A Failure of Command: Grant, Meade, and the Men of the Army of the Potomac in the Overland Campaign
On May 4, 1864, the Union Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and, in doing so, forever altered the nature of warfare. They were embarking on what became known as the Overland Campaign, a part of Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant's grand strategy of "hard war," designed to inflict a final and total defeat the rebellious states of the Confederacy. Their part in Grant's plan was to come to grips with General Robert E. Lee and his famous Army of Northern Virginia, draw them into the open, and destroy them in battle.
This role was so important that Grant, the newly appointed General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, elected to accompany them and command from the field. However, this army already had its own commander, the irascible, plodding George Meade, the victor of Gettysburg. By taking the field with the Army of the Potomac, Grant was creating a dysfunctional command system that grew more toxic with each passing day of what became a truly desperate campaign. Inter-staff warfare combined with a month of hard marching, nearly continuous fighting, and press coverage that gave Grant all the credit for Union success, fueling Meade's anger and resentment of the Grant and destroying any semblance of command cohesion.
The final result would be disastrous, as thousands of Union soldiers were sent to their deaths in a needless frontal assault at Cold Harbor, an assault that set a new and horrific standard for wholesale slaughter in a war that had already seen far too much.
Using the dispatches, reports, letters, diaries, and memoirs of senior officers who supported both Grant and Meade, a clear picture of the unworkable command system Grant created emerges, along with an equally clear picture of Grant's heroic efforts to carry the weight of command on his shoulders and make it work. At the same time, the command failures are contrasted with the dramatic and heartbreaking stories told by the soldiers who bravely tried to carry out Grant and Meade's orders in this critical moment in American history.
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This role was so important that Grant, the newly appointed General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, elected to accompany them and command from the field. However, this army already had its own commander, the irascible, plodding George Meade, the victor of Gettysburg. By taking the field with the Army of the Potomac, Grant was creating a dysfunctional command system that grew more toxic with each passing day of what became a truly desperate campaign. Inter-staff warfare combined with a month of hard marching, nearly continuous fighting, and press coverage that gave Grant all the credit for Union success, fueling Meade's anger and resentment of the Grant and destroying any semblance of command cohesion.
The final result would be disastrous, as thousands of Union soldiers were sent to their deaths in a needless frontal assault at Cold Harbor, an assault that set a new and horrific standard for wholesale slaughter in a war that had already seen far too much.
Using the dispatches, reports, letters, diaries, and memoirs of senior officers who supported both Grant and Meade, a clear picture of the unworkable command system Grant created emerges, along with an equally clear picture of Grant's heroic efforts to carry the weight of command on his shoulders and make it work. At the same time, the command failures are contrasted with the dramatic and heartbreaking stories told by the soldiers who bravely tried to carry out Grant and Meade's orders in this critical moment in American history.
A Failure of Command: Grant, Meade, and the Men of the Army of the Potomac in the Overland Campaign
On May 4, 1864, the Union Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan River and, in doing so, forever altered the nature of warfare. They were embarking on what became known as the Overland Campaign, a part of Lieutenant Ulysses S. Grant's grand strategy of "hard war," designed to inflict a final and total defeat the rebellious states of the Confederacy. Their part in Grant's plan was to come to grips with General Robert E. Lee and his famous Army of Northern Virginia, draw them into the open, and destroy them in battle.
This role was so important that Grant, the newly appointed General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, elected to accompany them and command from the field. However, this army already had its own commander, the irascible, plodding George Meade, the victor of Gettysburg. By taking the field with the Army of the Potomac, Grant was creating a dysfunctional command system that grew more toxic with each passing day of what became a truly desperate campaign. Inter-staff warfare combined with a month of hard marching, nearly continuous fighting, and press coverage that gave Grant all the credit for Union success, fueling Meade's anger and resentment of the Grant and destroying any semblance of command cohesion.
The final result would be disastrous, as thousands of Union soldiers were sent to their deaths in a needless frontal assault at Cold Harbor, an assault that set a new and horrific standard for wholesale slaughter in a war that had already seen far too much.
Using the dispatches, reports, letters, diaries, and memoirs of senior officers who supported both Grant and Meade, a clear picture of the unworkable command system Grant created emerges, along with an equally clear picture of Grant's heroic efforts to carry the weight of command on his shoulders and make it work. At the same time, the command failures are contrasted with the dramatic and heartbreaking stories told by the soldiers who bravely tried to carry out Grant and Meade's orders in this critical moment in American history.
This role was so important that Grant, the newly appointed General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, elected to accompany them and command from the field. However, this army already had its own commander, the irascible, plodding George Meade, the victor of Gettysburg. By taking the field with the Army of the Potomac, Grant was creating a dysfunctional command system that grew more toxic with each passing day of what became a truly desperate campaign. Inter-staff warfare combined with a month of hard marching, nearly continuous fighting, and press coverage that gave Grant all the credit for Union success, fueling Meade's anger and resentment of the Grant and destroying any semblance of command cohesion.
The final result would be disastrous, as thousands of Union soldiers were sent to their deaths in a needless frontal assault at Cold Harbor, an assault that set a new and horrific standard for wholesale slaughter in a war that had already seen far too much.
Using the dispatches, reports, letters, diaries, and memoirs of senior officers who supported both Grant and Meade, a clear picture of the unworkable command system Grant created emerges, along with an equally clear picture of Grant's heroic efforts to carry the weight of command on his shoulders and make it work. At the same time, the command failures are contrasted with the dramatic and heartbreaking stories told by the soldiers who bravely tried to carry out Grant and Meade's orders in this critical moment in American history.
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A Failure of Command: Grant, Meade, and the Men of the Army of the Potomac in the Overland Campaign
A Failure of Command: Grant, Meade, and the Men of the Army of the Potomac in the Overland Campaign
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Product Details
| BN ID: | 2940148994299 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Robert Thompson |
| Publication date: | 11/01/2013 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| File size: | 5 MB |
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