![A Democratic Theory of Judgment](http://img.images-bn.com/static/redesign/srcs/images/grey-box.png?v11.9.4)
![A Democratic Theory of Judgment](http://img.images-bn.com/static/redesign/srcs/images/grey-box.png?v11.9.4)
Hardcover
-
PICK UP IN STORECheck Availability at Nearby Stores
Available within 2 business hours
Related collections and offers
Overview
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9780226397849 |
---|---|
Publisher: | University of Chicago Press |
Publication date: | 12/12/2016 |
Pages: | 400 |
Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d) |
About the Author
Table of Contents
Preface Acknowledgments 1 Democracy and the Problem of Judgment 2 Judging at the “End of Reasons”: Rethinking the Aesthetic Turn 3 Historicism, Judgment, and the Limits of Liberalism: The Case of Leo Strauss 4 Objectivity, Judgment, and Freedom: Rereading Arendt’s “Truth and Politics” 5 Value Pluralism and the “Burdens of Judgment”: John Rawls’s Political Liberalism 6 Relativism and the New Universalism: Feminists Claim the Right to Judge 7 From Willing to Judging: Arendt, Habermas, and the Question of ’68 8 What on Earth Is a “Form of Life”? Judging “Alien” Cultures According to Peter Winch 9 The Turn to Affect and the Problem of Judgment: Making Political Sense of the Nonconceptual Conclusion: Judging as a Democratic World-Building Practice List of Abbreviations Notes IndexWhat People are Saying About This
“An elegant, beautifully written, and intelligent attempt to answer the fundamental question of fair evaluative judgments in a democratic polity. Zerilli argues that judgment that aims at fairness in a pluralist society does not need to be rendered as a merely procedural guide for adjudication among irreconcilable values. And she also argues that to make judgment a politically creative and reflecting function of evaluation does not necessarily entail falling into the trap of relativism or the identification of rationality with the reasons set forth by the winners in the game of politics. To solve these entrenched problems, Zerilli takes inspiration from Hannah Arendt, whose work guides her through a journey of interpretation and theoretical analysis that is absolutely brilliant.”
“Zerilli has presented an original and meticulous scholarly argument about the nature and possibilities of democratic judgment as well as about what might be construed as authentically political judgment in the context of a plural society. Her argument is lucidly and eloquently articulated, and it offers a pointed challenge to some of the dominant contemporary trends in the literature on democratic theory, particularly to the arguments about public reason that have been advanced by individuals such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Drawing creatively on the work of Kant and Arendt, Zerilli speaks to anyone concerned with the peculiarities of democratic deliberation and action, whether it takes place in formal institutional settings or in other dimensions of social life.”
“What is democratic political judgment? Does it require a standpoint of neutrality about normative truths? In this monumental work, Zerilli, combining both continental and analytic traditions in philosophy, gives a powerful case for the role of truth and objectivity in democratic political judgment, one attuned to the irreducible plurality of democratic societies. It is a vital contribution to what is arguably the central question of democratic political philosophy: What is democratic reasoning?”