Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

by Neil Feit

Overview

Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self. These are beliefs that we express by means of a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and others-that in general, the contents of our beliefs are properties. Unlike propositions, properties lack absolute truth values that do not vary with time, place, or person. Belief about the Self offers a sustained defense of the Property Theory of Content, according to which the content of every cognitive attitude is a property rather than a proposition. The theory is supported with an array of new arguments, defended from various objections, and applied to some important problems and puzzles in the philosophy of mind.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780199712267
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	07/24/2008
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
File size:	266 KB

About the Author

Neil FeitAssociate Professor of Philosophy, SUNY Fredonia

Table of Contents

Introduction     xi
Mental Content and the Problem of De Se Belief     3
Cognitive Attitudes and Content     4
The Doctrine of Propositions     7
The Problem of De Se Belief     11
The Property Theory of Content     16
In Favor of the Property Theory     25
Perry's Messy Shopper and the Argument from Explanation     26
Lewis's Case of the Two Gods     34
Arguments from Internalism and Physicalism     42
An Inference to the Best Explanation     52
Alternatives to the Property Theory     59
The Triadic View of Belief     59
How the Property Theory and the Triadic View Are Rivals     70
Dyadic Propositionalism Reconsidered     79
Arguments against the Property Theory     91
Self-Ascription and Self-Awareness     92
Nonexistence and Impossible Contents     95
Stalnaker's Argument     104
Propositionalist Arguments from Inference     109
The Property Theory and De Re Belief     117
Lewis's Account of De Re Belief     118
McKay's Objection to Lewis     121
Mistaken Identity and the Case of the Shy Secret Admirer     123
Some OtherWorries and Concluding Remarks     132
The Property Theory, Rationality, and Kripke's Puzzle about Belief     141
Kripke's Puzzle about Belief     142
The Puzzle Argument     146
A Solution to the Puzzle     150
Puzzles with Empty Names and Kind Terms     156
The Property Theory, Twin Earth, and Belief about Kinds     163
Twin Earth and Two Kinds of Internalism     164
The Twin Earth Argument     166
An Internalist Response (Stage One)     171
An Internalist Response (Stage Two)     176
Self-Ascription and Belief about Kinds     180
References     187
Index     193

Editorial Reviews

"Feit's book not only makes substantial new contributions to our understanding of belief about the self and its representational content, but it is also such a model of clear exposition that I would recommend it to those who are just starting to think about these issues."—Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"Feit's discussion of the arguments for and against the property theory of content is philosophically sophisticated, generous, and fair-minded, and he finds some extremely interesting applications for his version of the property theory."—Andy Egan, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan

"Belief about the Self is an important contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, and useful for the broader field of cognitive science."—John Perry, Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University

From the Publisher