Antitrust Economics / Edition 2

by Roger D. Blair, David L. Kaserman

Overview

The second edition of Antitrust Economics provides a thorough treatment of the economic theory that both motivates (and to varying degrees) guides the design and enforcement of the antitrust laws of the United States. Citing relevant legislation and landmark court cases, the text offers a comprehensive analysis of both horizontal and vertical antitrust issues and uses economic theory to evaluate antitrust policy throughout.

The clear, accessible prose in Antitrust Economics explains the theory/policy cycle and provides thorough analysis of market structure and business conduct as they relate to antitrust policy. The text moves fluidly from theory to real world court cases to public policy, making it ideal for upper-level economics majors or law school courses in antitrust law.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780195135350
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	03/04/2008
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	496
Product dimensions:	9.30(w) x 7.60(h) x 1.10(d)

About the Author

ROGER D. BLAIR is the Huber Hurst Professor of Economics at the University of Florida. His teaching and research centers mainly on issues in antitrust economics. He has published several books and many articles in economics journals and law reviews. In addition, he has provided consulting services to the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and many private parties.

DAVID L. KASERMAN is Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. He has over 25 years of experience as a professional economist and has been employed both in government agencies and academic institutions. His research interests are primarily in the fields of applied microeconmics and industrial organization

Table of Contents

Antitrust in a Market EconomyThe Case for CompetitionThe Case Against MonopolyAntitrust Response to MonopolyPrivate EnforcementAntitrust Building Blocks: Market Definition and Market PowerThe Law of MonopolizationExclusionary PracticesCollusion: Horizontal Price FixingAlternative Forms of Horizontal CollusionOligopoly and Tacit CollusionHorizontal MergersPrice DiscriminationThe Theory of Vertical IntegrationVertical Merger PolicyMaximum Resale Price FixingResale Price MaintenanceTying ArrangementsReciprocityExclusive DealingTerritorial and Customer Restrictions