Bureaucracy At War: U.s. Performance In The Vietnam Conflict

Bureaucracy At War: U.s. Performance In The Vietnam Conflict

by Robert W. Komer
Bureaucracy At War: U.s. Performance In The Vietnam Conflict

Bureaucracy At War: U.s. Performance In The Vietnam Conflict

by Robert W. Komer

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Overview

Bureaucracy At War U.S. Performance In The Vietnam Conflict is an encyclopaedic analysis of many issues raised in the course of the Vietnam War. Komer questions the presence of the U.S in South-east Asia as well as tackling technical, strategic, tactical, military and non-military issues.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780367156138
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Publication date: 10/31/2022
Pages: 192
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x (d)

Table of Contents

Foreword William E. Colby x

Preface xiv

List of Acronyms xvi

1 Vietnam Was Different, and We Knew It 1

Notes 6

2 Why Did We Do So Poorly? 9

The Gap Between Policy and Performance 10

The Weakness of the Saigon Regime 12

The incremental Nature of Our Approach 13

The Role of Institutional Constraints 15

Notes 19

3 The Flawed Nature of Our Chosen Instrument 21

U.S. Failure to Move the GVN 24

The Issue of Leverage 32

Notes 38

4 Institutional Constraints on U.S. Performance 41

Overmilitarization of the War 41

Mirror-Imaging and Conventional Response, 1954-1964 44

The Military Play Out Their Institutional Repertoires 48

The Air War Against the North 52

The Strategy of Attrition 56

Intelligence Inadequacies 60

U.S. Civilian Agencies Also Play Out Their Institutional Repertoires 62

Notes 65

5 Institutional Obstacles to the Learning Process 69

Institutional Inertia 70

Lack of Institutional Memory 72

Skewed Incentive Patterns 73

Inadequate Analysis of Performance 74

Notes 78

6 Lack of Unified Management 81

U.S. Conflict Management-Who Ran the Store in Washington? 84

Who Was in Charge in Saigon? 89

Weakness of GVN Conflict Management 92

Why Such Fragmented Conflict Management? 94

U.S. and GVN Fight Two Separate Wars 97

Lack of Adequate Overall Plans 104

Notes 107

7 Attempts at Adaptive Response 111

Technological Innovation 112

Institutional Adaptation 113

Pacification 1967-1972: An Example of Institutional Innovation 115

The Unprecedented U.S. Advisory Effort 122

Notes 129

8 Was There a Viable Alternative Strategy? 133

The Eisenhower Period-1954 to 1960 136

The Kennedy Years-1961 to 1963 137

Pacification Takes a Back Seat-1965 to 1966 140

Renewed Debate over Strategy-1966 to 1967 141

The Post-TET Reassessment 145

Why Was the Pacification Alternative Neglected for So Long? 147

Would a Pacification Alternative Have Worked? 150

Notes 154

9 What Lessons Can Be Learned? 159

Flaws in GVN/U.S. Performance 159

The Requisites of Adaptive Response 165

Ways of Forcing Adaptation 167

Achieving Adequate Performance from Allies 170

Notes 173

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