Applied Industrial Economics / Edition 1

by Louis Phlips

Overview

This book is an important collection of papers published over the past ten years in American and European journals. Part 1 explains market structure as a function of sunk costs and market size. Part 2 illustrates the central role of pricing schemes (including parallel pricing, delivered pricing and competition clauses) in sustaining equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Parts 3 and 4 give a game-theoretic foundation to competition policy and merger control. Louis Phlips offers a comprehensive introduction to the text in which he very carefully explains the reasoning behind his choice of papers, and provides a superb synthesis of the material.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521629546
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	09/24/1998
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	456
Product dimensions:	6.89(w) x 9.72(h) x 1.14(d)

Table of Contents

Preface; Introduction; Part I. Market Structure: 1. Game theory and industry studies: an introductory overview John Sutton; 2. Game-theoretic models of market concentration: sunk costs and market structure - a review article Richard Schmalensee; 3. Expanding markets: capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide industry Pankaj Ghemawat; 4. Declining markets: the devolution of declining industries Pankaj Ghemawat and Barry Nalebuff; 5. Empirical evidence: exit from declining industries - 'shakeout' or 'stakeout'? Marvin B. Lieberman; Part II. Industrial Pricing and Pricing Schemes: 6. Intertemporal pricing schemes: experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly Ronald Harstad, Stephen Martin and Hans-Theo Normann; 7. Spatial pricing schemes: on the strategic choice of spatial price policy Jacques-François Thisse and Xavier Vives; 8. Best-price policies: facilitating practices - the effects of advance notice and best-price policies Charles A. Holt and David T. Scheffman; 9. Vertical pricing schemes: vertical restraints and producers' competition Patrick Rey and Joseph Stiglitz; 10. Price discrimination in a common market: international price discrimination in the European car market Frank Verboven; 11. Tacit collusion (I): interfirm rivalry in a repeated game - an empirical test of tacit collusion Margaret E. Slade; 12. Tacit collusion (II): collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly Ray Rees; Part III. Competition Policy: 13. Collusion and predation: on the detection of collusion and predation Louis Phlips; 14. Vertical restraints: vertical restraints in European competition policy J. A. Kay; 15. Franchising agreements: economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising OECD; 16. Joint R&D ventures: cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers C. d'Aspremont and A. Jacquemin; Part IV. Mergers and Merger Control: 17. Unprofitable exogenous mergers: losses from horizontal merger - the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium S. W. Salant, S. Switzer and R. J. Reynolds; 18. Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare: horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro; 19. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: horizontal mergers - comment Gregory J. Werden; 20. Cournot and merger control: horizontal mergers - reply Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro; 21.Vertical mergers: vertical mergers in multi-product industries and Edgeworth's paradox of taxation Michael A. Salinger; 22. Enforcement of the US merger guidelines: empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines Malcolm B. Coate and Fred S. McChesney; 23. Enforcement of the European merger regulation: the merger decisions of the European Commission Damien Neven, Robin Nuttall and Paul Seabright; Index.