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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781546258513 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | AuthorHouse |
| Publication date: | 10/30/2018 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 210 |
| File size: | 1 MB |
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: An Overview
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is playing catch-up. As it hurriedly deals with one issue, another leaps forward, forcing the desert kingdom into a vicious circle of conflicts. All the while, it mistakes a mirage of its past leadership role for reality, but that leadership role has long since ceased to exist. This chapter addresses six themes to provide business, intelligence, foreign affairs, and academic communities both a clearer picture and an in-depth understanding of this controversial, intriguing, complicated, and ultraconservative Muslim monarchy.
This chapter offers a brief account of the political climate in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia as its focus. It includes topics such as Saudi-Chinese relations and what those mean for the political and economic future of the Middle East; the impact, if any, that renewed cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia may have in the region; and US-Saudi relations given the regional upheavals and resulting geopolitical shifts. To what degree and with what consequences will the Saudi royal family's internal struggle over succession further destabilize the monarchy? Will Saudi Arabia's Wahhabist ideology finally fall in upon its adherents, leading to the kingdom's own collapse? These issues are addressed with new insights, expanded knowledge, and answers to questions avoided for far too long.
As desert sands pass through the hourglass of history, Saudi Arabia realizes that its impulsive strategies and ill-conceived policies no longer serve its interests. Whoever would have thought that, in this era of chest pounding, the desert kingdom would finally reach out to Iraq to mend relations between Riyadh and Tehran? Yet, this Saudi initiative stemmed not only from the complexities of the Middle East current political landscape, but also the realization from within the kingdom of its declining clout. Now that Iran has reached an agreement with the West over its nuclear program, how will that outcome affect Saudi Arabia politically, economically, and socially? Consider what will become of the desert kingdom given the Middle East's geopolitical shifting. Consider furthermore the impact of lower oil prices on the already sluggish Saudi economy.
More than the preceding concerns, regional conflicts in the Middle East dominate and dictate the course of action the Saudi leadership must address. For example, the civil war in Syria shows no signs of abating. Anarchy in Yemen exacerbates tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Ongoing sectarian violence in Iraq fuels conflict between Shiites and Sunnis across the region. Political and security instability in Egypt is tentative. The failed state of Libya has opened the door for Russian support of self-appointed militias. Moreover, the kingdom's regional allies Egypt, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain assist the ongoing Saudi Arabian blockade against Qatar.
The balance of power in the Middle East has shifted. Saudi Arabia realizes how challenging it has become to influence events on the ground given Iran's growing influence, absent US leadership, Russia and China's increasing footprints as they reshape the region's political and economic outcomes to their favor, and Europe's undertaking major economic ventures with Iran. Add to those the power dynamics within the Saudi royal family given the elevation of prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MbS) to crown prince, next in line to the throne.
Behind the scenes, business leaders, global-affairs analysts, and security analysts now debate MbS's competence to lead the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after he receives full power from his ailing father, King Salman. Acting presumably in Saudi Arabia's interest, MbS impulsively conducted ground and air strikes on rebel-held areas in Yemen. That ill-conceived military action — which failed to defeat the Houthi rebels — raises serious humanitarian concerns. Saudi ground and air strikes have been partly responsible for displacing more than three million Yemenis and spreading famine.
One common theme surfaces during debates and discussions about Saudi Arabia. The common theme: once perceived as a global player — primarily due to its oil wealth — Saudi Arabia's political influence and economic impact in the Middle East and beyond are waning. Unlike the state of affairs 20 or 30 years ago, current geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East have changed the conversation regarding the KSA's ability to manage such force-producing events. Now with many more players, new and old, the Middle East brings with it a new political order, different thinking, and the need for a new strategy. This new outcome is forcing Saudi Arabia to be reactive rather than proactive. The desert kingdom has never been in similar situations because it never has had to deal with, or even be concerned about, Iran's increasing influence, China and Russia's growing presence in the region, Turkey's aggressive foreign policy in the region, and the ongoing chaos in neighboring Yemen and Syria. The KSA has yet to figure out its strategy to deal with such threatening upheavals.
Global-affairs analysts, business leaders, and security analysts today are asking many serious questions. Particularly, what role, if any, does Saudi Arabia contemplate for itself in the new order of the Middle East? Although Saudi Arabia knows that it is in its best interest, politically and economically, to reconsider its policy toward Iran, will it do so? Will Saudi Arabia retain its religious leadership in the Muslim world now that the world scrutinizes its Wahhabist ideology? Saudi Arabia looks politically vulnerable given the multitude of problems in the Middle East today.
Saudi Arabia must also address its economic outlook following the drop in oil prices on the global market. The KSA's concern about the region's economic outcome depends largely on what Iran can achieve economically. As it stands, Iran rejoins the international community through economic ventures with Russia, China, France, India, Germany, Denmark, and Austria, among others. Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia's domestic tensions include high unemployment, continuing restrictions against Saudi women, and discrimination against its Shi'a minority. The KSA's ongoing relegation to second-class subjects of Shi'a in the eastern province creates ill will. Add to that a rebellion of unemployed, disgruntled Saudi youth in Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam, or Qatif, and one may wake up to a country in chaos.
Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia's latest gesture to Iran, through Iraq, to restore diplomatic ties stems not from the KSA's desire to strengthen the ties of Islamic brotherhood. Rather, it stems from the KSA's fear of being left out in the cold once Iran holds the keys to the economic and political engine of the greater Middle East. It would be naïve to think that Iran could achieve this objective by itself. This effort will be well coordinated with Russia and China since doing so provides all three players a strategic incentive to continue working together despite different agendas and separate long-term goals. Nevertheless, for the KSA's sake, it makes sense to think strategically to ensure its positive involvement in the region's affairs regardless of their complexity. Toward that end, Saudi Arabia must evacuate and rebuild Yemen, reinstate diplomatic ties — if only on a limited basis — with its archenemy Iran, and diversify its economy from oil.
Equally important, a diplomatic initiative toward Iran could prove to be a shrewd tactic for the KSA. Specifically, Saudi Arabia could lessen fear within the Muslim world by talking with Iran. Talks would allow the KSA to hold onto its status as the leader — in words but not in deeds. By contrast, to argue that Iran's growing influence represents a threat to the entire Sunni Muslim world is nonsense; Crown Prince MbS's argument suggesting that Iran is going to take over the Muslim world is baseless. Those who are familiar with the history of tensions between Sunnis and Shiite since the death of Prophet Mohamed in 632 AD observe that the two branches of the faith will not see eye to eye, and I predict that that will not change anytime soon. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia and Iran have cooperated in the past, mainly in the 1960s, and joined forces to address challenges and threats to both countries. Alexei Vassiliev writes, "In the mid-1960s, Saudi Arabia and Iran grew closer. Both countries were monarchies with an interest in suppressing revolutionary movements in the Middle East as a whole, and in the Gulf in particular. They also had a common interest in confronting Egypt, which was then the leader of the anti-royalist and anti-Western camp in the region." Given the ongoing dynamics, and based on Iran's strategic thinking, I believe Iran's aspirations are hegemonic in nature: economically based, politically driven, and ideologically motivated.
The present work devotes a chapter to addressing the religious question and the KSA's relationship to the Wahhabist ideology. The kingdom's religious identity has been under the microscope following the attacks of 9/11 on New York City and the Pentagon. The question centers on the nature and extent of Saudi Arabia's connections to some of the terrorists involved in the plot, including Osama bin Laden. Similarly, the KSA faces scrutiny given WikiLeaks' recent disclosure suggesting that Saudi Arabia has been funding both ISIS and radical Sunni groups. The disclosure clearly indicates the Wahhabist ideology at work.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Iran raises its international profile with the indirect support of Russia and China following its nuclear agreement with the West. This comes on the heels of the United States' limited leadership, ambiguous foreign policy, and absence of a clear strategy for the Middle East. Will it benefit Saudi Arabia that the United States' limited role gives the KSA more opportunities to provide clandestine financial and logistic support to Sunni groups with a penchant for radical views and violent activities in the region and beyond? Possibly, but not conclusively!
Current developments in the Middle East affect the political and economic future of the desert kingdom. Will Saudi Arabia still be perceived as a regional leader after Iran's growing political, economic, military, and ideological expansion in the region? While Iran somehow is pleased with the ongoing upheavals in Yemen that further deepen Saudi Arabia's involvement, Tehran is uncertain what to make of Saudi Arabia's ongoing failed military engagement in Yemen, its support of Sunni rebels in Syria, and the latest conflict with Qatar. Speaking of Qatar, Saudi Arabia accuses Qatar of supporting terrorist groups, a statement I have reservations about given that 15 out of the 19 terrorists who attached New York and the Pentagon on 9/11 were Saudi nationals. As the translated Arabic adage goes, "the camel does not see his own hump." It behooves the Saudis to engage in some self-criticism and revisit various topics, including the interpretation of the Qur'an and tenets of Islam. Global-affairs analysts, intelligence and security analysts, and business leaders find it ironic that, following President Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia, in May 2017, the ultraconservative KSA embarks on more aggressive policies than the world has been accustomed to. For example, the perception is that President Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia gave the kingdom the green light to use unrestricted power to act, at its own discretion, regardless of international law, legal norms, and cultural traditions. The blockade of Qatar and the ongoing slaughter in Yemen exemplify how Saudi Arabia has abused that power. Its aggressive behavior raises many questions. Chief among them is whether the United States is willing to engage Iran militarily on behalf of Saudi Arabia. Is the United States willing to spill the blood of its soldiers and drain the financial resources of its hard-working citizens for causes that have nothing to do with America's interests? It is a dangerous path, to say the least, and President Trump needs to refrain from dangerous rhetoric because, in international relations, context matters. Mr. Trump needs to acquire the necessary political, social, religious, and cultural knowledge of the Middle East, a volatile region with ever-changing dynamics.
The other side of the same political coin is that Iran moves forward with its economic, political, and ideological aspirations in the region. The lifting of sanctions on Iran allows it to raise its international profile through economic ventures with China, Russia, Germany, and others. These economic ventures ultimately put pressure on Saudi Arabia's economy, leading the latter to reconsider its economic strategy when most, if not all, of its revenues depend heavily on oil. Now that oil prices are low, the KSA is forced to dip into its reserve funds. Shahine writes,
Saudi Arabia's foreign reserves have dropped from a peak of more than $730 billion in 2014 after the plunge in oil prices, prompting the International Monetary Fund to warn that the kingdom may run out of financial assets needed to support spending within five years. Authorities have since embarked on an unprecedented plan to overhaul the economy and repair public finances.
To demonstrate how the drop in oil prices has impacted the coffers in Saudi Arabia, one may look back at the example of the KSA's actions when it entered into an agreement to cut oil production with a non-OPEC member, Russia. The aim was to harm Iran economically — since it can sell oil on the open market following the lifting of sanctions — and to counter the ongoing decrease in oil prices. I do not expect oil prices to return to their pre-2014 prices of over $100 per barrel.
The international community also scrutinizes the Saudi royal family's covert internal power struggles after the elevation of prince MbS to crown prince, next in line to the throne. Undercover actions resulted in revelations of arrests and interrogations of deposed heirs, filling the pages of news outlets like the Wall Street Journal. The Saudis can no longer keep secret their internal squabbles. Now laid bare, those familial power struggles have worsened tensions within the KSA and have exacerbated anxieties throughout the international community over its present and future stability. Using history as my guide, I am reminded of the assassination of King Faisal on March 25, 1975, a rare example of how the royal family's internal fighting can spill over into the public square. This is problematic for two main reasons. First, MbS is young, impulsive, and lacks foreign-policy experience. Second, his military and economic policies in Yemen or Qatar proved to be disastrous. Similarly, the prince — who once vowed he would take his country's fight to Iran — forgets one of the first principles of international relations: Context matters. So, when MbS says that he will bring a war to Iran one day, then reaches out to them through Iraq the next day, it betrays his inability to fathom global affairs, regional politics, and the ramifications of escalating words of war.
Saudi Arabia is swimming in a sea of challenges it has never faced before, which raises two questions: Can Saudi Arabia be perceived as a regional power? Will it be able to affect the current political landscape in the Middle East? The answer to both questions is "no." I see no way that Saudi Arabia can limit Iran's growing influence in the region. America and Saudi Arabia no longer sit at the head of opposite ends of the meeting table. Those seats now belong to Russia and Iran. Subsequent pages address in greater depth how and why Saudi Arabia is increasing its economic and military ties with both China and Russia. Suffice it to say, the role the KSA has played in the region in the last 30 to 40 years is now nearly nonexistent.
The challenges the KSA faces seem to be too much to handle. The basis for my argument is that, through its ill-conceived policies, it has become evident that the KSA does not grasp the depth of the political paradigm shift in the Middle East. If the desert kingdom does, it seems unable to structure a well-defined strategy to address this shift. The ongoing failed military intervention in Yemen and the blockade on Qatar show evidence of this claim. Like many global-affairs analysts, Iranian officials do not know what to make of the KSA's continued failed policies. Do the failed policies suggest an internal struggle within the Saudi leadership or a breakdown in the decision-making process? Alternatively, do they reflect a rift over power with the elevation of MbS to crown prince, next in line to the throne? Whatever the case may be, the Saudi watchers conclude the role the KSA has played over the last three or four decades is ending.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Beneath The Veil"
by .
Copyright © 2018 David Oualaalou.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments, ix,
Preface, xi,
Chapter I Introduction: An Overview, 1,
Chapter II History of Saudi Arabia: Past and Present, 28,
Chapter III Saudi Arabia's Sources of Power, 57,
Chapter IV US-Saudi Relations: Present and Future, 82,
Chapter V Iran-Saudi Arabia Rivalry, 106,
Chapter VI Outlook for Saudi Arabia, 130,
Chapter VII Conclusion, 152,
Endnotes, 163,
Index, 179,