon programs are acutely aware of their qualitative and quantitative disadvantage vis-à-vis other more mature nuclear weapon states, and they respond by intentionally casting a tenebrous picture of their nuclear weapon capabilities. In such cases, verifiable evidence of weapon production or the intent of production is enough to sow seeds of doubt in other states, but it can also be an invitation for a preventive attack. To hedge against this possibility, states under existential deterrence must convert doubt into fear. This conversion, in most cases, requires a policy of ambiguity not only on nuclear capability but also on nuclear use. This amounts to a state keeping the nuclear option open while sending signals that strategically intermix fact with fiction. A state can consistently deny its nuclear weapon capabilities or exaggerate its capabilities, while at the same time remaining silent about if or when it would use these capabilities. It could also issue vague threats to the effect that if it is attacked, it can and will pursue counteraction. Under existential deterrence, a state signals possible retaliation rather than certain retaliation, on the basis of the belief that this possibility is enough to enhance a state's security.
Targeting
States with minimum nuclear capabilities subscribing to a strategy of existential deterrence are not likely to have an explicit targeting policy, since this would contradict the carefully woven narrative of doubt. This is not to say, however, that a targeting policy does not exist. Existential deterrence relies on fear, and the greatest fear comes from imagining the greatest harm. Nuclear weapons make possible what was previously unthinkable — the quick death of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. By targeting an enemy's cities (a targeting tactic known as counter-value targeting), a state can use its weapons to greatest effect — by holding hostage something of value to an opponent. This tactic is also desirable for new nuclear weapon states because it requires less precise weapons. After all, cities are large, permanent, and known targets.
Cases
The state of Israel has long relied on a strategy of existential deterrence. While Israeli officials often reaffirm Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region, these statements belie the widespread belief that Israel has had nuclear weapon capability since the late 1960s. This capability was made possible by France, which supplied Israel with a twenty-four-megawatt nuclear reactor and plutonium reprocessing center in 1957. An American engineer later "discovered" this center at Dimona in 1960. Later that decade, the U.S. State Department concluded that "Israel might very well now have a nuclear bomb," or if it didn't, it at least "had the technical ability and material resources to produce weapons grade uranium for a number of weapons." This conclusion was also included in a 1974 report by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) alongside speculation involving Israel's development of a nuclear-capable ballistic missile.
Though Israel did not admit to having either a nuclear bomb or a nuclear-capable delivery system, its refusal to sign the NPT and its rejection of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections did little to appease suspicions. These suspicions were seemingly substantiated by the public confession of nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu in 1986, when he supplied the Sunday Times of London with sixty photographs and a detailed description of the nuclear weapon program at the Dimona facility. Yet even Vanunu's statement did not break Israel's silence. Israel never admitted to having nuclear weapons, nor did it ever issue veiled threats implying nuclear use. The only thing it has admitted is the political utility of a strategy of nuclear ambiguity; as Israel's prime minister Ariel Sharon said, "Israel has to hold in its hands all the elements of power necessary to protect itself by itself. Our policy of ambiguity on nuclear arms has proved its worth, and it will continue."
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (henceforth North Korea) is more vocal than Israel on its entry into the nuclear club. It has repeatedly issued nuclear threats and demonstrated its nuclear weapon capability with several nuclear tests. Yet despite the state's conspicuous behavior, North Korea's nuclear program remains largely a mystery, since this country too has chosen to pursue a strategy of existential deterrence.
North Korea's nuclear capabilities date back to the early 1960s, when it constructed the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center with help from the Soviet Union. The Soviet IRT-2000 nuclear research reactor was used to produce civilian nuclear energy and was under IAEA safeguards. North Korea later expanded its operations to include uranium milling, fuel rod fabrication, and plutonium reprocessing, yet it still signed the NPT as a nonnuclear state. It also signed a joint declaration with South Korea in 1991, promising not to test, develop, procure, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.
This promise and North Korea's NPT membership were short-lived. In 1997 North Korea's highest ranking defector, Hwang Jang-yop, revealed that President Kim Jong-il had confirmed the state's nuclear capabilities in a private conversation. In 2003 North Korea withdrew from the NPT. Two years later, another defector came forward, describing in detail the nuclear bomb held at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. His statements were seemingly confirmed by state nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013.
Although North Korea's rhetoric and actions are much more ostentatious than Israel's and its capabilities are much less mature, both countries perceive value in keeping their nuclear capabilities and conditions of use ambiguous. This is likely because, thus far, nuclear ambiguity has enabled both states to avoid military conflict. In fact, there is a historical precedent of states successfully employing existential deterrence to avert aggression. Pakistan and India are prime examples. Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan's former ambassador to the United States, explains, "Although existential deterrence had its doubters both in and outside of the region, it was believed to work by substantially reducing the chances of preemptive escalation because of the profound first-strike uncertainty imposed by nuclear ambiguity. Since neither [India nor Pakistan] could be sure about the number, location and operational readiness of the other's nuclear weapons, this minimised the possibility of preemption or launching successful counterforce strikes."
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Chinese Nuclear Proliferation by Susan Turner Haynes. Copyright © 2016 Susan Turner Haynes. Excerpted by permission of UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
1. A Typology of Nuclear Strategies
2. Force Structure Variance
3. China’s Nuclear Strategy
4. The Influence of America
5. The Influence of Regional Powers
6. The Influence of Prestige
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index