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Overview
In A Mark of the Mental, Karen Neander considers the representational power of mental states—described by the cognitive scientist Zenon Pylyshyn as the “second hardest puzzle” of philosophy of mind (the first being consciousness). The puzzle at the heart of the book is sometimes called “the problem of mental content,” “Brentano's problem,” or “the problem of intentionality.” Its motivating mystery is how neurobiological states can have semantic properties such as meaning or reference. Neander proposes a naturalistic account for sensory-perceptual (nonconceptual) representations.
Neander draws on insights from state-space semantics (which appeals to relations of second-order similarity between representing and represented domains), causal theories of reference (which claim the reference relation is a causal one), and teleosemantic theories (which claim that semantic norms, at their simplest, depend on functional norms). She proposes and defends an intuitive, theoretically well-motivated but highly controversial thesis: sensory-perceptual systems have the function to produce inner state changes that are the analogs of as well as caused by their referents. Neander shows that the three main elements—functions, causal-information relations, and relations of second-order similarity—complement rather than conflict with each other. After developing an argument for teleosemantics by examining the nature of explanation in the mind and brain sciences, she develops a theory of mental content and defends it against six main content-determinacy challenges to a naturalized semantics.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780262036146 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | MIT Press |
| Publication date: | 06/16/2017 |
| Series: | Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology |
| Edition description: | New Edition |
| Pages: | 344 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.20(w) x 9.20(h) x 1.10(d) |
| Age Range: | 18 Years |
About the Author
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments xi
1 Thinking about Thought 1
Brentano's Problem 2
Naturalism, Consciousness, and Intentionality 3
From Informational Content to Representational Content 6
Original versus Derived Intentionality 9
Representations, Targets, and Contents 14
Semantic Evaluations 17
Teleosemantics 19
Overview of What Is to Come 22
2 Positing Nonconceptual Representations 27
A First Example 28
A Second Example: AH's Visual Deficit 29
The Inference to Normal Perceivers 32
Representational (as Opposed to Informational) Content 34
Intensional Ascriptions 36
The Formality Assumption 38
Sharpening the Methodological Conundrum 40
Semantic Externalism 42
Concluding Remarks 45
3 Functional Analysis and the Species Design 47
How-Questions and Why-Questions 47
A Division of Explanatory Labor for SE and CR Functions? 48
Minimal and Normal-Proper Functions 52
Questioning Thesis 3 56
Solving the Generalization Problem 58
The Properly Functioning System 61
Is It Idealization? 66
Related Views 68
Concluding Remarks 71
4 The Methodological Argument for Informational Teleosemantics 73
The Bare-Bones Version 73
Premise 1 74
Premises 2 and 3 78
Premises 4 and 5 83
Premise 6 84
From Methodology to Metaphysics 85
Teleosemantics: The Only Game in Town? 89
Fodor's (Teleosemantic) Asymmetric-Dependency Theory 90
Cummins' (Teleosemantic) Picture Theory 93
Concluding Remarks 96
5 Simple Minds 97
Why Anuran Perception Is Not a Toy Example 99
Sign-Stimuli and Prey-Capture in a Toad 100
Information Flow in the Neural Substrate 105
The Localization Content 109
What Is Represented? 115
An Attenuated Form of Verificationism? 119
Concluding Remarks 122
6 Response Functions 125
Starting Teleosemantics at the Right End 125
Functions as Selected Dispositions 127
How Blind Is Natural Selection? 130
Normal Conditions versus Normal Causes 134
Unsuitable Analyses of information 138
A Simple Causal Analysis of Information 142
Information-Carrying Functions 145
Concluding Remarks 147
7 The Content-Determinacy Challenges 149
Six Content-Determinacy Challenges 150
The Simple Starter Theory: CT 151
Distinguishing Locally Co-instantiated Properties 155
Distinguishing Properties Mutually implicated in Selection 159
A Note on Color Realism 163
Seeing Green versus Seeing Grue 167
Mach Diamonds versus Ordinary Squares 171
Concluding Remarks 174
8 Causally Driven Analogs 175
Inner Worlds Mirroring Outer Worlds 176
Analog Representations 180
The Second-Order Similarity Rule 183
Traditional Objections to Similarity-Based Content 187
Who Specifies the Isomorphism? 190
The Pictorial Intuition and Color Realism (Again) 196
The Missing Shade of Blue 200
Representing Determinates of Determinables 203
Berkeley's Problem of Abstraction 205
A Neo-Lockean Strategy 208
A Neo-Humean Proposal 211
Concluding Remarks 214
9 Distal and Distant Red Squares 217
The Problem of Distal Content 217
Informational Asymmetries in Response Functions 221
Other Solutions 224
Perceptual Constancies and Distal Content 227
Hallucinated Red Squares: In the World or just in the Head? 230
Binding to Spatiotemporal Representation 232
The Systematic Representing of Depth Relations 235
A Few Words on Distal Content and Concepts 237
Summing Up 239
Notes 245
References 285
Index 309
What People are Saying About This
While informational and teleosemantic approaches to content have been around for decades, Neander carefully builds the case for a unique view that fuses the best elements from each. A Mark of the Mental will hold significant interest for philosophers of mind and cognitive science, and its discussions of functions will be relevant to philosophers of biology as well.
Karen Neander is a founder of teleosemantics. Her book reveals years of subtle thought on the naturalistic explanation of original intentionality, of how, ultimately, representations can be about the world. Neander's explanation, at the preconceptual level of sensory-perceptual representations, is wonderfully informed and detailed. This book is a major advance.
Neander's book addresses some of the most important and challenging topics in perceptual psychology and the philosophy of perception, in each case making important advances. The main goal of the book is to develop and defend a theory of what it is for a perceptual state to represent an external object or property. The account that Neander offers, which is based on the notions of causation and biological function, is in my judgment the most promising one that has so far appeared. Among other virtues, it meshes nicely with information-processing psychology. The book also addresses a range of important ancillary topics. To illustrate, Neander argues persuasively that nonconceptual perceptual representations can (in a content-constitutive way) be analogs of their contents, and that their contents are “thin,” in the sense that they involve properties likecolors, sizes and shapes, and complex configurations of such properties, as opposed to higher-level properties like PREY, CAUSE, and MALE-FACE.The book is aimed at professors of philosophy and cognitive science, and at advanced students of those disciplines. If you're in one of those groups, I strongly urge you to buy a copy – and also to read it!
—Chris Hill, Professor of Philosophy, Brown University
Karen Neander is a founder of teleosemantics. Her book reveals years of subtle thought on the naturalistic explanation of original intentionality, of how, ultimately, representations can be about the world. Neander's explanation, at the preconceptual level of sensory-perceptual representations, is wonderfully informed and detailed. This book is a major advance.
—Michael Devitt, Distinguished Professor, Graduate Center, City University of New York; author of Ignorance of LanguageWhile informational and teleosemantic approaches to content have been around for decades, Neander carefully builds the case for a unique view that fuses the best elements from each. A Mark of the Mental will hold significant interest for philosophers of mind and cognitive science, and its discussions of functions will be relevant to philosophers of biology as well.
—Daniel Weiskopf, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Georgia State University; coauthor of An Introduction to the Philosophy of PsychologyNeander's book addresses some of the most important and challenging topics in perceptual psychology and the philosophy of perception, in each case making important advances. The main goal of the book is to develop and defend a theory of what it is for a perceptual state to represent an external object or property. The account that Neander offers, which is based on the notions of causation and biological function, is in my judgment the most promising one that has so far appeared. Among other virtues, it meshes nicely with information-processing psychology. The book also addresses a range of important ancillary topics. To illustrate, Neander argues persuasively that nonconceptual perceptual representations can (in a content-constitutive way) be analogs of their contents, and that their contents are “thin,” in the sense that they involve properties like colors, sizes and shapes, and complex configurations of such properties, as opposed to higher-level properties like PREY, CAUSE, and MALE-FACE. The book is aimed at professors of philosophy and cognitive science, and at advanced students of those disciplines. If you're in one of those groups, I strongly urge you to buy a copy – and also to read it!
—Chris Hill, Professor of Philosophy, Brown University