At the Heart of the Reich: The Secret Diary of Hitler's Army Adjutant

by Gerhard Engel

Overview

A revealing account of Hitler’s thoughts and actions throughout World War II from one of his closest aides.

Major Gerhard Engel was Hitler's army adjutant from 1938 to 1943. During his years with Hitler, Engel kept a diary. After the war, he added material to shed further light on certain events, military and political decisions, and Hitler's attitude to particular problems. His diary covers the decision-making process behind crucial military actions, including the annexation of Austria, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the war against Russia. He also addresses intrigue within Hitler's inner circle and his casual conversations with other key Nazi figures.

At the Heart of the Reich sheds important light on the Fuhrer's core beliefs. It includes the statement made by Hitler in 1941, “I am now as before a Catholic.” It also details his views on German Jews and dwells on the extent to which they served in the Wehrmacht. Engel also addresses the deportation of Jews from Salonika and Hitler's order to Himmler to select a destination, the details of which Hitler was apparently unconcerned with. The final part of the diary is mostly devoted to the war against Russia. Engel's reports confirm that the master plan was to take Leningrad and Rostov, then close pincers behind Moscow. The plan was frustrated by senior army commanders'’ lack of enthusiasm and Hitler's failure to exert firm leadership. Engel depicts Hitler as a vacillating, contrary man. It is not unlikely that this encouraged his generals to impose themselves and argue their plan to rush Moscow, which ultimately contributed to the defeat of the Third Reich.

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Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781510711556
Publisher:	Skyhorse
Publication date:	11/08/2016
Pages:	208
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 8.60(h) x 1.00(d)

Read an Excerpt

CHAPTER 1

1938

13 March 1938+ Vienna – Guderian

At the Imperial in Vienna I met General Guderian. He was shocked at what had gone on. I also kept hearing from him the word 'trust'. G. blamed everything on the Army High Command which had not been able to master itself in the ... spirit and so win the Führer's confidence. I was astonished at how frank he was to me as a young captain. Also spoke about our new OB [C-in-C], of whom he had a poor opinion. I replied that the friction and this crisis of confidence were nothing new, I had experienced too much of it as regimental adjutant and company commander, and the attitude of the SS towards us was monstrous. General G replied this could best be overcome if the Reichsführer-SS or the present Field Marshal Göring were appointed Cin-C. Then ways and means would be found to clear the path of complications. I was so astonished at this point of view that I made no comment, but I do not find it convincing.

14 March 1938

By chance I witnessed the F[ührer]'s reception of Cardinal Innitzer [Archbishop of Vienna] in the Imperial. F. approached I., bowed low and kissed hands. The cardinal raised the chained cross from his chest and with it made the symbolic sign of the cross. In the evening the F. was much taken with the visit and believes he can get along well with the Church in Austria. Heaps praise in general on the Catholic Church in Austria in contrast to the Reich. Over there it had become ever more political because of the parity of the two confessions. Here it was the state church and had a quite different relationship towards the state. In the Reich Bismarck and Windt-horst had made the same mistakes. Churches should only be allowed to become political if they were in the greater scheme of things the pawn of politics, that is of the political power. He himself had learned much from the Cath[olic] Church for his political struggle and would not talk of taking things to extremes. But whoever swam against the current and cloaked themselves with the Cross to oppose him would have to be eliminated. For this reason the declaration of loyalty by the cardinal seemed to him all the more precious. The cardinal had requested from him freedom of manoeuvre in the affairs of the Church, and had received from him an assurance.

19 March 1938 (Obersalzberg)

Himmler came from Vienna and reported about his cleansing measures. Presented a strident report in a previously unheard-of tone and sowed the first mines against the Church. Talks of 'regrettable' arrests. Continual shooting of Austrian officers of the Federal Army, who had to be got rid of. I was given a slip of paper with names to pass to OKH. Distinct impression that the thing is getting out of hand and old scores are being settled. In connection with the conversation, Reichsführer-SS asked F. for private talk. Doubtless the Fritsch affair is to be discussed.

19 March 1938+

Amongst other things I reported to General Haider. I was received with the same distrust as on most occasions with the other chiefs in the High Command, but the disrespect this time was the worst. I don't know what he thinks I am. Up until now I was an active officer chosen for this post by the highly respected former C-in-C. In general I do not understand what is going on at OKH. The only thing certain is that everybody is talking of a crisis of confidence. Most blame it on the Party, the remainder are incensed about 4 February. I fail to see clearly how it can have brought us to this. The only thing certain is that everything we experienced so far in Army life in terms of internal opposition to the Party has forced us into the current crisis, wherein the younger General Staff officers, colleagues of my year of entry, are quite forthright and lay the blame not least on the leadership at the War Ministry with all the subsequent consequences. Strange to record that there is a more positive attitude to the Party amongst the General Staff officers of the South German Gaue [NSDAP – Nazi Party – districts] than is the case with us. But, however one looks at it. it is not pleasant and as always since 1933 we in the Army are the lightning conductors.

19 March 1938*

Reported to General Haider. Distrustful reception as from most commanders-in-chief. Do not yet understand what is going on at OKH. One thing is sure: crisis of confidence of the first order. Most blame it on the Party, others on 4 February. I do not yet know how it came to this. Everything is leading at the moment towards a crisis. The young staff officers blame much on the War Minister. South German officers have a more positive attitude to the Party than is the case with us from North Germany. But, however one looks at it, it is not pleasant and the Army is once more the lightning conductor.

26 March 1938

A highly tense and unpleasant conversation with Schm(undt). Schm. came from F. and, beaming with joy, related how he had suggested that the Hitler salute should be introduced generally within the Wehrmacht. He had got the idea after witnessing the unprecedented wild jubilation shown to the Führer by troops he had met. I was appalled and asked him if he could imagine a positive reaction particularly from officers and NCOs. At Liegnitz he must have experienced at pretty close quarters the altercations with the Party, SA and SS as I did at Rostock. Then the burden of the unexplained affair involving Fritsch. The officer corps would definitely see it as salt in the wound. Schm. gave me a long lecture about what we officers were lacking. We were primarily the guilty party in the crisis of confidence and were making it really difficult for the F. Fact was, he honoured his old teacher Beck and also the old C-in-C but neither had recognised the sign of the times. One should not always look to blame the Party bosses. He had the definite impression that F. was seeking the confidence of the Wehrmacht and correspondingly also the Army, but a number of generals were setting out to sabotage it. I did not agree and opposed what he said as far as I could, having regard to our respective rank and office. Today I recounted all this to Siewert in confidence.

28 March 1938

Long talk with Siewert on how things ought to proceed. It is very difficult to get through to him because he is still completely preoccupied with how the C-in-C was treated and apparently cannot get along with Br. [Brauchitsch]. The latter is all tensed up and quite resigned. His reports to the F. are inhibited and hesitant, no relationship of confidence at all. However, he now has a good spy in the RK [Reichskanzlei – Reich Chancellery] for I keep my ears pricked and find out everything. Each day I pass information to S[iewert] and we both then try to give the C-in-C material to enable him to prepare the Army's rebuttal to accusations. F. does most of the talking and Br. does not dare interrupt or contradict him. Siewert hinted that Br. is very heavily weighed down with family problems and feels he cannot do what he sometimes wants to.

19 April 1938 (SS-) Verfügungstruppe

Long conversation between F. and Sepp Dietrich about expansion of the Verfügungstruppe [the military wing of the SS which became the WaffenSS]. Motive was the setting up of 4. Standarte [4th Battalion] 'Der Führer' in Vienna. F. says that this completes the expansion of the SS-Verfügungstruppe. He wants to keep this 'elite' small or it will not be an elite for long. It has to be; a political force blindly loyal to state and Führer. In the event of disturbances, this force would put them down brutally. He sees it as a real Praetorian Guard to snuff out all those, even within its own ranks, who swim against the current. Therefore [it has] to be equipped with the best and most up-to-date weapons, also with Panzers rather like a Panzer brigade. I am very concerned at this development and inform the C-in-C. It is high time that the Army did something similar or soon in Berlin we will all be evicted.

20 April 1938

I am on night duty and the solitude in the living quarters contrasts strongly to the hullabaloo experienced today throughout all Germany. Shortly after midnight the Führer and I were alone, and I was very curious to see his attitude towards me for, although completely correct, he treats me with obvious distrust which is not surprising. We walked the length of the corridor without pause for over two hours. First he asked me personal questions about my regiment, activity as company commander and my General Staff training. Then he spoke about the parade which had visibly impressed him. Above all the Panzers in the new camouflage livery went down very well. Suddenly changing the subject he talked about the 100,000-man army, praising it highly. I waited my moment to mention the services of Colonel-General Fritsch and hoped for a favourable opportunity but the F. moved on at once to Field Marshal von Blomberg, beginning with the assertion that the necessary departure of both commanders had affected him deeply. The services of the War Minister in helping erect the National Socialist state were historic and would always remain so. He owed it to him that in 1933, knowing precisely the leanings of the generals, he transferred into the state structure an Army loyal and correct. Blomberg had also recognised the need to recruit modern officers who thought as National Socialists. He [Hitler] knew that the political reorganisation of the Army was only possible as a gradual process and he had often had to get the minister to apply the brakes. The majority of the generals had rejected him and that remained the case today. He embodied a different Prussian-ness to that of those generals. Before the seizure of power, only in Bavaria had he had close contacts with senior Reichswehr officers. Politically, as with all other officers, he had not trusted Blomberg a great deal. Blomberg had been opposed to his every bold decision, the worst when Germany left the League of Nations; on that occasion Blomberg protested like an hysterical virgin. Yet that did not alter the fact that he was the first National Socialist-thinking commander-in-chief and in matters of rearmament he thought like him [Hitler], and not like Fritsch, who always worked at keeping things in check. The Fritsch affair would never have come into play if the War Minister had not made such an appalling choice. It was fatal only to get to know the bride's mother at the marriage ceremony. One could tell by her face the type of woman she was and her antecedents. Blomberg knew nothing and would not have believed it anyway if it had been explained to him. But most of all he [Hitler] had been shocked by the field marshal's attitude when they had had their last conversation. Blomberg had professed astonishment that he, Hitler, should be so reproachful and pointed out that he had been thinking as a National Socialist when he chose for his second wife a simple maiden from amongst the people. Whereas he [Hitler] and his Party colleagues might share a view of affairs different to, and freer than, the perverted morals of society, nevertheless he could hardly overlook a Party member in such a responsible position marrying a reformed prostitute. In the wake of this, he had taken no steps to intervene in the case of Fritsch because his confidence in the generals had been severely shaken.

I was absolutely shocked not to say flabbergasted that the Führer should speak so openly to me, a young officer. I was not in a position to respond, since Siewert and also the C-in-C had neglected to keep me informed. I had to labour at gathering the sum total of what I knew about both matters.

22/23 April 1938*

The birthday anniversary is gone and I have night duty again. In the vestibule I spent another ninety minutes walking up and down with F. We spoke a lot about the [birthday] parade. He asked a whole series of technical questions about weapons, amongst others the Panzer IV. Was very impressed by the military spectacle. So I dared to have another try about our former C-in-C. I mentioned a lot about his life and the regard with which he was held within the Army. Told him about manouevres at Stettin in which he was senior artillery commander, and much of his activities as commander of AR2 [2nd Artillery Regiment] at Schwerin. The Führer, today looking pale, heard me out quietly and for a change did not interrupt. Finally I made a plea, also at the instigation of the C-in-C, that he should receive Fritsch, this being the latter's most cherished desire. He sought a personal reconciliation and clarification. This was more important to him than any reinstatement or employment elsewhere. Here the Führer became unsettled. In a long discourse he spoke once more of the disappointments he had known since 1934, all due to Fritsch. He had been the restraining element in rearmament. Quite apart from what happened, he would have had to let him go. I interrupted and recalled a conversation at Döberitz in 1935 which had made a particular impression on me as regimental adjutant at that time. To do nothing precipitate had been the byword and nature of Fritsch, since he wanted to avoid the Army being watered down. With that I rested my case. He departed and went to bed.

20 May 1938+ (Ideas for Uniforms)

F. made fun of the new Foreign Ministry uniforms. Compared them with those of a circus master of ceremonies and suggested that the toilet ladies at the Foreign Office should have a nice uniform too. In all this palaver one saw the hollowness of diplomats and the 'need to do things properly' of protocol. He regretted very much that his foreign minister went along with this nonsense. Always people pointed out it was the same with other countries. But one should stop at idiocy. Moreover the cartel in other countries was always a small clique. His father had been a middle-ranking official in Austria entitled to a major's uniform but was only permitted to wear it on the birthday of Kaiser Franz-Joseph, at all other times it hung in the wardrobe.

Hewel dared to contradict but made a bad impression. F. started to snap but despite it Hewel shifted the attack to Göring. The field marshal was also fond of fine fancy dress uniforms. The F. gave the surprising retort: 'That is a special case, and I let him have his fun. He happens to have an extravagant personality; these small weaknesses are redeemed by his services.'

22 May 1938 (Beck)

Was with the Chief of the General Staff again to get him to attend the impending major conference of service heads with the F. He was very friendly as usual. To my hint that he was the best person to advise the F. on how things looked in the Army and how necessary it was to tread warily in some areas, he clapped me on the shoulder and said: 'Dear E[ngel], it is pointless putting all that to the Führer. He thinks only along political lines and is deaf to military objections. Besides, I am not used to his demagogic way. Convey to him my warmest greetings and tell him I will send Gen(eral) Haider who can supply answers to questions in such a way that he receives clear advice.' I returned really saddened and informed Schm., who was likewise very disappointed.

22 May 1938* Reich Chancellery – Rome Society

F. in a none-too-good mood the whole day. Talking about Italian Impressionists and let drop scathing condemnation of Rome society and Italian nobility. So much degeneracy, so many parrot figures and old frumps as he had never previously seen heaped together. Worst thing was, this society together with its hollowness and stupidity still exercised a fair degree of influence on politics because it was protected by the Quirinal [the royal palace] and, having the full support of the crown, made life difficult for the Duce. At the concert in the Villa Borghese ridiculous counts and countesses were seated in the first two rows and the deserving marshals of the empire in the fourth and fifth. At a gesture and at his request at least two of the marshals were brought forward. Worst of all was the queen, that mutton-thief from Montenegro. She was at least still stable, but otherwise pig-stupid. He had the worst martyr's-road behind him, namely the polonaise [dance] through the rooms of the capitol. Women there had thrown themselves on him and almost poked his eyes out with their lorgnettes. Everything had to be done to support the Duce in his struggle against this corrupt society. But he didn't have it easy, all the more so because the officer corps was thoroughly infiltrated by this kind of nobility.

May 1938+ F. – Beck – Haider

The Führer has called a pioneering conference of the responsible Army and Luftwaffe Staffs in order to discuss with them the political consequences arising from the return of Austria to the Reich fold.

(Continues…)

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Table of Contents

Maps 7

Preface 13

Introduction 25

The Diary

1938 35

1939 58

1940 84

1041 102

1942-43 126

Notes 151

Appendices

1 Armed Forces High Command, 1941-42 195

2 Array High Command, 1941-42 196

Bibliography

1 Unpublished Documents 197

2 Published Documents, Articles and Books 198

3 Select English Bibliography 204

Index 206