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Overview
Originally published in 1991.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780691636818 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 04/19/2016 |
| Series: | Princeton Legacy Library , #1148 |
| Pages: | 250 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.30(w) x 9.30(h) x 0.80(d) |
Read an Excerpt
Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran
By Tim McDaniel
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1991 Princeton University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-03147-7
CHAPTER 1
Historical Legacies
The comparison of complicated periods of social change in different countries is not without its conceptual challenges and pitfalls. Russia under Nicholas II and Iran under Muhammad Reza Shah both witnessed experiments in autocratic modernization, and for this reason the patterns of social change in the two periods may fruitfully be contrasted with each other. It is not a weakness of comparative sociology, but fundamental to its very nature, that such comparison cannot approximate a controlled experiment with clear-cut causal inferences. The periods under consideration, despite considerable distinctness and coherence, cannot be cleanly separated from previous historical patterns, and so sociological regularities rooted in a shared structure are intertwined with historical particularities. One example can illustrate how historical and sociological analysis must supplement each other. The actions of the clergy in late 1970s Iran were partly a response to the shah's modernization program, but also the expression of their role in Iranian society as this had developed over the previous centuries. Thus, a purely synchronic analysis of autocratic modernization cannot account for many of the fundamental traits of their political stance.
Similarly, both the particular experiences of autocratic modernization and the historical backgrounds to these in the two countries diverged from each other in significant respects. Although both Tsar Nicholas II and Muhammad Reza Shah were autocratic rulers, the historical contexts of autocracy, with all the rich variations and associations in each country, and the nature of the ruler's own autocratic rule were in many ways very different. The same variations characterize the gamut of concepts that comparison must employ—for example, merchantry, industrialization, clergy, political party, social class. Although perfectly appropriate for purposes of comparison, such concepts must also be fleshed out for the two cases with a degree of historical concreteness.
These glancing references to some of the methodological complexities of comparative sociology will not be further developed here. Their purpose, rather, is to provide a context and rationale for the present chapter, and to suggest how it fits into the overall logic of this study. It is difficult to imagine a marriage of history and sociology satisfactory to scholars in both disciplines. The concepts, generalizations, and propositions of analytic sociology will offend the historian concerned with evidence, nuance, and particularity. The rich detail, complexity and tentativeness of the historian will often leave the sociologist with an unsated appetite for generality and causal structure.
The comparison of two cases strikes a partial compromise between the historian's accustomed attention to a single case and the sociologist's preference for maximizing the number of cases in search of the most broadly based conclusions. More specifically, insistence on the similarity of the core process of autocratic modernization can be combined with an appreciation of historical contrasts in order to interpret both similarities and differences in the revolutions. Such a compromise will not satisfy all tastes. I will not be able to avoid abstraction and generalization—indeed, this is precisely one purpose of the study. Yet these abstractions will be too historically grounded to admit of easy extension to other developing countries or other revolutions, except insofar as they can provide a foundation for contrasts between types. Although I will at points allude to cross-type comparisons, the purpose here is to lay bare the fundamental traits and tensions of one pattern of modernization and its implications for social change.
Let me, then, summarize the overarching logic of the comparison. I have chosen a general problem, the nature and consequences of autocratic modernization as a pattern of development. However little else they shared, both Nicholas II's Russia and Muhammad Reza Shah's Iran encountered the dilemmas of this contradictory path to the modern world. But the historically shaped social physiognomies of the two countries led to very different patterns of change. Through contrast and counterpart the historical traits and experiences of the two countries can be shown to illuminate each other, both in terms of commonalities and particularities. The goal of the comparison is not simply generalization, but also insight into each concrete case through contrast, a kind of dialogue of theme and variations.
From these methodological bearings follows the necessity of beginning with an account of the fundamental long-term historical traits of the two societies. A consideration of the historical backgrounds of the regimes, their social and cultural foundations, the relation of the states to other institutions, the nature of the dominant social elites, and the societies' historical experiences with modernization will help interpret the characteristics and interrelations of the key contending actors during the periods of rapid development.
Background of the Modem State
Both Russia and Iran were geographically exposed, vulnerable to invasions and cultural influences from east and west. Russia is situated on an immense plain, with no physical barriers to foreign depredations, by which it has been victimized for centuries. Norsemen, Mongols, Poles, French, and Germans have taken advantage of its flat expanses of land and advantageous river routes to conquer or despoil the Russian territories. Iran's geography is more rugged, its mountains, deserts, and lack of navigable rivers posing barriers to conquerors and centralized rule. But its placement between the Mediterranean and Asia made it an obvious target of foreign aggressors, of whom there was no lack from Alexander the Great and later the Arabs to the English and Russians of modern times.
Perhaps it was partly this vulnerability to foreign threat that explains the relatively early formation of distinct territorial states in Russia and Iran. The struggle of the Russians against Tartar domination in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries culminated in the consolidation of power by the Moscow princes (partly through their astute cooperation with the Mongol authorities) over the other branches of the House of Riurik. They had to impose themselves not only against the Mongols, but also against the status quo of fragmented rule embodied in the appanage system of princes. The so-called appanage period of Russian history, from the mid-twelfth to the mid-fifteenth centuries, was characterized by a multitude of petty princes with limited authority even in their own territories, and by a tendency toward further fragmentation through the division of the prince's patrimony among all his sons. The struggle of the Moscow princes for supremacy in the face of foreign threat and internal centrifugal forces exemplifies one of the main themes of Russian history: the interplay between centralized power, incarnating order, and later, in its own view, rationality, against the manifold forces of chaos and dissolution. Chaos, spontaneity, disorder, the threat of anarchy, and the collapse of the state: all of these would form a powerful set of images justifying further concentration of power and the development of statist mythology with great appeal to a people well aware of the dangers of spontaneous social forces.
By the late fifteenth century the power of the Mongols had collapsed. With the fall of Constantinople to the Turks, the Russian church was able to establish its independence from the Greeks. The previous subordination, political and cultural, of the Russians to the Mongols and to Byzantium was now at an end, and the Moscow princes, beginning with Ivan III (1462–1505), proclaimed themselves tsars, and Moscow could now envision itself as the Third Rome. Territorial unity, national identity (primarily as the union of the true Orthodox believers), and autocratic power created the preconditions for a dramatic expansion of the Russian state in the following centuries.
Roughly contemporary developments in Iran offer interesting points of similarity and contrast. Iran, as a general term referring to the Iranian plateau east of Mesopotamia and west of Central Asia, was heir to ancient imperial traditions, but after the Arab conquests these had been eclipsed. In the Islamic middle ages, Iran, like Mesopotamia, witnessed a system of decentralized rule combining the power of petty rulers, the emirs, and the influence of local notables in the cities. The power of the emirs was arbitrary but limited and often ineffective, and there was constant warfare among them. This pattern was interrupted and partly transformed by the Mongol invasions of the mid-thirteenth century, which led to the imposition of Mongol rule until the conquests of Timur (late fourteenth century), who himself built upon the Mongol political inheritance. Although the Mongols frequently delegated power to local emirs, they also imposed elements of an imperial structure, including an emphasis on the absolute power of the ruling family. In addition, they reintroduced Turkic-Mongolian tribal and military chieftainships (first brought in by the Seljuks in the eleventh century), with their unstable alliances and competitions for power, which proved capable of posing continual threats to centralized monarchy well into the twentieth century. Finally, they encouraged a pastoralist mode of life that would later pose obstacles to the consolidation of a modern nation-state.
There were thus traditions and resources available for the creation of an absolutist state in Iran, as there were also numerous serious impediments. It was the achievement of the Safavid shahs to promote this process of state building in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with remarkable energy. Originating as a Sufi order in northwestern Iran in the late thirteenth century, the Safavid movement gained widespread support, especially among the nondominant Turkic tribes in the region, for its opposition to the ruling Aqquyunlu and for its elaboration of a militant religious doctrine. In 1501 Ismail, leader of the movement, declared himself shah of Iran, founding the dynasty that endured until 1722. At its high point, during the reign of Shah Abbas I (1588–1629), the shah ruled in absolutist fashion over a vastly expanded empire administered by a strong professional bureaucracy. Together with the Ottoman and Mogul empires, the Safavid state constituted one of the three great Islamic territorial formations of the early modern period. To buttress their temporal authority, the Safavids developed a distinctive caesaropapist conception of kingship, under which the king was regarded as the Shadow of God. Shi'ism was declared the state orthodoxy and forcibly imposed upon the people, who until that time adhered to a variety of Sunni, Shi'ite, and Sufi beliefs.
It is not easy to summarize in brief compass the nature of Shi'ism and its key differences from the majority Sunni belief. The historical foundation of the split was the conflict over the succession to Muhammad at the Saqifah assembly: whether the choice of leader should be restricted to the Prophet's household (Banu Hashim) or whether the head of the community should be selected through consensus. The partisans of Ali favored him as the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, whom they claimed the Prophet had chosen to succeed him before his death. Their opponents argued that Muhammad had deliberately not chosen a successor, leaving this responsibility to the community, which he deemed fully capable of choosing the most competent person.
To this historical dispute were added, over the centuries, various other cultural and ideological differences that, when combined with the opposing historical experiences of the two communities, transformed these two positions into conflicting and often incompatible religious traditions. To oversimplify: Sunnis stood for the tradition of the community, consensus, law (the shari'a), and the integration of political and religious elites. Shi'ism came to represent a hostile, or at least skeptical, stance toward the status quo, with an underlying millenarianism; emphasis on the authority of the religious elite, who were given the right to interpret the tradition on the basis of their religious knowledge; and the elevation of esoteric knowledge and inner experience over external law. This is not to say that Sunnism was conservative, Shi'ism revolutionary. In fact, the Sunni model of the community guided by law always posed an implicit challenge to imperfect secular authorities; and the Shi'a often retreated into an apolitical, otherworldly perspective based on a deep sense of the corruption of all worldly affairs. Yet it is also true that Shi'ism more than Sunnism was the repository of a dissident tradition within Islam, which frequently expressed itself historically in a greater degree of distance from the political authorities.
Building on earlier foundations, by the late sixteenth century autocratic monarchy attained unprecedented scope and power in both countries. Ivan the Terrible and Abbas I ruled vast territories over which they claimed absolute dominion. In their persons spiritual and temporal powers were united, and the legitimating concepts of the Shi'ite state and Moscow as the Third Rome buttressed their authority. State control over religious institutions was extended while the power of local elites was significantly reduced. Russia and Iran emerged as relatively well-formed states with defined (if changing) boundaries and peoples set off against their neighbors by a widely shared religious identity.
The differences were equally significant and provide keys to the very different historical developments of the two countries over the following centuries. The Iranian monarchy never lost its tribal foundations, nor was it able to control the power of rival tribal groupings. Iranian political life did not lose its segmentary character until at least the reign of Reza Shah in the early decades of the twentieth century. Such an apparendy modern movement as the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 could thus partly be interpreted in terms of the model of urban-tribal relations worked out by Ibn Khaldun for medieval Islam. All Iranian regimes until Reza Shah had a tribal basis, and all of them confronted tribal challenges to their power. The shahs were autocratic rulers because their power was arbitrary and in theory unlimited and because legitimate countervailing institutions were weak, but their governments were seldom able to control tribal forces effectively or deeply to penetrate society.
Russia had its own centrifugal forces, especially the various national groups that multiplied as the empire expanded. Yet the Muscovite state benefited from certain advantages and developed effective ways to handle the potential challenges. First, the national groups occupied distant and outlying areas. Their distance, diversity, and distinctness from Russian culture impeded the formation of alliances with rival sectors of the Russian political elite. In addition, the tsars adopted a policy of conversion, baptism, and often incorporation of the foreign elites into the state apparatus, thus limiting their potential role as local communal leaders. These efforts were not and could not be wholly successful, as the experience of the Ukraine testifies, but by Iranian standards the universality implicit in the nontribal nature of the Russian autocracy gave immense advantages.
A second crucial contrast lay in the manner in which the Russian and Iranian rulers responded to the classic dilemma of patrimonial regimes: how to establish control over the social elites upon which the ruler depends for the extension of his power over the population. Nobles can too easily usurp what are in theory contingent grants of land, withhold tax revenues due the ruler for their own purposes, or form military contingents loyal to themselves rather than to the central government. In response to these familiar problems the Russian rulers initiated policies to weaken the independent nobility and to form a service elite defined and controlled by the ruler. In the mestnichestvo system of seventeenth-century Russia, noble lineage was recognized as one ingredient in the official social hierarchy, but the overall rank also depended on the quality of state service. The emphasis on state service was further strengthened by the administrative reforms of Peter the Great (1682–1725), which established a formal ranking system based almost wholly on this criterion. In Iran the tribal basis of the ruling elite and the social cohesion produced by regional tribal solidarities hindered such a solution. Tribal elites and noble landowners maintained a degree of independence inconceivable in Russia after Ivan the Terrible's attacks on the boyars. Thus, early eighteenth-century Iran produced no Peter the Great but degenerated into political anarchy marked by provincial revolts and Afghan, Afshar, Zand, and Qajar tribal movements.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Autocracy, Modernization, and Revolution in Russia and Iran by Tim McDaniel. Copyright © 1991 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
- FrontMatter, pg. i
- Contents, pg. vii
- Acknowledgments, pg. ix
- Introduction: A Contradictory Route to Industrial Society, pg. 3
- One. Historical Legacies, pg. 14
- Two. Autocracy in Russia and Iran, pg. 48
- Three. Dimensions of Modernization, pg. 70
- Four. Dilemmas of Autocratic Modernization, pg. 88
- Five. The Cities in Revolution, pg. 111
- Six. Autocracy, Landlords, and Peasants, pg. 149
- Seven. Cultures of Rebellion, pg. 185
- Conclusion. Structural Crisis and Revolutionary Dynamics, pg. 218
- Select Bibliography, pg. 233
- Index, pg. 237