Between Philosophy and History: The Resurrection of Speculative Philosophy of History within the Analytic Tradition

by Haskell Fain

Overview

This work provides a welcome antidote to some of the distortions and biases which the two dominant schools of Anglo-American philosophical thinking, logical positivism and ordinary language analysis have introduced into the philosophy of history in the past three or four decades. In particular, it challenges two powerful stereotypes: that philosophy and history are conceptually independent of each other; and that there exists a sharp division between "analytical" (reputable) and "speculative" (disreputable) philosophy of history. By offering and defending his own conception of philosophy, the author seeks to show that there is indeed common ground between philosophy and history, that speculative philosophy of history lies between philosophy and history, not because it is neither philosophy nor history, but because it is both philosophy and history.

Originally published in 1970.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691647791
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	04/19/2016
Series:	Princeton Legacy Library , #1706
Pages:	342
Product dimensions:	6.20(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.20(d)

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Between Philosophy and History

The Resurrection of Speculative Philosophy of History within the Analytic Tradition

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By Haskel L. Fain

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1970 Princeton University Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-07158-9

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Some Anglo-Saxon Philosophical Attitudes

THIS IS A BOOK about philosophy written for historians as well as philosophers. Its particular focus is the philosophy of history. It is not a manual of the philosophy of history; the object is not to systematize or summarize those topics and issues that have most concerned professional philosophers. Professional philosophers tend to treat the philosophy of history as if it were a province of philosophy firmly under their control, whereas it is, in fact, border country. Those philosophers who write about the philosophy of history usually assume their audience to have an insider's knowledge of philosophy as well as the patience to examine adaptations of philosophical arguments, themselves somewhat threadbare from the use they have received elsewhere, to the subject matter of history. Certain conceptual difficulties allegedly facing the historian are exposed while philosophy itself somehow remains intact — this despite the fact that Anglo-American philosophy is just beginning to recover from a series of searching, yet simultaneously paralyzing, reexaminations by philosophers themselves.

In the last three or four decades, the two most influential schools of Anglo-American philosophy, logical positivism and the "ordinary language" movement, have given the discipline a different and tart flavor by bringing into question the value of philosophy itself. Not that this inquest has dampened philosophical reflection and analysis. Quite the contrary. Just as the spiritual withdrawal counseled by Stoic doctrine seemed to spur Roman Stoics to greater involvement in the practical affairs of the Empire, so nihilism in philosophy appears to breed more philosophizing. Philosophical nihilism, however, has affected decidedly the attitudes of contemporary philosophers toward their subject, and this change of perspective has naturally carried over into the philosophy of history, so much so that it is impossible for historians to assess recent philosophical discussions of history without some knowledge of the history of contemporary philosophy. True, the messianic impulse which fathered each of the two schools — the programmatic zeal to undertake a total revision of traditional philosophical practices — has largely dissipated. An Anglo-American philosopher today can call himself a metaphysician and almost keep a straight face. Nonetheless, even the new Anglo-American attitudes carry echoes of philosophical Hassliebe. The basis for the love-hate relationship between philosophers and philosophy needs airing.

The credo of the logical positivist, as stated by A. J. Ayer in his Language, Truth and Logic (1936), was that "the philosopher is not in a position to furnish speculative truths, which would, as it were, compete with the hypotheses of science, nor yet to pass a priori judgements upon the validity of scientific theories. ... [Rather,] his function is to clarify the propositions of science by exhibiting their logical relationships, and by defining the symbols which occur in them." In abandoning traditional metaphysics, the positivists fell upon science as providing the only possible way through which reality could be confronted and understood. Curiously, their idea of science seemed to rest upon an unquestioned use of the old Comtean hierarchy — physics before biology, biology before psychology, and so on — although they for the most part ignored Comte. The net effect of relying upon this taxonomy was that the concepts and modes of explanation and aims of the most "advanced" sciences tended to provide the models for inquiries of lesser rank. The logical positivists were timorous and respectful with regard to the "hard" or physical sciences; they became much more bold and assertive when "clarifying" the propositions of the "softer" sciences, often playing the role of a credentials committee. Had physics remained deterministic, the positivists would, no doubt, have been completely impatient with the statistical modes of explanation employed in the social sciences. Statistical accounts would have been regarded solely as temporary and theoretically replaceable substitutes for causal explanations. Even as it was, in essays presumably written for social scientists, the positivists put greater effort into explicating the nature of causal than into clarifying statistical explanation. History, insofar as it emerged into separate focus at all, was at best considered the softest of the soft sciences, blending imperceptibly into sociology. At that end of the scale the spirit of Comte reigned unchallenged. Any distinct characteristics deserving of serious notice, it sometimes seemed, stemmed from the circumstance that statements about the past are not subject to direct verification. Some positivists, in an effort to preserve the scientific status of history (which for them meant its intellectual respectability), went so far as to suggest that statements about the past are really disguised statements about documents and artifacts. Except for this minority view, history was held to be simply sociology cum documents, incapable of raising intellectual problems worthy of special attention.

The ordinary language school of philosophy, which grew out of and gradually eclipsed logical positivism, has also been tinged with skepticism toward philosophy. Skepticism toward philosophy, though, is quite the reverse of philosophical skepticism. Skepticism, provided it is of the right kind and is introduced on the proper occasion, is the animus of philosophy. A philosophical or skeptical question differs profoundly from an ordinary question. The point of a well-placed philosophical question, I want to argue, is to provoke reflection about concepts, concepts whose normal applications may be so familiar that they would escape notice entirely were it not for the skeptic's barbs. The official ordinary language attitude toward philosophical questions is quite different from this: an important tenet of the movement has been that the sting of some, many, or all philosophical questions (depending upon how radical an ordinary language philosopher one is) can be withdrawn by a refusal to depart from the ordinary employment of questions in practical deliberation and positive inquiry. "A philosophical question is not solved," wrote Friedrich Waismann in the mid-1950's, "it dissolves. And in what does the 'dissolving' consist? In making the meaning of the words used in putting the question so clear to ourselves that we are released from the spell it cast on us. ... [It] therefore was a confusion about the use of language. ... It is here that philosophy and grammar meet."

The ordinary language philosopher views history in a far more cordial manner than did the positivist. Indeed, his inclination is to protect the autonomy of history by defending the historian's right to continue using his concepts and modes of explanation as he has traditionally employed them. Ludwig Wittgenstein's dictum that "ordinary language is in order as it is" has been transmuted into the general opinion that ordinary history is all right. When the philosopher (here read "logical positivist") attempts to apply the rules and standards of other disciplines to the writing of history, the historian who listens will develop "mental cramps," which is the ordinary language jargon for "having a philosophical problem." To the positivist claim that causal explanation in history must be the same as that found in the sciences — in particular, that causal explanation cannot be achieved without explicit mention of general laws — the ordinary language retort is that the positivist account creates philosophical difficulties for the historian. Although the historian is unable to come up with general laws of history, he often attempts to explain historical events causally. Hence, the historian faces a dilemma if the positivist analysis of causal explanation (as well as of science) is correct: either he must cease being a historian and become a scientist, or he must surrender his traditional right and vested interest in explaining historical events.

If historians took this dilemma seriously, the writing of history would undergo radical change. But why, one might ask, is this dilemma a philosophical one? Because, according to the ordinary language philosopher, it need never have arisen if philosophers, wrongheaded philosophers, had not attempted to arrive at a general formula for the use of the word "cause." "The man who is philosophically puzzled," said Wittgenstein in The Blue Book, "sees a law in the way a word is used, and, trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results. ... Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us."

The moral, as it is understood by some who were influenced by Wittgenstein, is that there is no single rule of language adequate to cover all the uses of the term "cause," though the positivist makes it appear as if there is. Careful examination of the diverse applications of the great variety of causal expressions found in ordinary language (plain English, to be precise), such as "impel," "influence," "occasion," "originate," "bring on," "produce," and so on, will reveal that there is not one concept of causation but a family of them and that some of the concepts can be applied successfully without a knowledge of general laws. By sticking to these, the historian can carry on, quite untroubled by philosophical Angst. How ironic that the positivist account of causal explanation, itself designed to eliminate metaphysical wool-gathering, should be attacked by the ordinary language philosopher in part on the ground that it raises, rather than settles, philosophical problems!

I have written this book in the hope of communicating an insider's perspective on contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Before a historian can assess adequately what contemporary philosophers say about history, he must have some notion of what philosophers think about philosophy and philosophizing. It is frequently difficult to discern what a philosopher believes to be philosophically at stake when he writes about the study of history. Quite often a problem that perplexes the historian is used by the philosopher as an occasion to enter the lists against other philosophers. The particular battle may appear to be about the reliability of historical evidence, the nature of historical explanation, or the status of value judgments in history, but the real war is taking place off stage.

Despite recent gropings for an entente cordiale between philosophy and history, the interest of the ordinary language philosopher in history differs markedly from that traditionally shown by philosophers on the Continent. It is not unfair to characterize most Anglo-American philosophy from the eighteenth century on as profoundly ahistorical in temperament. There is little fascination with how things change in time or with the effect of broader historical change on moral, intellectual, or philosophical outlook. There are exceptions, of course. One is found in some recent work in the philosophy of science which exhibits a far deeper awareness of the history of science than hitherto. Nevertheless, few modern philosophers in England and America have contributed challenging historical perspectives, even in the history of philosophy. One easily gets the erroneous impression that the impetus for the history of philosophy comes solely from within, that it proceeds sealed off from the stormy winds of broader intellectual controversy. I believe a more apt conception is that philosophy moves in the calm centers of great historical hurricanes.

The divergence between history and philosophy in England and America is perhaps best personified by David Hume, a philosopher and a historian but not both at once. His principal ideas in philosophy did not stem from his concern with history; rather, when he turned to history, he had already completed his philosophical system. In his essay Of the Study of History, Hume eulogized history with the following words: "history is not only a valuable part of knowledge, but opens the door to many other parts, and affords materials to most of the sciences. ... A man acquainted with history may, in some respect, be said to have lived from the beginning of the world, and to have been making continual additions to his stock of knowledge...." Here we find the historian given the role of quartermaster, stocking materials for the serious scientific campaigns of the future. The conception is familiar enough. More revealing is Hume's "addition theory of knowledge," if I may call it that — the view that changing theories and ideas result in an addition to, but not an alteration of, mankind's conception of what knowledge itself is. Knowledge, like Human Nature, is judged everywhere the same, though methods for arriving at it change.

Only two major English-speaking philosophers, in recent times, produced philosophies imbued, albeit in different ways, with a sense for history: John Dewey and R. G. Collingwood. Although the fact is not often noticed, much of Dewey's philosophical insight had its source in certain speculations about history. Consider, for example, his thesis concerning the divorce between practical and theoretical inquiry in ancient Greece, with its consequences not only for Greek philosophy but also for Western philosophy which grew from it. But Dewey is not much read any longer by Anglo-American philosophers, and Collingwood, though he has come into fashion again, belongs to the Continental tradition. His historicist leanings, in particular, are viewed with alarm.

Even idealism, a philosophy translated from the original Berkeleian English into Hegelian German and then back again into English by Bradley and Bosanquet, remained disengaged in England and America from the enthusiasm for history displayed so markedly by the German master. Notwithstanding Bradley's first published work, The Presuppositions of Critical History, which was, as its title suggests, an essay in the philosophy of history, his more mature reflections were as little affected by thoughts about historical process as were Parmenides' about cosmic flux. "History," Bosanquet declared in his Gifford lectures of 1911-12, "is a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any considerable degree of 'being or trueness.' The doubtful story of successive events cannot amalgamate with the complete interpretation of the social mind, of art, or of religion. ... Social morality, Art, Philosophy, and Religion take us far beyond the spatio-temporal externality of history...."

It is understandable that those philosophers on the Continent whose theories were molded by a preoccupation with historical process, by some embracing vision of how and why ideas and ideals change in time, have claimed the greater share of attention by historians. Still, to most philosophers in England and America who have attained their majority within the last thirty years, thinkers such as Hegel, Dilthey, Bergson, and Croce appear opaque in fundamental ways. When one attempts to penetrate Hegel, one comes up against a bureaucracy of the intellect in which one can wander forever from department to department. If many philosophers in England and America can be justly accused of neglecting history, many philosophers on the Continent can be charged with philosophical negligence, with relying too heavily on ancient prerogatives and perennial questions.

It is time for English-speaking philosophers and historians to become seriously involved with one another's work. The process has already begun with the appearance of the journal History and Theory, as well as with the recent publication of a surprising number of books in the philosophy of history. It is my aim in this book to explore some of the possibilities for a new rapprochement.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from Between Philosophy and History by Haskel L. Fain. Copyright © 1970 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents

• Frontmatter, pg. i
• Preface, pg. vii
• Contents, pg. xi
• I. Introduction: Some Anglo-Saxon Philosophical Attitude, pg. 1
• II. The Alienation of Philosophy from History, pg. 13
• III. Philosophy as the Search for Criteria of Intelligibility, pg. 35
• IV. Philosophy of History as the Search for Criteria of Historical Intelligibility, pg. 53
• V. Divergent Opinions of Philosophy and History, pg. 68
• VI Philosophical and Historical Questions About the Past, pg. 97
• VII. Skepticism: Benign and Malignant, pg. 114
• VIII. Use and Abuse of Skepticism in Philosophy of History, pg. 133
• IX. Decision Procedures and Concept Formation, pg. 156
• X. Evidence, Knowledge, and Belief, pg. 172
• XI. Decision Procedures and Conceptual Change, pg. 188
• XII. Speculative and Analytical Philosophy of History, pg. 207
• XIII. The Whole Truth about History, pg. 233
• XIV. History as Story, pg. 256
• XV. History as Science, pg. 277
• XVI. Epilogue: The Covering Law Model of Historical Explanation, pg. 309
• Suggestions for Further Reading, pg. 319
• INDEX, pg. 327