Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918-1922
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Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918-1922
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| ISBN-13: | 9780691633770 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 04/19/2016 |
| Series: | Princeton Legacy Library , #1762 |
| Pages: | 470 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.20(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.20(d) |
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Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War
Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918â"1922
By Vladimir N. Brovkin
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1994 Princeton University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-03278-8
CHAPTER 1
The "New Course" That Failed (December 1918–April 1919)
In November 1918, when the worst excesses of local Chekas reached their apogee, Lenin's government abruptly changed its policies. The Decree of 14 June, which had expelled the Mensheviks and SRs from the CEC, was annulled. It was legitimate again for the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Social Democrats to run in elections to the soviets, open clubs, and speak at workers' rallies. It seemed, at least for the moment, that extraordinary rule was out of favor and that an attempt was going to be made to return to the status of the spring of 1918 — a multiparty electoral system with free campaigning and an independent press. Was this shift in policy merely a maneuver made for propaganda purposes, or was it a genuine attempt to find an alternative to the extraordinary rule of Red Terror, "seriously and for a long time" — as Lenin described his hopes when introducing the NEP in 1921? Why was moderation abandoned once again in April 1919? Grain requisitioning, mass arrests of socialists, and Red Terror resumed. Did Lenin change his mind, or was his new policy sabotaged by the Communist party? Or was he, perhaps, forced by other circumstances to postpone the moderate policies he had tried once before, and to sanction what is now known as War Communism?
Causes of Legalization
Officially the Bolshevik government explained its decision to legalize the Menshevik party as a response to the Mensheviks' more conciliatory posture toward the Soviet government. Indeed, in October and November 1918 the Mensheviks made a number of statements to the Bolsheviks' liking. They condemned the Allied intervention in Russia in strong terms. They forbade party members to take part in any uprisings or armed struggle against the soviets, and they recognized the Soviet Constitution of July 1918. Restoration of the Constituent Assembly and of a parliamentary republic based on universal suffrage was declared to be a long-term goal of the Mensheviks, but for the moment they saw their task as restoring the rule of the multiparty, freely elected soviets, which had been replaced by appointed commissars and by the Cheka. Menshevik conciliatory pronouncements had been made earlier as well, but they had not led then to a softening of Bolshevik policy toward the opposition parties. On the contrary, the second half of 1918 was a period of mounting attack on the Mensheviks and SRs which reached a crescendo during the official Red Terror of September–October 1918. Why, then, at the end of 1918 this sudden change of policy? The real reasons lay elsewhere: in Lenin's new foreign and domestic policy objectives.
The defeat of Germany in World War I, the withdrawal of German troops from Ukraine and the Baltic states, and on top of it all the German revolution changed the international environment profoundly for Soviet Russia by the end of 1918. The German Social Democrats were propelled to power in Berlin. Having waited patiently for the spread of revolution to Europe, the Bolsheviks in Moscow were ecstatic over the developments in Germany and Austria. The rise of the soviets there made them hope that the long-awaited revolution in Germany had finally arrived. The rise of socialism in Western Europe would ease Soviet Russia's international position and complicate the Allies' plans to crush the Soviet regime. For the time being the Bolsheviks were interested in cultivating good relations with German Social Democrats.
Since Russian Mensheviks (officially, Social Democrats) were well known in Europe from the days before the war, it was somewhat embarrassing for Lenin that Menshevik Central Committee members were being held in prison. In fact, Karl Radek, a key link between the German Social Democrats and Russian Communists, argued in the CEC that it was imperative to annul the Mensheviks' expulsion from the CEC. Moreover, German Social Democrats wrote letters asking Lenin to free Russian Social Democrats from prisons. The European press had covered the Bolshevik Red Terror extensively, and the Bolsheviks' reputation in Europe was tarnished. It was a convenient moment to soften this negative image by providing concrete evidence that the opposition socialist parties were legal in Russia and that the Red Terror was directed against "counterrevolutionaries" only.
The Mensheviks' support for the Soviet government against Allied intervention was also useful. The socialist and labor parties in the Allied countries had to be encouraged to intensify their opposition to intervention in Russia. The Bolsheviks were seriously worried about the Allies' intentions, now that the war was over, and they feared that the huge inventories of war matériel the Allies had accumulated could be channeled to the Whites. Concrete evidence that all of Russia's workers' parties were united against the Whites would be useful in generating public-opinion pressure in the Allied countries against intervention.
The second major cause of the New Course, as far as the external situation was concerned, was the turn of events in the east of the country. On 18 November 1918 Admiral Kolchak overthrew the multiparty government in Siberia, in which the SRs had played a leading role, and established an undisguised military dictatorship. He started his rule by executing socialists and disbanding the elected city councils, the dumas. For some Communists, the threat posed by the Whites made it necessary to use the socialists, if they were willing, in a joint struggle against the Whites. Others were interested in broadening the political base of the Soviet regime by reaching an honest agreement with the socialists (Mensheviks and SRs), within the framework of the Soviet Constitution. These views were expressed most articulately by a group of Siberian Communists in a letter to Lenin:
All workers and revolutionaries who remained alive, and all those supporters of the republic express only one wish: the speediest possible conclusion of an agreement with the socialist and pro-republic groupings on the platform of political compromise — Power to the People [as opposed to dictatorship of the proletariat] because if the hostility between the soviets and these groupings continues, it would end with the destruction of the working class.
In other words the consolidation of the White forces in Siberia under Kolchak represented such a grave danger that Communists needed the socialists against a common foe.
Aside from practical considerations dictated by the exigencies of the civil war and Allied intervention, some Communists advocated toleration of legal opposition parties as a matter of principle. One of the most outspoken proponents of this was N. Osinsky, one of the leaders of the Moscow party organization: "We must say clearly and definitively: that at the given stage of development there is no need at all to remove from the soviets and from free discussion political parties that do not advocate overthrow of Soviet power. ... freedom of the press and assembly for petit bourgeois parties represented in the soviets is possible and necessary." Osinsky's advocacy of a new policy stemmed not out of his sympathy for the Mensheviks and SRs but out of his concern for the development of the Soviet regime. Something had gone wrong in 1918. The revolution was supposed to liberate the working class. Instead workers were powerless vis-à-vis the appointed commissars. It was necessary to restore the accountability of the soviets to the electorate and the accountability of the Communist party to the soviets. Extraordinary measures had to be abolished. Power had to be vested in properly elected soviets, and the Cheka had to be subordinated to the courts.
In 1918 the Mensheviks had been arguing along the same lines and were labeled counterrevolutionaries for it. Now, in early 1919, a part of the Communist party shared these same views. This was partly so because local Communist organizations felt threatened by the power of the local Chekas. The journal of the executive committees of soviets launched an aggressive campaign against the prerogatives of the Cheka. The local Chekas, not the soviets, were the true masters in the provinces. They could shoot anyone "with a report afterward." In some places, the Menshevik leader Martov wrote, they even executed Communists.
The most important cause of the New Course was a movement within the Communist party itself for a revival of the soviets and for curbing Cheka lawlessness. These Communists saw the restoration of the Mensheviks' and SRs' right to be elected to the soviets as the restoration of responsible local government. What Osinsky implied in his articles was that the existence of opposition parties within the system of soviets would be a positive development. Opposition parties would act as a check on the arbitrariness so prevalent in the provinces. Victor Nogin, of the Moscow party organization, echoed these sentiments at the Eighth CP Congress in Moscow in March 1919: "We received such a countless number of horrifying facts about drunkenness, debauchery [razgui], bribery, brigandage [razboi], and senseless actions on the part of many functionaries that hair stood on end [volosy stanovilis' dybom]." Other speakers admitted that the soviets had simply been liquidated in the provinces, "even though it was against the Constitution." Osinsky was even more explicit. He spoke of the rise of patronage cliques, a bureaucratic hierarchy, and arbitrary rule over people "with special instructions [from the center]." In fact, he said, local officials were not accountable to anyone. V. A. Avanesov, a high-ranking official in the CEC, continued in the same vein: "in the localities, military commanders and executive committees commit such disgraceful and shocking things about which I could have talked for a long time." But he did not. Nevertheless, the general picture of the situation in the provinces emerging from the speeches of some Bolshevik leaders left no doubt that Soviet power had degenerated into a rule of patronage cliques, accountable to no one.
Something had to be done to restore order in the provinces. For the moment, concerned Communists saw the solution in restoration of the rule of law. They clamored for more glasnost, fair elections, and accountability of local officials. In the context of 1919 they even dared to defend the idea of a legal opposition party.
Legalization of the Opposition Parties
Due to the aforementioned factors of domestic and foreign policy, a number of concrete measures for legalizing opposition parties were adopted. In addition to the CEC decree Raphail Abramovich, a Menshevik CC member, and other Mensheviks were released from prisons. Social Democrats could now run in elections to the soviets and trade unions. They were allowed to reopen their clubs and offices. For the first time since August 1918 the Mensheviks were able to speak freely at workers' rallies. Finally they received a permit to resume publication of their newspaper, Vsegda Vpered, which had been shut down since May 1918. The first issue came out in January 1919. Within two weeks the paper reached a circulation of 100,000 and even that was not enough to satisfy demand. People from other cities traveled to Moscow to obtain a copy of the opposition paper. The editorial board would have been happy to increase circulation, but the Bolshevik authorities had limited the supply of paper available to the only uncensored publication in Soviet Russia.
Even though the CEC resolution had the force of law, local officials and the Cheka sabotaged its implementation almost everywhere. In its internal circular the Cheka instructed its local branches to let the socialists work, in view of the legalization decree, but added that it was imperative to "establish the strictest covert surveillance over them." Local Communist authorities were in no hurry to allow the legal existence of opposition parties. In Petrograd the city EC allowed the Mensheviks to organize a public rally, and it was even willing to consider granting a permit for publication of a newspaper, "depending on the outcome of the elections to the soviet." In other words if elections did not turn out favorably for the Communists, the opposition paper in Petrograd could not be tolerated.
In Kostroma local Communists wrote to their CC that in view of the anti-Communist attitudes of the population they would not legalize the Menshevik party. In Kozlov Township of Tambov Province the Social Democrats received the following reply to their application for legalization: "In view of the fact that the SD party in the Kozlov uezd [administrative district] has not sufficiently proved its loyalty to Soviet power and in its current composition is deemed dangerous for the orderly work of the soviet, the EC rejects the legalization application." Strictly speaking this was a violation of the law, since the CEC did not leave it up to the local authorities to decide whether to legalize the Mensheviks or not. What mattered in Russia, both then and now, was not the letter of the law but the ability of Moscow to enforce its policy. Since the Bolshevik leadership was divided over the legalization of opposition, conflicting signals came down to the provinces, and local authorities chose to act in the way that best suited them. Of all the provincial capitals, only in Tula did Soviet authorities grant the opposition complete freedom to campaign during elections to the soviet, but they did not permit the local Menshevik newspaper to resume publication. In most provincial cities local authorities banned the sale of and subscription to Vsegda Vpered, even though it was legally circulating in Moscow. In Orel local Communists arrested a correspondent of Vsegda Vpered for "meddling in their affairs." Bolsheviks in Rybinsk, Yaroslavl Province, explained to the Bolshevik CC why they decided not to allow a Menshevik newspaper: "In connection with the legalization of the Mensheviks, they applied to the EC for a publication permit to reopen their newspaper. But the EC decided against it because popular attitudes in Rybinsk are not favorable to Soviet power."
In the first three months of 1919 the Mensheviks were actually legal in the full sense only in Moscow. A small Menshevik faction was restored to membership in the supreme legislative institution, the CEC. The Mensheviks were also represented on the boards of many trade unions and recaptured the leadership of the Printers' Union. They were able to publish their paper, open several workers' clubs, and defend their point of view at workers' rallies. In Petrograd, Tula, and Bryansk, large centers of the metal industry, they were also elected to local soviets but were not permitted to publish their own newspapers. In Bryansk the Mensheviks were even admitted to the managerial board of the local plant since they had, as a local Communist put it: "an overwhelming majority over the Communists." Generally, at the local level, the Mensheviks managed to restore decimated organizations very quickly. Even if barred from the soviets, they were elected to scores of factory committees, workers' mutual aid fund boards, trade unions, cooperatives, and workshop committees on the factory floor.
At every step in their activity, though, the Mensheviks encountered increasing difficulties. In violation of the law, Menshevik delegates were simply not admitted to the National Board of the Metalworkers' Union. When the Mensheviks won a majority in the Printers' Union, the Bolsheviks refused to comply with the new leadership and set up their own Red Printers' Union. Now they saw their task as "unmasking" the true counterrevolutionary nature of the Mensheviks. In other words when their power was threatened, especially through legitimate elections, local bureaucrats immediately turned into zealous guardians of the Communist cause. A hard line would guarantee their privileged and uncontested position, whereas the liberal line of toleration was a path full of pitfalls and dangers. No wonder the majority of Communist functionaries preferred the security of their jobs and privileges. The zigzags in Bolshevik policy toward the Mensheviks reflected an intense struggle within the Communist party over economic policy, first and foremost a policy toward the peasants, and over the structure of local government and the status of the Cheka. The legalization of opposition parties was closely intertwined with these issues.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War by Vladimir N. Brovkin. Copyright © 1994 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
The Civil War and the Communist Myth
Western Myths
Historical Approaches
The Road to Civil War
1. The "New Course" That Failed (December 1918-April 1919)
Causes of Legalization
Legalization of the Opposition Parties
Lenin and Martov
Menshevik Policy Proposals
Legalization of the PSR
Debate on the Cheka
The End of the "New Course"
2. On the Internal Front: Enemies among the Workers
Strikes in Moscow
Strikes in Petrograd
Trouble in the Provinces
Strikes in Sormovo and Tver
Rebellions and Mutinies in Orel Province
The Astrakhan Tragedy
3. The White Tide
The White Tide in the East
Red Terror in the Urals
Peasant Rebellions on the Volga
The Whites' Breakthrough in the South
Decossackization
Makhno, Grigoriev, Zelenvi, and Others
Peasant Attitudes in Ukraine
Red Army Soldiers' Attitudes
The Three Blows to the Reds
Red Terror in Ukraine
4. On the Internal Front: The Greens
The Historical Setting
Policies of the Bolshevik Government
Requisition Detachments
Local Government in the Countryside
Peasant Attitudes
The Greens
The Greens Organization and Tactics
Bolshevik Antidesertion Measures
Peasant Uprisings
5. What Is to Be Done? Soviet Parties Face the Challenge of the Whites
The Menshevik Assessment of the Situation
The Right Mensheviks
The SRs and the White Threat
Fighting on All the Fronts
6. The Red Tide
Collapse of the Whites in the East
Collapse of the Whites in the South
The Fragmentation of Society
7. The End of Legal Opposition
The Mensheviks' New Platform
Successes and Perils
The Left SR Factions
The Balancing Act Breaks Down: The Affair with the British Delegation
Other Foreign Delegations
The Cheka Assault on the Opposition Parties
8. Workers under Militarized Labor
Theater of the Absurd
The Militarization of Labor
The Workers' Economic Situation
Workers' Responses
Elections
Strikes
9. The Green Tide
Bolshevik Intentions
Razverstka and Other Obligations
The Collection of Tribute
Informal, Invisible Peasant Government
Peasant Perceptions
Peasant Resistance: Central Russia
10. The Peasant War in Ukraine and Cossack Lands
Bolshevik Agrarian Policy in Ukraine
Occupation Policies in the Don Host and Kuban
Peasant Rebels: Ukraine
Don and Kuban Resistance
Subjugation
A Reign of Red Terror in Kuban
11. Sovietization of the Countryside: Tambov, Saratov, Tobolsk
Tambov
Lower Volga
The Urals and Siberia
Suppression
Epilogue: Regime in Crisis, 1921
Conclusion: Identity, Allegiance, and Participation in the Russian Civil War
Chronology of the Civil War
External and Internal Fronts
The White Movement
The Kadets
The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries
The Mensheviks
The Bolsheviks
The Greens
Scope of the Peasant War
Character of the Peasant War
Military Victory
Who Won? Who Lost?
Legacy
Bibliography
Index