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But as Lloyd Clark, a leading British military historian and academic, argues in Blitzkrieg, much of our understanding of this victory, and blitzkrieg itself, is based on myth. Far from being a foregone conclusion, Hitler’s plan could easily have failed had the Allies been even slightly less inept or the Germans less fortunate. The Germans recognized that success depended not only on surprise, but on avoiding being drawn into a protracted struggle for which they were not prepared. And while speed was essential, 90% of Germany’s ground forces were still reliant on horses, bicycles, and their own feet for transportation. There was a real fear of defeat. Their surprise victory proved the apex of their achievement; far from being undefeatable, Clark argues, the France 1940 campaign revealed Germany and its armed forces to be highly vulnerable—a fact dismissed by Hitler as he began to plan for his invasion of the Soviet Union.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780802125132 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Grove/Atlantic, Inc. |
| Publication date: | 09/20/2016 |
| Pages: | 480 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.40(w) x 8.60(h) x 1.70(d) |
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Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
Ingredients
There are always antecedent causes. A beginning is an artifice, and what recommends one over another is how much sense it makes of what follows.
Ian McEwan, Enduring Love
You live in interesting times. Interesting times are always enigmatic times that promise no rest, no prosperity or continuity or security. [In our age] there coexist a number of incompatible forces, none of which can either win or lose ... Never has humanity joined so much power and so much disarray, so much anxiety and so many playthings, so much knowledge and so much uncertainty.
Paul Valéry, poet and philosopher, in a prize-giving speech at a Paris lycée in 1932
IT WAS THE END FOR WARSAW and Poland. After days and nights of pounding by the Germans, the nation's leadership reviewed the situation. The city's brave civilians could, and would, continue their resistance if necessary, but to what ends? Not for the first time in Polish history, the enemy was grinding Warsaw's buildings into dust, its barely recognizable streets filled with thousands of dead. Further fighting was deemed to be futile and there seemed to be no hope of salvation. On 28 September 1939, a spokesman of the High Command announced in a clear, cold voice that 'After twenty days of heroic defence ... [and] practically the destruction of half the city' an armistice had been agreed and conditions for capitulation were being discussed. It was a remarkable military achievement for Germany, which was now reaping the benefits of Hitler's investment in the nation's military machine. Swift and effective, the campaign filled the excited German chancellor with a confidence that was evident to senior officers at a Führer Conference on 27 September at which he announced his intentions to invade the West. A long-held ambition was to be realized: France was to be invaded and the humiliation of 1918 and 1919 avenged. Yet Hitler's audience, still digesting events in Poland, was stunned by the news. Neither the army (Heer) nor the air force (Luftwaffe) believed that they could possibly be ready in time: disengagement and post-surrender duties would vie with the need to relocate, rearm and reorganize, to learn lessons and train and plan accordingly – the list was endless. Hitler had anticipated their concerns – in his view this was the apprehension of the feeble – but his attempt to remind the military professionals of victories over the old enemy in 1815 and 1870 was not relevant in the circumstances. Further attempts to reassure them with ideological mumbo-jumbo about the German soldier's 'natural superiority' which, when combined with 'experience and aggressiveness', made a German division 'worth more than a French division' also failed to hit their mark. General Franz Halder, Chief of Staff to the Army High Command (OKH), could not hide his misgivings and expressed his belief that any invasion plans for the West would have to be delayed by months or even years if the necessary preparations were to be made. Hitler dismissed the opinion. 'The relative strength will not improve in our best interests,' he said testily. 'The enemy strength will gradually improve. ...' The meeting was left under no illusion that Hitler, as Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces, sought invasion before the year was out.
Hitler's Führer Directive No. 6, dated 9 October 1939, provided a little more detail about his ambitions towards France and spoke of a 'swift and shattering blow in the West' in an attack through Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. The aim was to:
[D]efeat as much as possible of the French Army and of the forces of the allies fighting on their side, and at the same time to win as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France to serve as a base for the successful prosecution of the air and sea war against England and as a wide protective area for the economically vital Ruhr.
Keen to instil a sense of urgency into proceedings and to guide OKH's planning of the invasion, Hitler followed the directive with a Führer Conference the very next day. Here he asserted that an attack against France would prove 'no more difficult than Poland' although, he conceded, a decision might only be achieved after Germany had been 'forced into positional' warfare. Such a situation was deemed a distinct possibility because it was accepted that, despite significant improvements to the German military over recent years, any invasion would still need to outflank the Maginot Line to the north and so run into a waiting enemy in central Belgium. Altogether, it was an undertaking that horrified the generals as they considered the damage which was likely to be done to their still-developing military machine, and one they thought could well end in defeat.
General Wilhelm Keitel, the chain-smoking head of Hitler's strategic decision-making body Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) who was 'temperamentally unequipped to deal with Hitler' and trusted his brilliance unreservedly, offered his resignation over the issue, but it was refused. General Walther von Brauchitsch, the commander-in-chief of the army who was becoming increasingly deferential to the Supreme Commander, nonetheless shared his field army commanders' concerns that the operational challenges involved in the scheme were too great. One of their number was the dour General Wilhelm von Leeb, of whom a fellow officer said if he 'ever tried to smile, it would crack his face'. He had recently been called out of retirement to command Army Group C, had lost a son in the Polish campaign and was one of several senior officers who used the word 'insane' to describe Hitler's proposal. In the wake of the new directive, private conversations were had between old professional colleagues, but although they agreed that an invasion was ill-advised, it did not take them long to recognize the futility of encouraging an argument with a man whose mind was already made up.
Disagreement and friction between Hitler and his senior generals was not a new phenomenon and gained an edge as the Führer's demands became more exacting and risky. Hitler felt threatened by the traditional and aristocratic Prussian officer class, with their influence, easy confidence, sense of entitlement and conservatism – didn't these men want to fight? In return, the generals despised his lack of self-control, his political fanaticism, his cult of personality and the power he had accumulated, even if they did share his vision of a Germany returning to greatness. Most found their Führer and his associates boorish, stained by the politics of the gutter, and believed him ill-suited to be their country's leader, let alone their Supreme Commander. Hitler had assumed this position in 1938 and exploited the officer corps' abiding sense of honour by having them all swear a personal oath of loyalty and obedience to him: he needed to control these leaders of men and to harness their professionalism in order to achieve his political aims in Europe. To which end, he used OKW as his central military staff; it had been formed in 1935 to replace the War Ministry and direct the service commands and was comprised of both loyal and competent men. These officers took Hitler's strategic ideas and translated them into orders that were passed on to the subordinate service commands, whose latitude of action was increasingly confined solely to operational issues. Further undermining their influence, Hitler rarely invited service chiefs to the same Führer Conferences and ruled by creating division. Disunited, the services posed less of a threat to OKW's strategic plans.
Hitler was particularly keen to neuter OKH since Germany was a great land power and the army had always directed strategy and acted as the politicians' principal adviser on war policy. By succeeding in this, he made the General Staff less a focal point for military creativity and more an organization which turned his strategic whim into operational reality. Nevertheless, as the autumn of 1939 set in and winter loomed, Hitler believed that OKH was deliberately and unnecessarily vacillating over the production of its own plans. Frustrated and sensing treachery, he decided that it was time to reassert his authority and on 23 November held a command conference at the imposing new Reich Chancellery on Berlin's Vossstrasse at which he reaffirmed: 'My decision is unalterable. I will attack France and England at the best and soonest moment ... I will stop at nothing and I will annihilate anybody who is against me.' OKH's reaction was immediate, the tipping point had been reached, and staff officers – led by Halder – did their utmost to produce a plan that would satisfy the Supreme Commander.
OKH's concerns about Germany's ability to emerge victorious in a campaign in the West remained undiminished, despite the successful outcome of the Poland campaign. The recent strengthening of the armed forces had been welcomed by the service chiefs, but it had been a long and arduous road to recover from the strict military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. During the 1920s, a number of talented officers had seen the armed forces through intensive care, waiting patiently until strength could be regained. Nurturing both the physical and intellectual abilities of the new Reichswehr, a quasi-military organization, early in this period was General Hans von Seeckt. Intelligent and shrewd, as head of the 'defence force' from 1920 to 1926 he laid the foundations for a new, modern German military ready to contest industrialized warfare. It was von Seeckt who put the German military on a course that his successors duly followed, and Hitler took full advantage of this gift and, in full defiance of Versailles, openly rearmed.
Just weeks after coming to power in January 1933, Hitler announced to his ministerial colleagues that 'billions of marks are necessary for German rearmament ... the future of Germany depends exclusively and alone on the rebuilding of the armed forces. Every other task must take second place to rearmament. ...' This, together with the reintroduction of conscription in 1935, was part of a process of mass mobilization for war. The German people, keen to right the wrongs of 1919, were carefully conditioned for war and came to believe their destiny was closely tied to the military and personal sacrifice. Meanwhile, the armed forces prospered in the knowledge that they were an essential part of Hitler's vision. A glimpse of the future was provided in March 1936 with the reoccupation of the Rhineland by German troops. Although this risky operation involved just three battalions of infantry and two squadrons of aircraft, Hitler believed it essential if Germany was to confront the status quo successfully. As it was, France blinked first, and Germany stepped back into the international sunlight. The confidence that the episode gave Hitler further fuelled the nation's preparations for war. Within a year, almost every area of economic life had been brought under the control of the Nazi state and the speed of rearmament was increased. By 1938, Germany was spending 17 per cent of its GNP on the military (it had been 3 per cent in 1914). This was twice the figure for both Britain and France, and in 1939 it rose to 23 per cent. Yet the tempo of rearmament was sometimes impossible to maintain. In 1936, for example, there was a plan to increase the army's forty divisions to over 100 and to have them ready for action three years later. Within twelve months, however, the schedule was thrown into disarray as half of the 1937 target was missed. Hitler, though, displayed a stubborn unwillingness to accept reality, and he refused to acknowledge the army's advice that they would not be ready for a general war until 1943. Such, in fact, was the senior officers' pessimism that they argued that the Westwall – nearly 400 miles of defences on the border with France which sought to deter an attack in the West, and particularly one undertaken to aid France's allies in the East – would not be completed until 1953.
The military consistently challenged the demanding schedule required by Hitler's unfurling foreign policy. In the wake of the Anschluss with Austria during May 1938, for example, while the army had concerns about aspects of their performance which demanded attention, Hitler looked to use force in Czechoslovakia. Major General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW, noted in his diary at the time: 'Sharp controversy between Hitler and army leaders. Hitler says: we must go ahead this year, the army says we cannot.' The invasion of Czechoslovakia was eventually replaced by a negotiated settlement, but Hitler was furious that his clenched fist had been prised open into a handshake. As he eschewed anything that smacked of German weakness, the military had to fight a constant battle to make Hitler recognize the practicalities involved in the application of force. Yet while the military wanted to develop its strength and capability, Hitler was keen to strike as early as possible in order not to give his enemies more time to prepare. He could not help being vexed by the military's persistent handwringing, even if he also knew that the Germans were still not ready for another war. His response was characteristic: the service chiefs would be brought into line and the population's mental conditioning would be completed through a renewed propaganda effort. The armed forces were given another year to develop muscle – and, in Hitler's eyes, a spine – and the populace to become hardened to the idea of war. Both would be tested at the end of the summer of 1939 by the invasion of Poland. But while the German people were relatively keen to see territory lost at Versailles regained, the generals recognized that the invasion would very likely lead to war with France and Britain.
As it was, by August 1939 the armed forces were on standby once again and a sense of anticipation gripped the nation. Uniforms were to be seen everywhere while barracks, training areas and new airfields sprang up across the country. By this time, Germany's armed forces had grown to over 4,564,000 personnel – 3,737,104 in the army, 677,000 in the Luftwaffe and 150,000 in the navy – out of a population of 80 million. Yet such figures hint more at potential capability, and the generals were very aware that only 1.31 million troops were in active units, 647,000 were fully trained in reserve, around 1.8 million were partly trained and 808,000 had received no training at all. This meant that the field army of 103 divisions that had been raised in four waves was of widely varying quality. The first wave consisted of fifty-two active divisions – fifteen of which were armoured and motorized – with 78 per cent regulars and the remainder being reservists recently released from active duty. These divisions were fully trained and equipped. In contrast, the third wave was comprised of fourteen divisions containing men up to the age of forty-five who had not been trained since 1918, and a supply train that contained more horses than trucks. Indeed, equipment and weapons were in such short supply that the field army had thirty-four divisions that were only half-equipped. To this end, von Leeb informed Halder that the third-wave divisions were only fit for static defence and the fourth wave needed more training to be capable of anything.
But while past German military success had been firmly rooted in its army, air power was now a factor too, which meant that the Luftwaffe also had to be carefully developed. Central to this was the identification of whether it would be most effective at the strategic, operational or tactical level, or a mix of all three. Reichsminister of aviation and former fighter pilot Hermann Göring was keen on the strategic potential of heavy bombers to bring about a rapid and decisive victory. Even so, by 1935 Germany had proved unable to produce the 450 aircraft required and changed tack towards a more flexible air fleet. Evidence of this can be seen in August 1939, for by this date the Luftwaffe's operational strength included 788 fighters, 431 long-range fighters, 361 dive-bombers, 1,542 medium bombers, 630 reconnaissance aircraft and 488 transport aircraft. It was an impressive force and certainly offered more potential than the navy, which became relatively neglected because, other than its U-boats, it was deemed to offer few strategic advantages. Indeed, as Admiral Erich Raeder, its commander-in-chief, noted: 'The navy is not ready for the great fight with England. The only thing the fleet can do is to prove that it can sink honourably.'
Yet although both the army and air force had mass by August 1939, their potential for offensive success depended on the application of the relevant fighting methods and how well those methods could be integrated into a suitable operational plan. Throughout the rapid development of air and ground forces under the Nazis, staff officers had to remain keenly aware of what Hitler might ask the military to achieve, against whom and where. It was these considerations, therefore, that shaped German doctrine and thence, procurement, organization and training. That doctrine was built on the foundations laid by von Seeckt and his successors which sought not only to provide the basis for a large army but also, through the hard work of a general staff – the brain of the army – an intelligent one. It demanded excellence in every facet of the Reichswehr in order to make it the best small force anywhere. Its officers, from whom the general staff were chosen, were rigorously and competitively selected, trained and educated. It was a system that produced a doctrine that was to remain influential throughout the opening years of the war, but also a general staff that was instinctively deferential to history and tradition, and therefore uncomfortable with the unorthodox and radical.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Blitzkrieg"
by .
Copyright © 2016 Lloyd Clark.
Excerpted by permission of Grove Atlantic, Inc..
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Table of Contents
List of Illustrations,
List of Maps,
Prologue,
Introduction,
Chapter 1: Ingredients,
Chapter 2: Plans,
Chapter 3: Final Preparations,
Chapter 4: 10 May – Forward,
Chapter 5: 11–12 May – To the Meuse,
Chapter 6: 13 May – Crossing the Meuse,
Chapter 7: 14–15 May – Counter-Attacks and Exploitation,
Chapter 8: 16–20 May – Crisis of Command and the Coast,
Chapter 9: 21–24 May – Arras, Weygand and the Halt Order,
Chapter 10: 25 May–4 June – Withdrawal and Evacuation,
Chapter 11: 5–8 June – Fall Rot and Resilience,
Chapter 12: 9–22 June – Driving South, Paris and Armistice,
Epilogue,
Conclusion,
Order of Battle,
Endnotes,
Select Bibliography,
Acknowledgements,
Index,