Aspects of Agency: Decisions, Abilities, Explanations, and Free Will

by Alfred R. Mele

Overview

The libertarian theory of free will combines a negative thesis and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that free will is incompatible with determinism. The positive thesis is that there are actions that involve exercises of free will—-'free actions,' for short. While remaining neutral on this negative thesis, Aspects of Agency develops a detailed version of the positive thesis that represents paradigmatically free actions as indeterministically caused by their proximal causes and pays special attention to decisions so instigated. The bulk of Mele's work is a masterful defense of a positive libertarian thesis against objections to theses of its kind. Aspects of Agency includes solutions to problems about luck and control that are widely discussed in the literature on free will and moral responsibility. The seven chapters on free will are preceded by an introductory chapter and three chapters on central issues in the philosophy of action that bear on standard treatments of free will: deciding to act, agents' abilities, and commitments of a causal theory of action explanation.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780190659974
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	05/01/2017
Pages:	262
Product dimensions:	6.20(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.10(d)

About the Author

Alfred Mele is the author of nine previous OUP books and over 200 articles. He directed the Big Questions in Free Will Project (2010-2013) and is currently the director of the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control Project.

Table of Contents

Preface

1. Introduction
2. Deciding to Act
3. Actions, Explanations, and Causes
4. Agents' Abilities
5. Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other?
6. Is What You Decide Ever up to You?
7. Arbitrary Decisions and the Problem of Present Luck
8. Complete Control and Disappearing Agents
9. Libertarianism and Human Agency
10. Two Libertarian Theories: or Why Event-causal Libertarians Should Prefer My Daring Libertarian View to Robert Kane's View
11. Living Without Agent Causation

References
Index

Editorial Reviews

"Al Mele's impressive new book features his most recent contributions to the philosophy of agency and free will. Several of the early chapters set out the key notions in philosophy of action relevant to the free will debate, and they do so with unsurpassed lucidity. Participants in the free will debate will find this material valuable for clarifying their own thinking and writing... the book as a whole is another excellent contribution of Mele's to our understanding of agency and free will." — Derk Pereboom, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"Congratulations to Alfred Mele for yet another outstanding book on free will! Mele is certainly one of the world's leading experts on the topics of free will and theory of action. In Aspects of Agency, Mele builds upon his highly influential work on agency, intention, and abilities to offer a compelling event-causal theory of libertarian free will. In doing so, he argues forcefully against those who contend his event causal libertarian theory cannot overcome the problem of luck, and he also shows why agent causal theories are no improvement over what he has to offer. Mele's book is an exciting addition to his earlier work on free will, since in this one he focuses his attention just on libertarianism. It is a beautifully written, tightly argued piece of philosophy from which both the general reader and the expert will profit handsomely. It is no doubt yet another game changer." — Michael McKenna, Professor of Philosophy, the University of Arizona

"Aspects of Agency makes important contributions to our understanding of central topics in the philosophy of action, such as the nature of practical decisions, agents' abilities, commitments of causal theories of action explanation, and whether one's deciding is ever up to one, that are vital to understanding key positions and disputes in the free will literature. It is also a thoughtful and illuminating discussion of principal issues about free action. Mele's thesis that event-causal libertarianism is superior to agent-causal libertarianism is supported by scrupulous and trenchant argument. This excellent book is wonderfully clear and beautifully organized. The penetrating arguments will inspire any number of lively debates." — Ishtiyaque Haji, Professor of Philosophy, University of Calgary

"This is an excellent book. The first part sets out the key notions involved in the free will debate with unmatched clarity. Al Mele, as a leading and analytically meticulous philosopher of both action and of freedom, is one of very few philosophers capable of doing this so well. The second part, an extended defense of event-causal libertarianism against the main objections, advances the debate in a lively and engaging way. Anyone who wishes to make further progress would be well-advised to take this important contribution into account." — Derk Pereboom, Chair and Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University

From the Publisher