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Overview
A typical definition of abrogation found in the Jurisprudence literature is: ‘The (heavenly) replacement of one juridical ruling with a later ruling.’
This book surveys the subject of abrogation (Naskh) in the Qur’an, Hadith and Islamic literature, illustrating that the concept of abrogation was introduced after the Prophetic era in order to explain certain verses of the Qur’an and what has come to be termed as “conflicting Prophetic narrations” (Mukhtalaf al-Hadith).
It goes on to suggest that the “abrogated rulings” were merely pre-Islamic cultural practices that contradicted with Islamic principles. Furthermore, the book argues that the Qur’anic verses and Prophetic narrations, which were misperceived as “conflicting,” should be contextually situated and applied according to the wisdom behind them with the practical implication being the validation of all Qur’anic verses and (authentic) Prophetic instructions regardless of their perceived contradictions. Allowing Islamic jurisprudence to retain its flexibility within changing circumstances.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780860377603 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Kube Publishing Ltd |
| Publication date: | 12/14/2018 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| File size: | 1 MB |
About the Author
Dr. Jasser Auda is the Executive Chairman of the Maqasid Institute, a global think tank based in London, and a Visiting Professor of Islamic Law at Carleton University in Canada. He is a Founding and Board Member of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, Member of the Fiqh Council of North America, Al-Shatibi Chair of Maqasid Studies at the International Peace College South Africa, Fellow of the Islamic Fiqh Academy of India, and General Secretary of Yaqazat Feker, a popular youth organization in Egypt. He has written 25 books in Arabic and English.
Adil Salahi is a scholar, author and translator, who has written or translated into English various books on Islam. After working for the BBC Arabic Service for several years, he worked for the Arabic daily, al-Sharq al-Awsat. He continues to publish many Articles in various Publications including , Arab News, a an English daily published in Saudi Arabia. Adil Salahi taught at the Markfield Institute of Higher Education, Leicester, England. His popular biography of the Prophet, Muhammad: Man and Prophet, is widely respected and has been translated into multiple languages.
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Introduction
A rule of false logic has pervaded intellectual and philosophical methodologies, which we may call ‘the rule of inevitable false dualism’. It simply involves that any philosophical question may be presented as a choice between two logical conclusions and there can be no third alternative. Debate ensues between two extreme opposites and each debater tries hard to prove their point and refute their opponent’s argument.
For example, there is long-drawn debate between the advocates of objectivism, who maintain that things have natural realities that we can arrive at through consciousness, and the advocates of subjectivism, who claim that it is impossible to arrive at the reality of things. People simply have certain mental pictures of things. Each side makes certain arguments in support of their principle. We note that there are few attempts to come up with a theory that combines the facts of both sides, such as those who speak of ‘a reality with a social subjectivity’ as an alternative to both views. These try to combine all that is right in all views and reconcile the seemingly contradictory arguments.
Students of philosophy argue about another supposedly inevitable dualism even though it is false, namely, the dualism of science and religion. Many people imagine that the two are mutually contradictory. Indeed, this dualism appeared in our Islamic heritage under the heading ‘the contradiction between reason and revelation’ or ‘the contradiction between the rational view and religious text’. This occurred in spite of the strong emphasis Islam lays on the bond between faith and intellectual reasoning, which is well known to all. Many people imagine that they have to make an inevitable choice between what belongs to religion and what belongs to science. Other correlative choices are between the material and the metaphysical; personal interest and morality; the material and the spiritual; and other opposites that are by no means mutually exclusive.
Science and religion may be mutually contradictory in a particular area or dimension. For example, religion gives top position to its texts, while science accords that position to experience and observation. However, who can say that the Islamic faith, and its central belief, is not based on experience and observation? Who can claim that intellectual consideration of scientific findings has nothing to do with the divine text? The Qur’anic method of proving God’s existence and belief – in anything – is based on observation and contemplation. God says in the Qur’an: ‘Say: “Consider all that there is in the heavens and the earth.”’ (10: 101) ‘No fault will you see in what the Lord of Grace creates. Turn up your eyes: can you see any flaw? Then Look again, and again: your vision will come back to you dull and weary’. (67: 3–4) Indeed, Ibn Taymiyyah was absolutely right when he chose for his voluminous work on logic and philosophy the title: ‘Prevention of contradiction between reason and revelation, or the consistency between authentic religious texts and clearly rational views’. Moreover, religion and science are mutually complementary in several other areas, such as that both aim at the achievement of human happiness, and both attach central importance to the origin of life, the system of existence, and so on.
We may also consider that mind as an abstract and as matter, which is subject to our senses, are mutually complementary, rather than contradictory. If we extend our area of consideration beyond the domain of the five senses, we realise that the most recent theories of comprehension and the brain suggest that mind and matter have mutual influence on each other. Numerous examples of the interaction between mind and matter are given in contemporary sciences, such as having a hunch that leads to a fact without there being any material evidence pointing to it, or a dream that comes true, or the effect of spiritual and psychological factors on patients. We only need to think of the effect of ruqyah, which is a supplication, in speeding a patient’s recovery.
Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh) – the different schools of which represent the philosophy of Islamic legislation – was not immune to the different philosophical systems and their false assumptions. A number of false dualisms appeared in some theories of usul al-fiqh leading to long-drawn debates and differences. Yet some scholars of legal theories were aware that it was possible in each such case to reconcile opposed views within a creative and useful framework.
For example, scholars of legal theory differ concerning the acceptability of certain secondary sources as evidence or as the basis of rulings. Some would consider a certain source as acceptable evidence pointing to a particular conclusion or ruling, while others would consider it unacceptable or ‘false’, in the legal theorists’ parlance. If a source of evidence is acceptable then it may serve as a basis for a ruling, while a ‘false’ source is essentially unacceptable under any circumstances, and as such no ruling can be based on it. Examples of this include al-Shafi‘i’s book, Butlan al-Istihsan, or ‘The invalidity of subtle analogy’; Dawud’s book, Ibtal al-Qiyas, or ‘Refuting analogy’; Ibn al-Rawandi’s book, Ibtal al-Tawatur, or ‘Refuting recurrence’; the disagreement between the Maliki and the Shafi‘i schools on whether the actions of the people of Madinah serve as evidence for rulings or not; and the disagreement between the Zahiris, Ja‘faris and Zaydis on one side and the rest of the fiqh schools on the other side on whether analogy is acceptable as evidence or not.
For example, the practice or the unanimity of the people of Madinah is a full source of evidence according to the Maliki school of fiqh. Imam Malik determined many questions on its basis, such as the unanimity of the people of Madinah in explaining certain verses of the Qur’an. He considered such practice or unanimity a standard by which greater weight is given to certain hadiths of the category of ahad (narrated by single reporters). Imam al-Shafi‘i rejects the very concept of giving the people of Madinah or their practice any special legislative status. He argues that it could open the door to claiming such status for the unanimity of the people of other cities.[1]
Some scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, take a different view, which does not consider the question as an inevitable dualism. They accept the practice of the people of Madinah as a basis in considering certain questions, although they themselves belong to the Hanbali school of fiqh, which rejects the idea of considering such practice as a source of evidence. Ibn Taymiyyah, for example, considers the unanimity of the people of Madinah, the Prophet’s city, as a sort of collective narration of the Prophet’s Sunnah. As such, it is treated as another narration that may even be more authentic than narrations by single reporters. This is a fine and logical solution that puts this source of evidence in a broader perspective that enables us to benefit from what is positive and useful of it, rather than confining it to the restriction of a dualism that either totally accepts or rejects it.[2]
Let us take another example of false dualism from legal theory, which is known as ‘the concept of opposite implications’ (mafhum al-mukhalafah). All main schools of legal theory, apart from the Hanafi school, consider the meaning of the wording of a text to be of two parts: agreement and disagreement. Thus, the concept of disagreement means that if the wording of a text confirms a particular ruling, then according to the concept of opposite implications, the same wording confirms its opposite. In other words, the presence of a particular fact means logically the absence of its opposite. The fiqh schools that adopt the concept of opposite implications divide it into five categories: name, description, condition, extent and number. Thus, the mention of any of these five categories in the text of the Qur’an or a hadith means that its opposite is non-existent or false. The Hanafi scholars reject this logic, but their rejection is not based on rejecting the concept of false dualisms. They consider that a single reason behind a religious text cannot include two rulings at the same time.[3] Yet this is another false dualism.
For example, fiqh scholars discuss the adjective ‘pastured’ in the hadith: ‘Zakat is due on pastured animals’.[4] According to the concept of opposite implications, cows that are not taken to pasture are not liable for zakat in the view of the majority of scholars,[5] even though they represent a property liable to growth. This is clearly contrary to the very purpose of zakat. An example of the ‘description’ category and the application of the concept of opposite implications occurs in the following Qur’anic verse: ‘Any of you who, owing to circumstances, is not in a position to marry a free believing woman may marry a believing maiden from among those whom your right hands possess’. (4: 25) The description here is the word ‘believing’, which refers to women and maidens. Al-Shafi‘i considers belief a condition for the validity of marriage. Hence, operating the concept of opposite implications, al-Shafi‘i considers marriage with non-believers unlawful in all situations. By contrast, the Hanafi scholars, who do not accept the concept of opposite implications, consider that a Muslim man may marry a woman who is a believer or an unbeliever. They argue that the adjective ‘believing’ in the verse does not necessarily negate unbelievers. Thus, they reject the false dualism.
In the category of ‘condition’ we may give the following example of inevitable dualism. God says in the Qur’an: ‘If they [meaning divorced women] are with child, maintain them until they have delivered their burden’. (65: 6) Implementing the concept of opposite implications, scholars say that if a divorced woman is not pregnant, then she does not have the right to maintenance by her divorcing husband. This is contrary to the understood meaning that when a man chooses to divorce his wife, he bears certain financial responsibility towards her. The Hanafi scholars disagree because they reject the concept of opposite implications,[6] not because of the contradiction with the understood meaning.
An example of the ‘extent’ category is found in the following verse detailing rulings applicable to fasting: ‘Eat and drink until you can see the white streak of dawn against the blackness of the night’. (2: 187) This verse makes clear that eating and drinking are permissible until the specified time, but not after that. The Hanafi school shares the same ruling, but the Hanafi scholars consider that the verse mentions eating and drinking as primary actions, and that they are specifically meant, not as a result of the concept of opposite implications.[7]
The concept of opposite implications is also applied to ‘number’. Thus, when a verse of the Qur’an or a hadith mentions a particular number, then all other numbers are, according to this concept, unacceptable. It is not possible that any other number, even ones mentioned in other verses or hadiths, can replace that specified number in the same context. Examples are found in the hadiths concerning zakat and specify thresholds for liability to zakat in different types of property. These thresholds, specifying numbers, may differ in different narrations or hadiths. Most scholars resort to the solution of specifying a particular number and rejecting others, either through considering a particular text weightier on balance or through inevitable choice even though different narrations are equally authentic, or through abrogation even though the abrogated text is confirmed. All this is not religiously required. This book is a critique of such an approach, which is based on dualism, its reasoning and conclusions.
All fiqh schools exclude figurative descriptions from the concept of opposite implications, as well as any effect of the application of this concept that is in contradiction with other texts.[8] However, the cited examples show that the very concept of dualism presents us with a type of choice between two alternatives that, in my view, represents faulty reasoning which both lacks evidence and is unnecessary. Indeed, such fallacies lead to rigidity in fiqh and contribute to the formation of a mentality that does not leave room for a middle ground between opposite choices or the reconciliation of varying meanings. Such dualism in reading religious texts also limits the flexibility of rulings as they apply to changing circumstances and it restricts the ability of fiqh to address new circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, it prevents religious texts from guiding such flexibility, which is a main objective of such texts.
When the concept of opposite implications was applied to number, as has been mentioned earlier, in some cases of zakat it resulted in what was called ‘contradiction’ between a number of hadiths mentioning specific numbers of what should be paid in zakat. There were marginal differences in the numbers mentioned in authentic hadiths.[9] As we shall see, scholars found themselves having to claim that other numbers mentioned in authentic hadiths were abrogated. Such claims were made only to ensure consistency in the application of the concept of opposite implications to numbers.
The amount of zakat for camels as specified in the instructions the Prophet ordered to be written to Abu Bakr, ‘Ali and ‘Amr ibn Hazm varied.[10] Because of these differences, scholars differed as to which numbers they should adopt and which they should abandon on the basis of the concept of opposite implications. A few scholars tried to reconcile the relevant reports. Al-Tabari, for example, reconciled all these reports by stating that a scholar is free to determine which number to apply in estimating the amount of zakat due.[11] In his highly distinguished book, Fiqh al-Zakat, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi reconciled the numbers by stating that the zakat collector may apply any of the numbers on the basis of the financial status of the zakat payer.[12] Such types of reconciliation are better, as a well-known rule of fiqh states that ‘It is better to enforce a religious text than to discard it’.
If we take a broader look at the religious objectives of the whole issue of zakat, disregarding inevitable dualisms and their mutual effects of weight or contradiction, we will not need to deal with or reconcile any contradiction. It is well known that one of the objectives of zakat is to take a donation, or sadaqah, from people who have more than the threshold of zakat and have held their property for a year, which means that they have over a certain standard of wealth. This donation is given to the poor, the needy, insolvent debtors and other beneficiaries of zakat. This broad perspective presupposes taking into consideration the amount of wealth and its growth, as well as how rich any individual is, regardless of whether his cattle is pastured or not, her gold is circular or not, the underground resources are solid minerals or liquid ones, the agricultural produce is wheat, barley or rubber, and regardless of all other details to which Islamic legislation does not pay much attention in the first place.
As we shall see, the objectives of Islamic legislation include ensuring mutual social security, making matters easy for people, and ensuring law and order in society. Therefore, numbers and shapes of property may differ, but should not and do not affect the duty of zakat or its fulfilment of its goals and aims.
The aforementioned logical premises and brief examples merely serve as an introduction to this book. I feel that what I am tackling has an important and essential role in the process of contemporary Islamic revival. My subject presents a methodological critique of the theory of abrogation, which is often misunderstood and wrongly applied by scholars of olden and modern days.
I have written on this subject on more than one occasion, tackling it from different angles and within different contexts. This book brings together what I have written earlier and presents my ideas through examples that point to various questions to which the theory of abrogation, in the sense of annulment, was applied in order to arrive at confirmed and settled rulings. Yet we will see that this sense of abrogation is by no means valid from an Islamic point of view.
The theory of abrogation is similar to that of dualism, which we have already mentioned, in the fact that it has a long heritage that has been transferred from one generation to another. This heritage is represented in the branch disciplines of Islamic studies known as al-Nasikh wal-Mansukh (the abrogating and the abrogated texts), Mukhtalaf al-Hadith (hadiths that are at variance) and Hall al-Ta‘arud (reconciliation of contradictory statements). This is a heritage that has been greatly impacted by inevitable dualisms, which is wholly unnecessary in the same way that a full picture does not have to be only in black and white. This book will show that in every question where contradiction was assumed, some meticulous scholars have discussed it in detail, refuting the idea of contradiction and abrogation, drawing the picture in full, not in shades of grey but in all its splendid colours.
This humble effort tries to paint a general picture of Islamic law, through the discussion of this subject. It aims to present in full colour, not in black and white, what we understand of its meanings. This provides us with a splendid picture and a rosy way forward. I seek God’s help and place my trust in Him. To Him belong all knowledge and all grace. To Him I turn and pray to grant me success.
[1] Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi‘i, Al-Risalah, p. 158.
[2] Ahmad ‘Abd al-Halim Ibn Taymiyyah, Kutub wa Rasa’il wa Fatawa Ibn Taymiyyah fi al-Fiqh, vol. 20, pp. 123, 133, 163, 203 and 283.
[3] Muhammad Abu Zuhrah, Usul al-Fiqh, pp. 136–9.
[4] Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Fiqh al-Zakat, vol. 1, p. 240.
[5] Ibid., p. 141.
[6] Abu Zuhrah, Usul al-Fiqh, p. 143.
[7] Ibid., p. 144.
[8] Ibid., p. 140.
[9] Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh al-Zakat, vol. 1, p. 182.
[10] Muhammad ibn Isma‘il al-Bukhari, Sahih.
[11] Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Jami‘ al-Bayan ‘an Ta’wil Ayi al-Qur’an, vol. 5, p. 401.
[12] Al-Qaradawi, Fiqh al-Zakat, vol. 1, p. 184.
Table of Contents
Table of ContentsIntroduction
Chapter One: Objectives of Islamic Law: Concepts and Aims
Chapter Two: Internal Contradiction or Mutual Exclusion by a Scholar2.1 Mutual exclusion or contradiction2.2 Contradiction between texts2.3 Ways of dealing with superficial contradiction
Chapter Three: Abrogation: Definitions and Uses3.1 Linguistic and technical definitions 3.2 The limitation, exception or interpretation of an earlier text by a later one3.3 Abrogation as meaning final annulment of a religious ruling
Chapter Four: A Critique of Some Methodologies Confirming Abrogation4.1 Is there any definitive evidence of the abrogation of any Qur’anic verses?4.2 Contradiction as evidence for abrogation4.3 Abrogation on the basis of dates: Are we required to adopt the latest?4.4 No abrogation based on anyone’s personal opinion4.5 What does ‘express’ abrogation mean? Is it enough to prohibit something after it was permissible, or to permit it after it was prohibited?
Chapter Five: Cases of How Objectives Help in the Enforcement of Superficially Contradictory Texts5.1 Objectives of protecting the approved essentials by the Muslim government5.2 The objective of making things easier through a gradual implementation of Islamic laws5.3 Striking the balance between the objectives of worship and keeping things easy5.4 Balancing the objectives of human beings’ safety and protecting the environment
Theoretical and Practical Conclusions
Bibliography
Index