Table of Contents
Preface and Acknowledgements xi
Introduction 1
I What is a theory of time? 1
II Initial Plausible options for a theory of time 3
III What conditions must any adequate philosophical theory of time satisfy? 14
Part I The Presentist Manifesto 19
1 When am I? 21
I The Present Problem 21
II Tensed theories toppled 24
III Tensed truth-conditions: token-reflexive or non-token-reflexive, that's not the question 33
2 A theory of presentism 39
I The parameters of the problem 39
II A radical response 40
III Priorian presentism 41
IV Reductive presentism 47
V Ersatzer presentism 52
VI Branching time for presentists 61
VII The advantages of ersatzer presentism 65
3 Some outstanding problems for presentism met 70
Problem 1 McTaggart's argument 70
I McTaggart's position 71
II McTaggart's argument 73
III How ersatzer presentism avoids McTaggart's argument 76
Problem 2 A deontic, semantic, and paradoxical need for other times 78
I The deontic need 78
II The semantic need 79
III The paradoxical need 80
Problem 3 Future contingents, non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle muddle 82
Problem 4 Transtemporal relations (I) 95
I Earlier than and defining tenses 96
II Determinables 98
III Qualitative relations 98
Problem 5 Transtemporal relations (II): reference 99
I Prior, proper names, and presentism 99
II Rigidity for Russellians 102
III Who wants to be a Millianaire? 103
IV Passing the nominal parcel 104
4 Transtemporal relations (III): causation 109
I Formulating theories of causation within presentism 110
II The direction of time and causation: the counterfactual connotation of causation 115
III Thedirection of time and causation: the means-end connotation of causation 121
IV Mellor's argument against causal loops 131
V Presentism and backwards causation 134
Part II Presentism and Relativity 137
5 Physics for philosophers 141
I Basic notions 141
II Essentials of special relativity 146
III Minkowski space-time diagrams 151
IV Minkowski's philosophical conclusions 157
6 The present dialectic in special relativity 160
I Putnam's thesis 160
II Stein's antithesis 162
III Questioning the grounds for adopting Einstein's definition of simultaneity 172
IV Understanding and defining absolute simultaneity 173
V The interpretation of the Lorentz transformations 176
VI The 'conspiracy of silence' objection 179
VII Simplicity and surplus content 182
VIII The Present Problem revisited 184
IX Conclusion 185
7 Becoming inflated 187
I The Mellor-Rees argument against tense theories 187
II Can expansion combat such wrinkles? 191
III Event and creation horizons 197
IV Bursting the balloon 198
8 All the time in the worlds: Gödel's modal moral 204
I Gödel's philosophical position on the nature of time 205
II Establishing part I of Gödel's argument 206
III Part 2 of Gödel's argument 212
IV Using TNT as ammunition against Gödel's conclusion 213
V Tenseless time: one way to dispose of TNT safely 214
VI The essential properties of time 216
VII Another way to dispose of TNT-although taking great care to do it safely 217
Bibliography 225
Index 239
