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Overview
Like the Battle of Verdun, the Battle of the Frontiers has often been ignored by military historians, who assumed that the French lost the first battles of the World War I because they launched suicidal bayonet charges against German machine guns. Therefore, for nearly a century, these battles have been considered uninteresting. In reality, these were some of the most important, hard-fought and instructive battles of the First World War. The Battle of the Frontiers is the first history of this battle in English and is based on ground-breaking research conducted in French and German army archives. It also makes use of neglected French and German books and articles, as well as German regimental histories, and includes personal accounts by participants such as Manfred von Richthofen (when he was still a cavalry lieutenant) and the young Erwin Rommel. Terence Zuber here presents a dramatic new perspective on combat in 1914.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780752496726 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | The History Press |
| Publication date: | 12/07/2009 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 336 |
| Sales rank: | 795,163 |
| File size: | 1 MB |
| Age Range: | 18 Years |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
The Battle of the Frontiers Ardennes 1914
By Terence Zuber
The History Press
Copyright © 2013 Terence ZuberAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-7524-9672-6
CHAPTER 1
German Tactics and Training
After the First World War, German officers stated almost unanimously that the German army of 1914 was the best-trained and best-disciplined in the world, and that peacetime tactical doctrine and training proved themselves unequivocally in combat, leading the German army to 'brilliant successes'. Repeatedly, German soldiers of all grades said that their victorious engagements had been conducted 'just like in training'. Such opinions must be taken seriously, since they were made by some of the most combat-experienced soldiers in modern military history with the benefit of four years of high-intensity warfare to educate and refine their professional judgment.
The foundation for German success in the Battle of the Frontiers was laid in the forty-three years of doctrinal development and training prior to the battle. This chapter will concentrate on the final German tactical doctrine that was implemented in 1906 and used as the basis for subsequent training.
The German army was so serious about training that many German officers regarded combat as merely the final live-fire training test. The regimental historian of the 22nd Infantry Regiment (IR 22) wrote that combat was an opportunity for the regiment to 'show what it had learned and done in decades of hard peacetime work', an opinion also expressed by Otto von Moser, one of the most important German authors on tactics and training.
TC1[The Art of War]TC1
Combat was characterised by Clausewitz as the realm of friction and the clash of two independent forces. The combat leader must comprehend what is happening on the battlefield in an environment where everything is uncertain and draw conclusions based on limited information. War, in German doctrine, is an art; decision-making and leadership in combat are creative acts. War is not a science, in which decisions can be made by following a set formula. Nor can a war be fought, as some Western armies try to do, according to the principles of business management.
After a long debate, the German Army rejected Normaltaktik – applying a standard solution to tactical problems. Every German doctrinal manual emphasised that there was no Schema, no biscuit-cutter solution to operational and tactical problems. Each operational and tactical situation had to be evaluated on its own merits. No two situations are alike. Doctrine, the study of military history, and training exercises provide a framework for decision-making, but the soldier uses his intellect and will to solve each tactical problem. Doctrine may emphasise the offensive, but that does not mean that there is a knee-jerk requirement to attack under all circumstances. A German combat leader therefore required clear and sharp judgment and perception, but above all strength of character, determination, energy and equilibrium.
TC1[The Nature of Combat in 1914]TC1
By 1914 firepower, in the form of magazine-fed small-calibre rifle, machine guns, and quick firing artillery pieces, dominated the battlefield. Whatever could be seen could be hit. Smokeless powder made weapons fire almost invisible and counter-fire much more difficult.
Every army in Europe had noted the consequences of the firepower-dominated battlefield, both in defensive and offensive operations. They recognised that it was necessary for all arms to use the terrain to provide protection against observation and fire. Troops were dispersed in order to reduce casualties. Closed formations could no longer be used if exposed in the open to effective enemy fire. Units could be committed to combat only in broad lines, and had to be further broken down to the point that they could utilise the cover provided by the terrain. On the defensive, even thin lines could present significant resistance, especially if they were in tactically effective positions. The difference between armies lay not in the recognition of the problem, but in the quality of the subsequent training.
German doctrine emphasised that if the proper tactical precautions were not observed, if units attempted to cross open ground under effective fire or failed to adequately disperse, the result would be extraordinarily high casualties in a very short time. On the other hand, adequate use of terrain, proper tactical movement and dispersion would rob small arms, machine gun and artillery fire of much of their effectiveness; the casualties in Manchuria in 1904–05 were lower than those of 1870–71.
Every army but the French adopted combat camouflage uniforms. The German army introduced the field grey combat uniform in 1907, after tactical tests had shown that it offered the best concealment, particularly against long-range or air reconnaissance when troops were marching in column.
The combination of camouflage uniforms, smokeless powder, dispersion and the use of terrain meant that it had become extraordinarily difficult to discern an enemy's location, movement and strength. It was also difficult to tell if one's own fire was effective and if the enemy was taking casualties. For these reasons, it was widely recognised that the battlefield had become 'empty'. Not only had the enemy become invisible, the only members of his own unit that the soldier could see were those in his immediate vicinity. Formal discipline became ineffective. The lethality of weapons fire eliminated the direct influence of the senior leaders over their men. The German army emphasised that combat leadership would be provided by company-grade officers and NCOs. Everything depended on the qualities of the small-unit leader and the individual soldier. Training therefore had to emphasise and reinforce the soldiers' ability to think and act – in particular, to fire and move – in small units or on his own initiative.
Concentration of Mass
The first principle of war for practically any army, at the strategic, operational and tactical level, is to have superior forces at the decisive place and time. German doctrine emphasised that it was also important to conduct the main attack, if possible, against the flank and rear of the enemy. This, the Handbook for Tactics Instruction said, was 'the highest accomplishment in the art of war'. No other European army emphasised the flank attack and the envelopment to the degree that the German army did; the French army advocated the frontal attack and breakthrough.
Units under effective fire could not manoeuvre against the enemy flank. Envelopments were generally only feasible if units not in contact marched against the enemy flank. For this reason the German army at the operational level marched on a very broad front, and at the tactical level deployed early from march column to combat formation.
The Offensive
In 1914, all European armies emphasised the offensive. It was thought that the future war could be won quickly in big battles, but only by offensive action. The Handbook said that leaders and troops would never choose of their own free will to stand on the defensive. The attacker has the initiative; he can choose the time and place of the attack and mass his forces there, hopefully against weak points in the enemy defences. However, the attacker had to accept that he was going to take heavy casualties. Nevertheless, the will to win and ruthless determination would secure victory, which was all that counted.
Initially the attacker might well suffer higher casualties than the defender, but once the defender was driven from his position his morale and cohesion would be degraded and he would be subjected to pursuit by fire. If the attacker continued the pursuit vigorously, the defender might be completely destroyed.
The German army, going back at least as far as Frederick the Great, had a bias in favour of offensive operations, and this bias was reflected in German training and doctrine before the First World War. The Handbook said that troops attack when they feel themselves to be superior to their enemy; the German army clearly thought that this feeling of superiority was most likely to arise not from superior numbers, though this was possible, but rather from high morale: from the soldier's confidence in their leaders, their training, tactics and weapons. Attacking was more difficult than defending, but the act of going on the attack itself gave the troops 'massive moral superiority'.
German doctrine acknowledged that modern firepower had reinforced the effectiveness of defence. As the Boer War had demonstrated, even weak forces on thin, extended fronts could maintain themselves for some considerable time against a frontal attack by superior forces. But firepower could also assist the offensive. If the attacker used the terrain effectively, he could bring his firepower closer and closer to the enemy position. In particular, the attacker could concentrate his fire at a chosen place. If he could do so at vulnerable points, such as a salient in the defensive position, or the flanks, then the firepower advantage would be on the side of the attacker.
It might also be necessary to attack to fix an enemy in place, that is, prevent him from moving his troops, usually to keep the enemy from withdrawing or shifting forces. Fixing an enemy in place would be necessary in order to provide the time for an attack on his flank or rear to be effective. One could attempt to fix an enemy in place by conducting a feint attack, but as a rule the enemy would not be fooled for long and a serious attack would become necessary. In actual practice in August 1914 it was found that at all levels – strategic, operational and tactical – it was nearly impossible to fix an enemy in place. The French were always able to break contact and withdraw.
By adopting the defensive, the defender was acknowledging his inferiority. The defender could chose where he wanted to defend, and prepare his position and the battlefield in order to maximise the effectiveness of his fire, but having done so was forced to wait and react to the enemy's actions. The Russo-Japanese War proved to the satisfaction of practically the entire European military community that even if the defence were reinforced by modern trench works and machine guns the passive (Russian) defence failed and the (Japanese) offensive succeeded.
A successful defensive battle would only be decisive if it facilitated a counteroffensive. The idea that the defender can throw back the enemy attack, and then go over to the offensive in turn (the elder Moltke's defensive-offensive concept) was appealing, but, as military history shows, was also unworkable. A better solution was to go on the defensive on one part of the front, perhaps on terrain not suitable for the offensive, where it was possible to employ fewer forces, which would allow stronger forces to take the offensive on another part of the front.
Tactically and operationally all European armies favoured the offensive, for purely military reasons. It does not therefore necessarily follow that these required the strategic offensive or aggressive political goals: strategy and grand strategy are the function of politics, not of tactics and operations.
The Infantry Regiment
The basic tactical unit was the infantry company. The wartime strength of a German infantry company was five officers (OFF) and 260 enlisted men (EM). The company commander was usually a captain who was responsible for individual, NCO, and squad and platoon training, particularly individual marksmanship and small-unit fire tactics. The company was broken down into a small company command group and three platoons of about eighty men (in practice, between sixty-four and seventy-two men), each platoon consisting of eight squads, each squad led by a sergeant or corporal.
The German non-commissioned officer corps was a particular strength of the German army. Each peacetime German infantry battalion had between seventy-two and seventy-eight career NCOs, while a war-strength battalion had eighty-five NCOs (including four medical NCOs). These were men who had re-enlisted expressly to become non-commissioned officers. They were carefully selected and provided with excellent training by the company commander and army schools. Individual training was in their hands. The company first sergeant, the 'mother of the company', held his position for a considerable period and enjoyed immense prestige and responsibility. The French army was less well provided with NCOs, which was a serious weakness. A French peacetime company usually had only eight NCOs, of which only five were career NCOS. The company also included the combat trains, which consisted of the ammunition wagon and the mobile field kitchen, and the field trains, which included a company supply wagon and a rations wagon.
The German infantry battalion consisted of four infantry companies and the battalion headquarters: twenty-six OFF and 1,054 EM. The battalion commander was usually a major, or perhaps a lieutenant colonel. He was assisted by the battalion adjutant, the most capable lieutenant in the battalion, who was the operations officer, and by a rations officer, in combat usually a reserve lieutenant, as well as a surgeon and a paymaster, who was also the NCO in charge of property. Each battalion had eight bicycle messengers, armed with carbines. The company trains were united under battalion control to form the battalion combat trains (four ammunition wagons, four mobile field kitchens, plus the battalion medical wagon) and the battalion field trains (battalion staff wagon, four company supply wagons, four rations wagons, one sundries – tobacco and similar personal use items – wagon, one battalion supply wagon), together nineteen vehicles, thirty-eight horses and forty-seven men. On the march and in combat, the battalion combat trains stayed close to the battalion, while the field trains could be as far as a day's march behind.
The German infantry regiment was composed of three battalions and a machine gun company: 86 OFF, 3,304 EM, 72 vehicles and 233 horses. The regiment was the most important unit in the German army. The regimental commander was responsible for selecting and training the officer corps. The annual recruit, company and battalion inspections and range firing exercises took place in his presence and largely under his control. Unit pride was directed principally towards the regiment and its history. The regimental commander was a lieutenant colonel or colonel. The regimental staff consisted of three lieutenants: the adjutant (operations officer), an assistant operations officer, and the leader of the field trains (which united all the battalion field trains) as well as the regimental surgeon. The regiment also had a large four-horse wagon with engineering tools: 1,200 small shovels, 275 large shovels, 288 pickaxes, 107 picks, 66 axes, 30 saws and 96 wire cutters. The regimental trains included 72 wagons, 165 EM and 210 horses. In theory the field trains would catch up with the regiment when it billeted or bivouacked, but that rarely happened during mobile operations.
German regiments generally had two designations, first their number within the German army, such as Infanterie-Regiment 154, and then their territorial name, in this case 4. Schlesisch (4th Silesian), or the name of the German state it belonged to, such as Infanterie-Regiment 100 (1. Sächsisches – 1st Saxon). The exceptions were the Prussian Guard and the Bavarian army, which were not numbered within the German army and used only their own designations. German regiments were also frequently given an additional name of famous generals or members of the high aristocracy. According to the history of the regiment, infantry units could also be called Fusiliers or Grenadiers. Hence the 6th Infantry Regiment was really Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreußisches) Nr. 6. In full recognition that this is a cardinal sin against the traditions of the old Imperial German army, for the sake of simplicity we will simply call this regiment IR 6.
Battalions were numbered with Roman numerals I, II, III, and referred to as I/IR 164 (1st Battalion, Infantry Regiment 164). Companies were numbered consecutively within the battalions: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th companies always belonged to the I Battalion, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th II Battalion, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th III battalion. 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, Infantry Regiment 164 was abbreviated 3/I/IR 164 or simply 3/164. The same system applied to cavalry, artillery and engineers.
The tactical organisation of the French infantry was a mirror image of the German. French units were designated first by their number, then arm: for example, 9e Regiment de Infanterie, which we will abbreviate as 9 RI.
Brigade to Corps
An infantry brigade in both the French and German armies consisted of two infantry regiments and a small brigade staff, and was usually commanded by a brigadier general. In the German army an artillery section of three batteries was often attached to the brigade for tactical control. A German infantry division was a combined-arms force, consisting of two infantry brigades, an artillery brigade, a cavalry regiment, in total, twelve infantry battalions, three or four cavalry squadrons, twelve artillery batteries (seventy-two guns) and one or two engineer companies, plus service and support units. Most division commanders were former General Staff officers. The small divisional staff consisted of a General Staff major and the adjutant (personnel officer), surgeon, intendant, JAG and chaplain. A French infantry division was similar, but had only nine four-gun artillery batteries (thirty-six guns), although it was usually supplemented with corps artillery.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Battle of the Frontiers Ardennes 1914 by Terence Zuber. Copyright © 2013 Terence Zuber. Excerpted by permission of The History Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Introduction,1 German Tactics and Training,
2 Mobilisation, War Plans, Deployment and Approach March,
3 Rossignol,
4 Bellefontaine,
5 Neufchâteau,
6 Bertrix,
7 Maissin-Anloy,
8 Virton,
9 Éthe and Bleid,
10 Longwy,
11 The Battle South of Longwy,
12 Conclusions,
Appendix: Laws of War,
Glossary,
German Order of Battle,
French Order of Battle,
Endnotes,
Acknowledgments,