Table of Contents
Acknowledgments v
Introduction ix
I Limits, Continuity and Robustness 1
1 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 3
2 Limit Games and Limit Equilibria D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 21
3 Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 41
4 Finite Player Approximations to a Continuum of Players D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 59
5 On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements D. Fudenberg D. M. Kreps D. K. Levine 67
6 When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine W. Pesendorfer 95
II Reputation Effects 121
7 Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 123
8 Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 143
9 Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent M. Celentani D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine W. Pesendorfer 163
10 When is Reputation Bad? J. Ely D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 177
III Repeated Games 207
11 The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information D. Fudenberg E. Maskin 209
12 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine E. Maskin 231
13 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 275
14 An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 309
15 The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 331
16 Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine S. Takahashi 345
17 Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring D. Fudenberg D. K. Levine 369
Erratum 389
