Auction Theory

by Vijay Krishna

Overview

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions.

• Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions
• New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications
• New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780080922935
Publisher:	Elsevier Science
Publication date:	09/28/2009
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	336
File size:	5 MB

Table of Contents

I Single Object Auctions Private Value Auctions The Revenue Equivalence Principle Qualifications and Extensions Mechanism Design Auctions with Interdependent Values The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle Asymmetries and Other Complications Efficiency and the English Auction Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values Bidding Rings

II Multiple Object Auctions An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values Some Revenue Considerations Sequential Sales Nonidentical Objects Packages and Positions Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values

III Appendices Continuous Distributions Stochastic Orders Order Statistics Affiliated Random Variables Some Linear Algebra

What People are Saying About This

From the Publisher

Develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner

Editorial Reviews

In this complete evaluation of auction theory, Krishna (economics, Pennsylvania State U., University Park) covers the situations where a single object is sold; theory of auctions with private values; the revenue equivalence principle; the adjustments to the principle required by asymmetries, risk aversion, and budge constraints; mechanism design with private values; a model with interdependent values and affiliated signals; the revenue ranking principle; efficiency properties of English auction; mechanism design with interdependent values; and collusive behavior and bidding cartels. The second half of the book is devoted to the description and modeling of multiple object auctions. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Booknews

"Krishna’s superb Auction Theory is an ideal text and reference because his clear and precise exposition distills the vast literature and provides excellent motivation, examples, exercises, and connections to commercial applications." —Robert B. Wilson, Stanford University

"On its publication in 2002, Vijay Krishna's book immediately became a central reference in auction theory. But the subject has continued to develop, and so we're very fortunate that Krishna has now updated the text." —Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study, Nobel Laureate in Economics

From the Publisher