Table of Contents
Cover Title Page Copyright Dedication Contents Reference Abbreviations I. The Focal Topic: The Content and Use of Concepts II. The Strategy of Semantic Descent III. The Social Dimension of Discursiveness: Normativity and Recognition IV. The Historical Dimension of Discursiveness: Recollective Rationality V. Cognition, Recognition, and Recollection: Semantics and Epistemology, Normative Pragmatics, and the Historicity of Geist Part One. Semantics and Epistemology: Knowing and Representing the Objective World I. Classical Representational Epistemology II. Genuine Knowledge and Rational Constraint III. A Nonpsychological Conception of the Conceptual IV. Alethic Modal and Deontic Normative Material Incompatibility I. Introduction II. Two Dimensions of Intentionality and Two Orders of Explanation III. Two Kantian Ideas IV. Hegel’s Pragmatist Functionalist Idea V. The Mode of Presentation Condition VI. The Experience of Error VII. The Two Sides of Conceptual Content Are Representationally Related VIII. Conclusion I. The Emergence of the Second Object II. From Skepticism to Truth through Determinate Negation III. Recollection and the Science of the Experience of Consciousness I. Sense Certainty Introduced II. Two Senses of “Immediacy" III. A Bad Argument IV. First Good Argument: Classification V. Second Good Argument: Anaphoric Recollection 5. Understanding the Object / Property Structure in Terms of Negation: An Introduction to Hegelian Logic and Metaphysics in the Perception Chapter I. The Lessons of Sense Certainty II. Determinateness and Exclusive Negation III. Formal Negation and Two Orders of Explanation IV. Properties and Objects V. Two Metaphysical Roles of Objects VI. Ten Kinds of Metaphysical Differences VII. From Perception to Understanding I. Forces as Allegorical for Theoretical Entities II. Invidious Eddingtonian Theoretical Realism& III. Holism and the “Play of Forces" IV. From Forces to Laws as Superfacts V. The “Inverted World” and Possible-World Semantics I. Explanation and the Expression of Implicit Laws& II. Objective Idealism III. “Infinity” as Holism IV. Expressivism, Objective Idealism, and Normative Self-Consciousness Part Two. Normative Pragmatics: Recognition and the Expressive Metaphysics of Agency I. The Historicity of Essentially Self-Conscious Creatures II. Identification, Risk, and Sacrifice III. Creatures Things Can Be Something For: Desire and the Triadic Structure of Orectic Awareness IV. From Desire to Recognition: Two Interpretive Challenges V. Simple Recognition: Being Something Things Can Be Something for Is Something Things Can Be for One VI. Robust Recognition: Specific Recognition of Another as a Recognizer VII. Self-Consciousness VIII. Conclusion I. Normative Statuses and Normative Attitudes: A Regimented Idiom II. The Kantian Autonomy Model of the Institution of Normative Statuses by Normative Attitudes III. A Model of General Recognition IV. A Model of Specific Recognition V. The Recognitive Institution of Statuses, Subjects, and Communities VI. The Status-Dependence of Attitudes VII. Conclusion I. Introduction: Asymmetrical, Defective Structures of Recognition& II. The Subordination-Obedience Model III. Identification IV. The Practical Conception of Pure Independence V. The Struggle VI. The Significance of Victory VII. The Master-Servant Relationship VIII. The Metaphysical Irony at the Heart of Mastery IX. From Subjects to Objects X. Recognition and Cognition XI. The Semantic Failures of Stoicism and Skepticism I. Looking Ahead: From Conceptual Realism and Objective Idealism to Conceptual Idealism II. Two Sides of the Concept of Action: The Unity and Disparity that Action Involves III. Two Models of the Unity and Disparity that Action Essentially Involves IV. Intentional and Consequential Specifications of Actions V. Practical Success and Failure in the Vulgar Sense: The Vorsatz / Absicht Distinction VI. Identity of Content of Deed and Intention VII. Further Structure of the Expressive Process by Which the Intention Develops into the Deed I. Hegelian vs. Fregean Understandings of Sense and Reference II. Retrospective and Prospective Perspectives on the Development of Conceptual Contents III. Intentional Agency as a Model for the Development of Senses IV. Contraction and Expansion Strategies Part Three. Recollecting the Ages of Spirit: From Irony to Trust I. Epochs of Geist II. Immediate Sittlichkeit III. The Rise of Subjectivity IV. Alienation and Culture I. Introduction: Modernity, Legitimation, and Language& II. Actual and Pure Consciousness III. Recognition in Language IV. Authority and Responsibility in Language as a Model of Freedom& V. Pure Consciousness: Alienation as a Disparity between Cognition and Recognition VI. Faith and Trust VII. Morality and Conscience I. Two Meta-attitudes II. The Kammerdiener III. The Authority of Normative Attitudes and Statuses& IV. Naturalism and Genealogy V. Four Meta-meta-attitudes VI. Looking Forward to Magnanimity I. Niederträchtig Assessment II. Confession III. Forgiveness IV. Recollection V. The Conditions of Determinate Contentfulness VI. Trust and Magnanimous Agency VII. Hegel’s Recollective Project I. Edifying Semantics II. Geist, Modernity, and Alienation III. Some Contemporary Expressions of Alienation in Philosophical Theories IV. Three Stages in the Articulation of Idealism V. Recollection: How the Process of Experience Determines Conceptual Contents and Semantic Relations VI. From Verstand to Vernunft: Truth and the Determinateness of Conceptual Content VII. Normativity and Recognition VIII. Dimensions of Holism: Identity through Difference IX. Truth as Subject, Geist as Self-Conscious X. The Age of Trust: Reachieving Heroic Agency& XI. Forgiveness: Recognition as Recollection Afterword: To the Best of My Recollection Notes Index