Adam's Task: Calling Animals by Name
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Adam's Task: Calling Animals by Name
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Overview
Adam's Task, Vicki Hearne’s innovative masterpiece on animal training, brings our perennial discussion of the human-animal bond to a whole new metaphysical level. Based on studies of literary criticism, philosophy, and extensive hands-on experience in training, Hearne asserts, in boldly anthropomorphic terms, that animals (at least those that interact more with humans) are far more intelligent than we assume. In fact, they are capable of developing an understanding of "the good," a moral code that influences their motives and actions.
Drawing on an eclectic range of influences—Nietzsche, T. S. Eliot, Disney animal trainer William Koehler, and Genesis from the Bible, among others—Hearne writes in contemplative, exploratory, and brilliant prose as she interweaves personal anecdotes with philosophy. Hearne develops an entirely new system of animal training that contradicts modern animal behavioral research and that, as her examples show, is astonishingly effective.
Widely praised, highly influential, and now with a new foreword by New York Times bestselling author Karen Joy Fowler, Adam’s Task will make every trainer, animal psychologist, and animal-lover stop, think, and question.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781510704220 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Skyhorse |
| Publication date: | 10/25/2016 |
| Sold by: | SIMON & SCHUSTER |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 296 |
| File size: | 993 KB |
About the Author
Donald McCaig, the author of Jacob’s Ladder, Rhett Butler’s People, and Canaan. He and his wife, Anne, work a sheep farm in the western mountains of Virginia.
Karen Joy Fowler is a New York Times' bestselling author of six novels, including The Jane Austen Book Club and We Are Completely Beside Ourselves, which was shortlisted for the 2014 Man Booker Prize. She lives in Santa Cruz, California.
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
By Way of Explanation
The impulse behind this book is specifically philosophical, which is a way of saying that the circumstances of my life have been such that it mattered enormously to me to find an accurate way of talking about our relationships with domestic animals. It mattered to me as a dog and horse trainer for what I hope are obvious reasons. When you are incoherent in your notions about an animal you are working with, things do not go so well with the animal, and an animal trainer is a person who can't help but be uneasy about such a state of affairs, whether or not s/he has the linguistic wherewithal to articulate the problem and the solution properly.
If I had remained firmly within the worlds of discourse provided by the stable and the kennel, I might have been content, not because there is no philosophy in those worlds, but because there is such a rich and ever-changing web of philosophies when good trainers talk and write. These philosophies remember and speak to their sources in the thought of the past and are, unlike the general run of philosophies, continually tested and either reaffirmed or revised, since the world of the genuinely good dog or horse trainer is one in which reality is quite clearly, as Wallace Stevens had it, "an activity of the most august imagination."
However, my temperament regularly led me away from the kennel and tack room to university libraries and cafeterias, laboratories and classrooms. The result was that for some years I uneasily inhabited at least two completely different worlds of discourse, each using a group of languages that were intertranslatable — dog trainers can talk to horse trainers, and philosophers can talk to linguists and psychologists, but dog trainers and philosophers can't make much sense of each other. (Philosophers and linguists may have sometimes thought that they found each other incomprehensible, but their quarrels were usually about the interior decoration of the house of intellect and not about fundamental structural principles.) Because I had learned to talk, more or less, in both worlds, I was intensely alert to the implications of Wittgenstein's remark, "To imagine a language is to imagine a form of life."
Here is as good a place as any to speak of the example that most clearly indicates the problem I set out to deal with. In Germany there was once a cart horse named Hans, owned by one Herr von Osten. Hans had to back the cart he pulled in a circular drive, and his skill at doing this, the story goes, so impressed von Osten that he decided that horses in general and Hans in particular must be smarter than generally supposed. Von Osten began doing various things with Hans, teaching him to respond to questions either by tapping with a hoof a certain number of times or else by indicating one of a number of blocks on which the alphabet was written.
Hans was a good learner, and in time philosophers, linguists and psychologists from all over came to test his acumen. It turned out that Hans could not answer questions if he could not see the person asking him. It turned out further that if the questioner was in sight, Hans could always find out what the questioner thought was the correct answer, no matter how hard the questioner worked at remaining still and impassive. Hans apparently read minute changes in breathing, angles of the eyebrows, etc., with an accuracy we have trouble imagining.
This led to von Osten's being denounced as a fraud, and he seems to have died an unhappy man, not so much on his own account as on that of the horse in whom he so deeply believed. And there has now come to be a technical term in academic studies of animal psychology, the "Clever Hans fallacy." This is the fallacy of supposing that an animal "really" understands words or symbols when what the animal is doing is "merely" reading body language. In the literature, this notion is used to discredit virtually anyone who disagrees with the writer in question as either a fraud and a charlatan or else as just plain credulous and stupid. There is an unhealthy air of triumph in the rhythms of the prose of the people who do this discrediting, and I have found myself moved to wonder why, if the trainers and thinkers who believe that Hans illustrates something more important are so discountable, they must be so often attacked.
I told a friend of mine, the poet Josephine Miles, the story of Clever Hans. She said, in response to finding out that the humans couldn't conceal from Hans what counted as the correct answer, "But isn't that interesting!" One of the points of this book is to say, "Yes, Jo, that is interesting." She is now dead, so I can't say it to her, but I can say that she would probably want me to explain that, of course, when I here and throughout the book take swipes of one sort and another at academic thinking, they are lover's complaints — if I didn't love the worlds of discourse we call intellectual and academic, I wouldn't care if things went well there or not.
One of the worlds I lived in when I first set out to address this problem was the animal trainer's world — the trainer of domestic animals primarily, although that world is not to be located by the boundaries of kennels, racetracks, horse-show grounds or obedience trials. The other world was the world of the intellectual, especially the academic or full-time intellectual, though it is not strictly bounded by the walls of either university or editorial offices.
What happened was that in the mornings I would get up just before dawn and work my horses. Generally I had finished with most or all of them (it depended on how business was going or whether certain horses were giving me trouble) by noon, so I would shower and go over to the local university. There were a couple of people there I liked to meet and talk with over lunch, and I also liked to prowl around in the library and either take courses in or just hang around courses in philosophy, psychology, zoology and linguistics. I had been bitten in my childhood by a passion for books, especially books that were, as a recent novel has it, "hard to read, books that could devastate and transform your soul, and that had a kick like a mule when you were finished with them." There were as many glittering and lovely creatures in those books and in the conversations of people who cared about them as there were in the kennel and the stable.
But despite their many beauties, most of the philosophers and their associates in the libraries, and all but two or three of the people at lunch, were profoundly disappointing, not in and of themselves, but in terms of my passion for a language with sufficient philosophical reach to tell me what I wanted to know about the stable and the kennel. And there was a great deal that tended to cause me to lose my temper, such as the enormous amount of time that was spent in "curing" students and others of saying precisely the sort of thing I wanted to say vigorously and significantly about animals.
One thing that preoccupied me was the trainers' habit of talking in highly anthropomorphic, morally loaded language. That was the language I wanted to understand because it seemed to me after a while that it was part of what enabled the good trainers to do so much more than the academic psychologists could in the way of eliciting interesting behavior from animals. Trainers, for example, have no hesitation in talking about how much a mare loves or worries about her foal, a cat her kittens or a dog or a horse their work. But for philosophers and psychologists to speak of love was to invoke abilities that are, for reasons I am still not clear about, as rigidly restricted to Homo sapiens as some religious doctrines have restricted the possession of a soul to members of certain races, cultures and sometimes genders.
In any event, the talk I heard was of no help in enabling me even to figure out what my project was, though I knew a lot after a while about what it wasn't. It wasn't behaviorism, it wasn't ordinary-language philosophy and it wasn't classical quantificational logic. Nonetheless, I saw many interesting things along the way. A student giving a paper on post-parturition behavior in cats would inadvertently attribute to the mother cat a mental state, such as caring about her kittens. The student would be corrected and would learn in time to deliver solemnly quantified reports on the amount of licking behavior, suckling behavior and so on that was "exhibited" by the queens. I wondered about that word "exhibited." Exhibited to whom? The researchers? The kittens? I also wondered about the intellectual and spiritual futures of students so carefully instructed in the terrible grammar such ways of talking entailed.
Another habit that students had, curiously, to be cured of was the habit of supposing that one animal might hide from another animal. (I have never known a hunter to be successfully cured of this habit of mind.) I was deeply intrigued by this, for what in the world was the puppy doing under the bed when you returned home to find an unwelcome monument on the broadloom, if not hiding? But it was sternly pointed out to me what a great and anthropomorphic mistake it was to say or think this. In order to be hiding, whether from predators or from the vexed owner of the carpet, a creature would have to have certain logical concepts that animals simply couldn't have. I remember one careful exposition on the subject of octopuses, who will, in laboratory situations, hide behind glass in plain sight of predators. A number of things struck me about that seminar. One was the way the scientists cheerfully applied interpretations of the behavior of octopuses to the behavior of gazelles and St. Bernard puppies which seemed to me to demonstrate insufficient respect for the individuality of octopuses. Another was the indifference of the researchers to questions about the importance of vision for octopuses and their predators, and yet another set of considerations had to do with my reflecting that in the same position I would probably do the same thing, either out of mindless habit or because in the tanks in the laboratories there wasn't anything else but the glass to get behind.
But in order to hide, it was carefully explained, one had to have a concept of self. Not only that, one had to have the concept of self given by the ability to speak academic language, or at least a standard human language — a concept of self that depends on the ability to think. And, as one philosopher informed me unequivocally, any sort of thinking requires "first order logical quantification theory." Since I myself didn't seem, on investigation, to be using FOQ, I couldn't make much of this.
Since those days, certain conceptually laborious and interesting experiments involving gorillas and mirrors have weakened the more rigid of the foundations of some of these cognitive allegories, but there is still little help from science. The work with gorillas seems to establish that gorillas share with human beings a tendency, which Aristotle notes in the opening pages of the Metaphysics and which Plato worked into his parable of horse and rider, to rely on vision. Dogs and wolves and other animals, by contrast, distinguish themselves from other individuals, and friends from foes, by scent markers. I don't know why one can't speak, at least tentatively and for the sake of philosophical speculation, of a wolfs territorial markings as being a series of scent mirrors, or, as fiction often has it, signatures, and argue from that to a concept of self. But I learned early on to be cautious about saying this sort of thing, and I said less and less as time went on, except to the two or three friends who were patient with my ramblings. My passion to find a way to write about the language of people who actually work interestingly with animals increased, however.
After trying to talk, I would leave the university in the middle or late afternoons to work with a dog or so and any horses that had been left out of the morning schedule. Here, in the various training arenas, the discourse was radically different. It was, as I have said, anthropomorphic, "morally loaded," as it has always been in the great training manuals. By this I mean that implicit as well as explicit in the trainers' language is the notion that animals are capable not only of activities requiring "IQ" — a rather arid conception — but also of a complex and delicate (though not infallible) moral understanding that is so inextricably a function of their relationships with human beings that it may well be said to constitute those relationships.
Xenophon speaks of horses "greatly appreciating" certain "courtesies," and, to the irritation of a more or less scientifically minded translator, of the "cunning" of certain hunting dogs in leading other dogs off the trail of a rabbit by barking or baying falsely. The editor and translator in question appends a footnote in which he indulgently explains and apologizes for Xenophon's naive little slip here in attributing such a degree of intellectual capacity for misdirection to a mere (helplessly sincere) animal. When I showed that passage to a friend of mine who is fond of fox hunting, he remarked rather gloomily, "I believe I know that darned hound!"
Xenophon wrote quite some time ago, but his notions and something like his language continue to echo in modern training, albeit revised, here and there expanded, here and there muted, as well as from time to time severely reduced. Trainers still speak of whether or not a horse is "mean," "sneaky," "kind" or "honest" and vary their approaches to situations accordingly, sometimes saying, "Hey! You've got to come down on that dog hard and fast and right now — that's a real hood." Or "Relax, there isn't a tricky bone in that horse's body; he'll take care of you." Or "Don't worry, he'll come around okay, he's no real criminal, just a juvenile delinquent." Or, in appreciative awe, "Look at that dog work. She knows her job, doesn't she?" Or, as a general principle of training, "But first and above all, the horse's understanding must be developed." Or "If you want to know where the track is, ask your dog!"
There seems to me to be something terribly important about this language and what it implies, partly of course because it is a language I myself speak, but also, as I began in time to notice in more and more detail, because one can do so much more with the trainers' language, despite the fact that in the mid to late twentieth century it sounds as it has for some time — at best naive and at worst offensive, somewhat in the way that Huckleberry Finn has sounded offensive to some. In the past, attempts to speak in the way I have in mind have been regarded as heretical as well as intellectually unsound. And the agitation expressed by some writers and thinkers in the face of the trainers' persistence in talking the way they do, as well as the uneasiness some trainers express in response to their awareness of the possibility of that agitation, and the attempts in the introductory portions of some training manuals to placate that agitation, suggest that modern injunctions against anthropomorphism have as much of a heretic-hounding impulse behind them as any of the older ones. When, for example, I gave a portion of the chapter "Tracking Dogs, Sensitive Horses and the Traces of Speech" as a talk at the New York Institute for the Humanities, one person in the audience said that what I was saying sounded a little, well, religious. I patiently worked at finding out what she meant by religious, and it turned out that she meant "anthropomorphic." I said, "Oh, yes indeed, that's the whole point of this project!" She wondered aloud if I should be allowed to teach in a university, and at a later talk, when I found myself seated next to her by accident, she asked me to leave the room. The morally loaded language of William Koehler's stunningly fine training books have led to any number of court cases and to one case of the books having been banned, for a while at least, in Arizona.
(Continues…)
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Table of Contents
Foreword by Karen Joy Fowler,
Introduction by Donald McCaig,
Preface to the 1994 Edition,
1. By Way of Explanation,
2. A Walk with Washoe: How Far Can We Go?,
3. How to Say "Fetch!",
4. Tracking Dogs, Sensitive Horses and the Traces of Speech,
5. Crazy Horses,
6. Horses in Partnership with Time,
7. Calling Animals by Name,
8. The Sound of Kindness,
9. Lo the American (Pit) Bull Terrier,
10. What It Is about Cats,
11. Rights, Autism and the Rougher Magics,
Afterword,
