An Incipient Mutiny: The Story of the U.S. Army Signal Corps Pilot Revolt
328
An Incipient Mutiny: The Story of the U.S. Army Signal Corps Pilot Revolt
328Hardcover
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Overview
An Incipient Mutiny traces the creation of the U.S. Army Signal Corps Aeronautical Division in 1907 up to the establishment of the Air Service of the National Army in 1918. It is a shocking account of shortsightedness, mismanagement, criminal fraud, and cover-up that led ultimately to a pilot revolt against the military establishment. Dwight R. Messimer focuses on the personalities of the pilots who initiated the rebellion and on the Signal Corps officers whose mismanagement brought it on. The official air force histories say nothing about the poor construction and design flaws in the airplanes that the Signal Corps used, which were responsible for the deaths of 25 percent of the pilots, a death rate so high that no life insurance company would issue them a policy. At the same time, there were airplanes on the market that were superior in every way to the planes the army was using and less expensive as well. The loss of human life, then, could not have been more senseless.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781640122123 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Potomac Books |
| Publication date: | 01/01/2020 |
| Pages: | 328 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 1.30(d) |
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Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
The Army's Balloons, 1892–1908
Army aviation started out in 1892 with a single captive balloon for use as an aerial platform from which enemy movements could be seen and reported. Observation and reporting by visual and telegraphic means was the balloon's sole purpose. The Signal Corps was not a line formation, and combat was not its primary role. It was a situation that allowed balloons to fit nicely into the Signal Corps table of organization and equipment, which was not the case with airplanes that came seventeen years later.
The Signal Corps had been created during the Civil War, with Col. Albert J. Myer as the chief signal officer (CSO). The army's Civil War balloon corps was actually a civilian organization that never successfully integrated into the army, and in 1863 the balloon corps was disbanded. The only connection the Signal Corps had with balloons during the war was Signal Corps officers occasionally going up in a balloon to make observations and send their reports to the ground with signal flags or telegraph. Following the disbandment of the balloon corps in 1863, there were no balloons in the army until 1892.
After the war, the Signal Corps lacked a clear-cut mission, and in 1886 Congress passed legislation that allowed personnel for the Signal Corps to be drawn on the detail system from the Battalion of Engineers. In the meantime, Col. Benjamin F. Fisher had replaced Myer as the CSO and held that position until Myer successfully lobbied his own return to office on 21 August 1867.
The years immediately following the Civil War were marked by the growth of agriculture, the national economy, and westward migration. Together, those developments created a need for a national weather service. On 2 February 1870 Congressman Halbert E. Paine introduced legislation authorizing the secretary of war to provide for the taking of meteorological observations at military posts and stations throughout the United States and its territories. Seeing an opportunity to stave off dissolution of the Signal Corps, Chief Signal Officer Myer lobbied Representative Paine to assign the execution of the law to him. The legislation passed on 9 February, and Colonel Myer's lobbying was rewarded on 15 March 1870 when Secretary of War William W. Belknap assigned the weather duty to the Signal Corps.
The Weather Service, officially known as the Division of Telegrams and Reports for the Benefit of Commerce, became the Signal Corps' primary responsibility, and under the recently promoted Brig. Gen. Albert J. Myer, everything went well. The civilian personnel and military staff melded seamlessly and functioned efficiently until 1880, when Myer died. His contentious replacement, Brig. Gen. William Babcock Hazen, served a seven-year tenure marked by discord, scandals, and, in 1881, allegations of fraud involving the Signal Corps disbursing officer, Capt. Henry W. Howgate. The captain was accused of embezzling $237,000 by using fraudulent vouchers. Notably, another scandal thirty-four years later involved a Signal Corps officer, Capt. Arthur Cowan, who allegedly filed fraudulent vouchers for flight pay.
Brigadier General Hazen was also rocking the boat by insisting that the Signal Corps should be treated as a separate branch rather than part of the War Department, a precursor of Capt. Paul Beck's attempt to separate army aviation from the Signal Corps in 1913. Hazen cited the Corps of Engineers as the example of how the Signal Corps should be treated. In the process of wrangling with the War Department over the status of the Signal Corps, coupled with the discontent among the civilian weather service employees, the War Department became increasingly unhappy with the Signal Corps in general and the weather service in particular. Brigadier General Hazen died abruptly on 16 January 1887, having been taken ill during a reception given by President Grover Cleveland. His replacement was Brig. Gen. Adolphus Washington Greely.
Upon taking his post in 1887, Brigadier General Greely inherited an unruly lot of Signal Corps officers that he could not satisfy, nor could he quell the discontent among his civilian weather service employees. Increasing criticism from Congress and the press could not be stifled. By 1889 Greely was convinced that there was no hope of settling the contentiousness that had grown up under Hazen. That same year President Benjamin Harrison recommended transferring the weather service to the Department of Agriculture, and Congress agreed. The act making the transfer was passed and signed on 1 October 1890. Greely now found himself in the same spot that Brigadier General Myer had been in twenty-one years earlier: the Signal Corps lost its primary responsibility, and he needed a replacement before someone decided there was no more use for the corps.
The 1 October act that transferred the weather service to the Department of Agriculture also gave the Signal Corps the responsibility for collecting and transmitting information for the army, a duty that Greely interpreted to include having a balloon section. That line of thinking probably sprang from an 1889 report in which 1st Lt. Richard E. Thompson described how several European armies had observation balloon units. Greely's plans for a Signal Corps balloon section might also have stemmed from the precedent set during the Civil War when telegraph-equipped captive balloons were used to communicate with field commanders. Having come up with the idea, he had also to come up with a legal justification for a Signal Corps balloon section.
The closest thing to a legal justification was found in the 1891 Field Service Regulations, under "The Service of Information," article 3, paragraph 61, part of which read, "The commanding officers of independent forces and of separate columns should use all available means [emphasis added] to secure necessary information concerning the enemy and the ground over which operations are to take place." And article 85, paragraph 1537, in the 1891 Regulations for the Army of the Unites States assigned the Signal Corps the duty of collecting information for the army by telegraph or otherwise, and all other duties (emphasis added) usually pertaining to military signaling.
Greely arranged through the secretary of war, Stephen Benton Elkins, to have 1st Lt. William A. Glassford assigned as the military attaché to the U.S. embassy in Paris, with orders to gather as much information as possible "on the aeronautic equipment of the principal nations and manufacturers." He also authorized Glassford to buy a captive balloon complete with all the necessary equipment.
At the time, Greely did not have a specific appropriation for the purchase, and he never got one. Having sent Glassford to buy a balloon, Greely asked Congress for $11,000 to create a balloon service. Congress turned down the request, and Greely went to the commanding general of the army, Lt. Gen. John M. Schofield, and Secretary of War Elkins, asking for authorization to use existing Signal Corps funds. It was a "Rob Peter to Pay Paul" sort of financing, but his request was approved.
Meanwhile, Glassford surveyed French army balloon activities, visited French manufactures, and bought a balloon from the Paris firm Lachambre. The balloon arrived in the United States in 1892, was christened General Myer, and the Signal Corps had a balloon detachment, which was the sum total of army aviation. There had been no congressional act creating an army balloon service, no specific authorization for a Signal Corps balloon service, and no mention of a balloon service or balloon trains in either the Regulations for the Army of the United States or the Field Service Regulations prior to 1901.
In 1896 the General Myer, already deteriorating from long storage, was destroyed at Fort Logan, Colorado, while being inflated during a windstorm. Sgt. William Ivy and his wife made a new balloon, using rubber sandwiched between two layers of silk. The homemade balloon was used in Cuba during the Spanish-American War in 1898 and was destroyed during fighting on San Juan Hill. Signal Corps balloon operations during the Spanish-American War, though limited, were sufficient to inspire Congress to allot $18,500 for a balloon shed and other buildings in establishing a balloon detachment at Fort Myer, Virginia, in 1900. But getting the balloon detachment off the ground was not easy.
A German kite balloon, three French silk balloons, and five small cotton signal balloons that had been bought before 1898 were in storage at Fort Frankfurt, New York. But that on-hand equipment had deteriorated during storage. In 1902 Carl Edgar Myers, a nationally recognized authority on all aspects of balloon design and construction, was hired to repair the damage. Myers used Signal Corps soldiers under Maj. Samuel Reber to construct the needed hydrogen-filled captive balloons at Fort Frankfurt, and directed their use during the army-navy maneuvers on the Atlantic coast during the summer of 1903.
In the years following the maneuvers, the Signal Corps made little use of balloons, though more were bought. The problem was that the small size of the Signal Corps created a serious shortage of officers and men to work with balloons. And the Signal Corps did not have a hydrogen-generating plant, forcing them to rely on "hydrogen bottles," which were in short supply until 1906. In that same year, theoretical and practical instruction in balloon operations became a requirement in all three service schools, but the extreme shortage of equipment limited the instruction to theory only.
In February 1906 Brigadier General Greely was promoted to major general, and Brig. Gen. James Allen replaced him as CSO. One of Brigadier General Allen's first acts was to buy a "complete military captive balloon with all the appurtenances and an ordinary spherical balloon ... for preliminary instruction of officers and enlisted men of the Signal Corps in the elementary principals of aeronautics." On 1 August 1907 Allen established an Aeronautical Division within the Signal Corps, putting it "in charge of all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines, and all kindred subjects." The memorandum staffed the newly created Aeronautical Division with Capt. Charles DeForest Chandler and two enlisted men, Cpl. Edward Ward and PFC Joseph E. Barrett. Allen now had the organizational structure in which to develop army aviation; he just did not have the financing.
In October 1907, CSO Allen attended the St. Louis air meet, where he met and watched a dirigible flight made by Thomas S. Baldwin. Allen saw the military future of the dirigible, but Congress would not give him the money for one because the Aeronautical Division did not legally exist at the time. Fortunately, in those days, the annual appropriation for the Board of Ordnance and Fortification included money the board could use to buy weapons and equipment for practical trials. Following the air meet, Allen applied to the board for a $25,000 allotment to purchase "one experimental non-rigid dirigible balloon." The Board granted the request on 7 November 1907, and the still unofficial, but now temporarily funded, Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps was off the ground and growing.
When Brigadier General Allen signed Office Memorandum no. 6, the focus was on balloons, which had found a comfortable niche in the Signal Corps. But when he included "air machines" in the list of things that were to be under Signal Corps control, he laid the cornerstone for the turmoil that soon followed. The problem was that the Signal Corps' justification for having a balloon detachment was its responsibility for reconnaissance, observation, and communications, a multiple role the Signal Corps applied to airplanes when the time came. Though it went unrecognized at the time, the airplane had a greater potential and was more suitable for offensive combat than it was as an adjunct to balloons.
It seemed logical to put both lighter-than-air aircraft and heavier-than-air aircraft under Signal Corps control, because the potential for waging an offensive campaign against the enemy with airplanes was not then recognized. Soon after the army bought its first airplane in 1909, the airplane's offensive capabilities became apparent, and not much later they were demonstrated. Nevertheless, from 1907 to 1918, army aviation remained under Signal Corps control. It happened because General Greely took the initiative, Brigadier General Allen expanded the program, and nobody with authority questioned their actions. As 1st Lt. Paul Beck later said, "They just reached out and took it."
In 1907 1st Lt. Frank Lahm was in France, where he had achieved international recognition by winning the first Gordon Bennett International Balloon Race in 1906. On 8 August 1907 Lieutenant Lahm was attending the French Cavalry School at Saumur when he was detailed to the Signal Corps for two years, making him the first line officer detailed to the Signal Corps for aviation duty. His orders directed him to first go to London and Berlin to see what progress the British and Germans were making in aeronautics. Upon arrival in Washington in December, he was assigned to work with Captain Chandler.
Chandler and Lahm made several free balloon flights together and prepared information bulletins on balloon construction, hydrogen manufacturing methods, and many other balloon-related topics for distribution to officers and men who were attending the Signal Corps school. In the meantime, Signal Corps Specification no. 486, detailing what the army wanted for its first airplane, had been issued on 23 December 1907.
Through its balloon activities, the Signal Corps became closely associated with the newly formed Aero Club of America (ACA), the governing body for sport ballooning and, subsequently, heavier-than-air aviation in the United states. Being the governing body meant the ACA represented the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) in the United States, which made it possible for the ACA to issue balloon and airplane pilot's certificates and competition licenses under the auspices of the FAI.
In 1907 the ACA, with ground support from the Signal Corps, made a series of demonstration ascents with captive balloons to drum up public interest in sport ballooning. The ACA also created the Lahm Trophy Race to honor Lahm's 1906 victory in France. The Lahm Trophy was a cup that went to the pilot of the first balloon to exceed 402 miles, the distance Lahm had flown in 1906.
Capt. Charles DeForest Chandler won the first Lahm Trophy Race, which started from St. Louis on 17 October 1907. A week and a half later, Chandler and his copilot, Maj. Henry B. Hersey, were in St. Louis for the 30 October start of the second Gordon Bennett International Balloon Race. Of nine balloons in the race, three were American. Chandler flew as the copilot in a balloon piloted by a civilian, James C. McCoy, and Major Hersey piloted the third balloon. The Germans won the race, and Chandler and his pilot came in fourth. The balloon race marked the entry of army balloonists into competitive flying and air meets, forming the basis for what became a sort of balloon fraternity in the Signal Corps.
During Brigadier General Allen's tenure, six Signal Corps officers, Lt. Col. Samuel Reber, Maj. Edgar Russel, Maj. George O. Squier, Captain Arthur S. Cowan, Capt. Charles DeForest Chandler, and 2nd Lt. Frank Lahm, held ACA committee positions. The result of this close association was twofold: it provided a conduit for the ACA's intrusive involvement in army aviation, which as early as 1911 was already showing signs of becoming more of a flying club than a military unit. The involvement was made more intrusive by the fact that the ACA's founding members were enormously wealthy, politically powerful men, whose influence went right to the White House.
Brigadier General Allen focused his full attention on balloons until 1907, when he also became interested in airplanes. But his continued focus on balloons until 1913, combined with the Signal Corps' primary mission of observation, reconnaissance, and communications, stifled any consideration of the airplane's potential for offensive combat. Allen remained wedded to the idea that the airplane was just another observation, reconnaissance, and communications vehicle. During his time as the CSO, the airplanes the army bought were unreliable, dangerous, and generally unimproved from 1909 to 1914, so Allen shared the conventional wisdom that balloons and dirigibles were more practical than airplanes. As a result, he did not provide the leadership and direction necessary to develop military aviation along the offensive lines then being pursued in Europe.
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Excerpted from "An Incipient Mutiny"
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Copyright © 2020 Dwight R. Messimer.
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Table of Contents
List of Illustrations Introduction 1. The Army’s Balloons, 1892–1908 2. Benjamin D. Foulois, 1909–1911 3. Paul Ward Beck, 1911–1912 4. The Benjamin Foulois–Paul Beck Feud, 1911–1913 5. The Flying Club, 1911–1912 6. The First Signs of Trouble, 1912 7. Upheavals, 1913 8. An Incipient Mutiny, March 1913 9. Beck Makes His Move, 1913 10. Cowen’s Flight Pay, 1913–1915 11. The Seeds of Rebellion, 1911–1914 12. William Lay Patterson, 1914–1915 13. The Rift, 1914–1915 14. Rebellion, 1915 15. The Reaction, 1915 16. The Turnaround, 1915 17. Court-Martial, 1915 18. The Garlington Board and the Kennedy Committee, 1916 19. Separation Achieved, 1917–1918 Epilogue Notes Bibliography Index