Attention and Memory: An Integrated Framework

by Nelson Cowan

Overview

For decades, the fundamental processes underlying memory and attention have been understood within an "information processing" framework in which information passes from one processing stage to another, leading eventually to a response. More recently, however, the attempt to build a general theoretical framework for information processing has been largely supplanted in favor of two more recent approaches: parallel/connectionist models of processing and direct investigations of brain function. In Attention and Memory, cognitive psychologist Nelson Cowan reconciles theoretical conflicts in the literature to presents an important, analytical update of the traditional information-processing approach by modifying it to incorporate the last few decades of research on memory, attention, and brain functioning. Throughout, the author cogently considers and ultimately refutes recent challenges to the fundamental assumption of the existence of special short-term memory and selective attention faculties. He also draws a new distinction between memory processes operating inside and outside of the focus of attention. Coherent and balanced, the book offers a clearer understanding of how memory and attention operate together, and how both functions are produced by brain processes. It will be welcomed by students and researchers in cognitive psychology.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780198023227
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	01/01/1998
Series:	Oxford Psychology Series , #26
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
File size:	1 MB

About the Author

University of Missouri-Columbia

Table of Contents

	Preface	vii
1.	Introduction: Modeling Memory and Attention	3
1.1	The fundamental relation between memory and attention	5
1.2	The emergence of memory and attention in modern psychology	6
1.2.1	Behaviorist movement	6
1.2.2	Gestalt movement	7
1.2.3	Empirical observations of capacity limits	8
1.3	Modeling the processing of information	9
1.3.1	Broadbent's 1958 model	9
1.3.2	Modifications of Broadbent's (1958) model	11
1.3.3	Abandonment of Broadbent's (1958) model	13
1.3.4	A reconsideration of approaches to modeling: what is being modeled?	15
1.3.5	On the role of models in scientific progress	20
1.4	The model of Cowan (1988)	24
1.4.1	The article and the book	24
1.4.2	Background of the modeling framework	24
1.4.3	Cowan's (1988) formulation	27
1.5	A comparison of Cowan (1988) with other modeling approaches	32
1.5.1	Alternative graphic representations of the assumptions of Cowan (1988)	32
1.5.2	More explicit theories of memory and attention	33
1.5.3	More extensive unified theories of cognition	34
1.5.4	Partial-system models	36
1.5.5	Alternative arrangements of components	37
1.5.6	Strong modularity	38
1.5.7	Summary remarks on model comparisons	39
1.6	Key issues regarding memory and attention	40
1.6.1	Chapter 2: sensory memory	40
1.6.2	Chapter 3: short-term storage	42
1.6.3	Chapter 4: "virtual" short-term memory mechanisms	43
1.6.4	Chapter 5: habituation and dishabituation of orienting	43
1.6.5	Chapter 6: attention and long-term memory	44
1.6.6	Chapter 7: attention and awareness	44
1.6.7	Chapter 8: summary discussion including neurophysiological underpinnings of memory and attention	45
1.6.8	Strategies for reading this book	46
Part I	Transient-Memory Phenomena
2.	Sensory Memory Persistence	49
2.1	Sensory memory in current cognitive psychology	50
2.2	Definition and distinguishing features of sensory memory	53
2.3	Types of sensory memory and their durations	56
2.4	Uses of sensory memory	66
2.5	Neural representation of sensory memory	70
2.6	Challenges to the concept of sensory memory	75
3.	Memory Activation and Attentional Focusing	77
3.1	A brief history of short-term memory concepts	77
3.1.1	Capacity limits of short-term memory	77
3.1.2	Time limits of short-term memory	78
3.1.3	Monistic memory theories	78
3.2	Short-term memory limits according to cognitive psychology	79
3.2.1	Short-term memory and information processing	79
3.2.2	Capacity limits of short-term memory	81
3.2.3	Time limits of short-term memory	81
3.2.4	Combination of capacity and time limits	85
3.2.5	The role of long-term knowledge in short-term memory tasks	85
3.2.6	The role of covert processes in short-term memory tasks	86
3.2.7	Short-term memory limits in other cognitive tasks	90
3.3	Cowan's (1988) conception of short-term memory	93
3.3.1	Basic structure	93
3.3.2	The role of unconscious activation	94
3.3.3	The role of multiple-feature activation	95
3.3.4	Impact of the model	96
3.3.5	Short-term memory limits in particular tasks	97
3.3.6	An analogy	98
3.3.7	Relation between short-term memory and working memory	99
3.4	Some unresolved issues in the Cowan (1988) approach	100
3.4.1	How many short-term memory limits?	100
3.4.2	How is serial order coding accomplished?	101
3.4.3	How modular is short-term memory storage?	102
3.4.4	How is neuromotor memory coding accomplished?	103
3.4.5	What is the proper definition of memory decay?	105
3.4.6	Are process boundaries fuzzy?	108
3.5	Neurophysiology of short-term memory	109
4.	Actual Versus "Virtual" Short-Term Memory Phenomena	111
4.1	A challenge to multiple-store accounts	112
4.1.1	Through-list distractor procedure	112
4.1.2	The monistic view	114
4.1.3	Neurological and neurochemical evidence	116
4.2	Arguments against the monistic view	118
4.2.1	Through-list distractor procedure reconsidered	118
4.2.2	Peterson & Peterson procedure reconsidered	125
4.2.3	Articulatory loop reconsidered	128
4.2.4	Hebb's approach reconsidered	129
4.2.5	Detailed models of short-term memory phenomena	130
4.3	Where do we search for short-term memory?	131
4.4	Refrain: what is short-term memory?	133
Part II	Selective Attention Phenomena
5.	Attention Filtering and Orienting	137
5.1	The problem of attentional filtering	137
5.2	Habituation of orienting as a selective filter	140
5.3	Evidence linking orienting and selective attention	143
5.3.1	Effects of habituation to unattended stimuli	144
5.3.2	Effects of orienting to changes in unattended stimuli	149
5.3.3	Formation of a neural model	154
5.3.4	Codes included in vs. excluded from the neural model that leads to habituation of attentional orienting	156
5.3.5	The roles of novelty and significance in the neural model	157
5.3.6	Role of the active attentional focus in orienting	158
5.3.7	Habituation of orienting vs. suppression of attention	159
5.3.8	Potential objections to habituation as an attentional filter	160
5.4	Some unresolved issues related to the habituation hypothesis	162
5.4.1	Preconditions for habituation	163
5.4.2	Candidate phenomena of unclear status	164
6.	Attention and Long-Term Memory	167
6.1	Dissociations between direct and indirect memory measures	167
6.2	The importance of attention for long-term memory	171
6.2.1	Attentional manipulations in memory tasks	171
6.2.2	Attention, memory, and amnesia	175
6.2.3	Attention and taxonomies of memory	177
6.2.4	Contrasting theories of memory and amnesia	178
6.2.5	Control of the type of processing	178
6.3	Dissociation of automatic and attention-related factors	179
6.4	Separate or embedded memory processes?	182
6.4.1	The importance of correcting for guessing	183
6.4.2	Partial overlap between conscious and unconscious memory: modeling the general case	185
6.5	Specific mechanisms of attention in memory storage and retrieval	189
6.5.1	Perception and attention in relation to memory	189
6.5.2	What occurs in implicit serial learning?	190
6.6	Automaticity, attention, and long-term memory	192
6.6.1	Description of automaticity in search tasks	192
6.6.2	General description of automaticity	193
6.6.3	Some controversies about automaticity	194
6.6.4	A comparison of automaticity with habituation of orienting: two perspectives on memory and attention	197
6.7	A reassessment of attention and memory in Cowan's (1988) model	198
7.	Attentional Focus and Conscious Awareness	200
7.1	The concept of a unitary focus of attention	202
7.1.1	Limited attentional resource	202
7.1.2	Unity of attention and awareness	203
7.1.3	Distinction between "attention" and "selection"	204
7.1.4	Internal vs. external attentional focus	204
7.2	The challenge from cognitive science: multiple resources	205
7.2.1	Allport's objections	206
7.2.2	Response to Allport	206
7.2.3	The multiple resources approach	207
7.2.4	Response to multiple resources approach	208
7.2.5	Detailed analysis of a critical dual task study	208
7.2.6	A more analytic approach to resources: the PRP paradigm	213
7.2.7	Response to Pashler	215
7.2.8	Attention-division vs. attention-sharing	216
7.2.9	Resources and hemispheric functioning	217
7.2.10	Resouces and automaticity	222
7.2.11	Resources and intelligence	223
7.2.12	Unified vs. multiple attentional resources: a summary	224
7.3	The challenge from psychology at large: dissociated states and awareness	225
7.3.1	Dissociated states	225
7.4	The challenge from philosophy of mind: multiple percepual drafts	232
7.4.1	Is there a Cartesian theater?	232
7.4.2	Phi phenomenon example	233
7.4.3	Gap-filling examples	234
7.4.4	Parallel and serial processing with multiple drafts	234
7.4.5	A general critique of the multiple drafts view	235
7.4.6	Critique of Dennett's interpretation of the phi phenomenon	236
7.4.7	Critique of Dennett's interpretation of the blind spot	238
7.4.8	General comment on Dennett's thesis	238
7.5	Response to challenges to a unified view of attention and awareness: a summary	239
8.	Concluding Observations, with Steps Toward Neuroscience	241
8.1	Relationships between memory and attention	242
8.1.1	Effects of attention on memory	243
8.1.2	Effects of memory on attention	244
8.2	Some directions for further work	246
8.2.1	Amount of detail	246
8.2.2	Explicitness of assumptions	247
8.2.3	Level of analysis	247
8.3	Toward a neuroscience of memory and attention	248
8.3.1	What are we looking for?	248
8.3.2	Mapping brain processes onto the model of Cowan (1988)	249
8.3.3	Summary of neural hypotheses	268
8.3.4	Consciousness in a wider context	268
8.4	Some observations about the future: on the changing relation between brain research and cognition	272
	References	275
	Author Index	309
	Subject Index	317

Editorial Reviews

"Students and researchers. . .intrigued by the continuing debates over memory and attention models and their neurological interface will find this a thoughtful and timely work." —Choice

From the Publisher