Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method
J. L. Austin is famous for writing as if he thought it a condition, on the adequacy of what we say while doing epistemology, that it accord faithfully with what we would say in ordinary circumstances. A durable consensus formed after Austin's death that his pursuit of epistemology faithful to 'ordinary language' was fundamentally misguided. While critics saw his methods as resulting from a failure properly to understand the nature of the epistemologist's project, Mark Kaplan argues that this consensus arose from a misreading of Austin. In Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method, he sets out his stance that both the condition of adequacy to which Austin was committed and his reason for being committed to it, have been misunderstood by his critics. Starting by carefully analysing what Austin said about knowledge in 'Other Minds,' examining the response to skeptical arguments, and taking seriously the methodological remarks Austin scattered in his corpus, Kaplan demonstrates that Austin's methods were not born of a misunderstanding of the project of epistemology. Rather, Austin was a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived though was not against epistemological theorizing itself. Kaplan concludes that Austin understood himself to be offering substantive answers to key epistemological questions and defending a way of doing epistemology that is fully capable of providing these important answers.
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Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method
J. L. Austin is famous for writing as if he thought it a condition, on the adequacy of what we say while doing epistemology, that it accord faithfully with what we would say in ordinary circumstances. A durable consensus formed after Austin's death that his pursuit of epistemology faithful to 'ordinary language' was fundamentally misguided. While critics saw his methods as resulting from a failure properly to understand the nature of the epistemologist's project, Mark Kaplan argues that this consensus arose from a misreading of Austin. In Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method, he sets out his stance that both the condition of adequacy to which Austin was committed and his reason for being committed to it, have been misunderstood by his critics. Starting by carefully analysing what Austin said about knowledge in 'Other Minds,' examining the response to skeptical arguments, and taking seriously the methodological remarks Austin scattered in his corpus, Kaplan demonstrates that Austin's methods were not born of a misunderstanding of the project of epistemology. Rather, Austin was a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived though was not against epistemological theorizing itself. Kaplan concludes that Austin understood himself to be offering substantive answers to key epistemological questions and defending a way of doing epistemology that is fully capable of providing these important answers.
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Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method

Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method

by Mark Kaplan
Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method

Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method

by Mark Kaplan

eBook

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Overview

J. L. Austin is famous for writing as if he thought it a condition, on the adequacy of what we say while doing epistemology, that it accord faithfully with what we would say in ordinary circumstances. A durable consensus formed after Austin's death that his pursuit of epistemology faithful to 'ordinary language' was fundamentally misguided. While critics saw his methods as resulting from a failure properly to understand the nature of the epistemologist's project, Mark Kaplan argues that this consensus arose from a misreading of Austin. In Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method, he sets out his stance that both the condition of adequacy to which Austin was committed and his reason for being committed to it, have been misunderstood by his critics. Starting by carefully analysing what Austin said about knowledge in 'Other Minds,' examining the response to skeptical arguments, and taking seriously the methodological remarks Austin scattered in his corpus, Kaplan demonstrates that Austin's methods were not born of a misunderstanding of the project of epistemology. Rather, Austin was a powerful critique of how that project has been conceived though was not against epistemological theorizing itself. Kaplan concludes that Austin understood himself to be offering substantive answers to key epistemological questions and defending a way of doing epistemology that is fully capable of providing these important answers.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780192558329
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Publication date: 07/11/2018
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 256
File size: 375 KB

About the Author

Mark Kaplan is Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. He is the author of Decision Theory as Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1996). He has also written numerous articles and book chapters on the work of J. L. Austin, on epistemology, and on Bayesian decision theory (in particular, the philosophical motivation and epistemological import of that theory). His work has been supported by the American Council of Learned Societies and the National Science Foundation.

Table of Contents

1. Austin's Critical Method
2. Austin as Theorist
3. Philosophical Detachment Revisited
4. How to do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface
5. How to Do Things with Austin: Gettier's Challenge
6. Epistemology Austin's Way
Appendix. Appendix
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