A Course in Microeconomic Theory / Edition 1 available in Hardcover
A Course in Microeconomic Theory / Edition 1
- ISBN-10:
- 0691042640
- ISBN-13:
- 9780691042640
- Pub. Date:
- 03/13/1990
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
- ISBN-10:
- 0691042640
- ISBN-13:
- 9780691042640
- Pub. Date:
- 03/13/1990
- Publisher:
- Princeton University Press
A Course in Microeconomic Theory / Edition 1
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Overview
The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780691042640 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 03/13/1990 |
| Edition description: | New Edition |
| Pages: | 864 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.75(w) x 10.00(h) x (d) |
Table of Contents
Preface xv
Chapter 1 An overview 3
1.1 The basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium 3
1.2 The purpose of microeconomic theory 7
1.3 Scope, detail, emphasis, and complexity 10
1.4 A précis of the plot 12
Part I Individual and social choice
Chapter 2 The theory of consumer choice and demand 17
Prologue to part I 17
2.1 Preferences and choices 18
2.2 Marshallian demand without derivatives 37
2.3 Marshallian demand with derivatives 51
2.4 Aggregate demand 62
2.5 Bibliographic notes 63
2.6 Problems 65
Chapter 3 Choice under uncertainty 71
3.1 Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility 72
3.2 On utility for money 81
3.3 Applications to market demand 87
3.4 States of nature and subjective probability 98
3.5 Problems with these models 112
3.6 Normative applications of the theory 120
3.7 Bibliographic notes 122
3.8 Problems 124
Chapter 4 Dynamic choice 133
4.1 Optimal dynamic strategies 133
4.2 Menus and meals 139
4.3 Bibliographic notes and discussion 143
4.4 Problems 146
Chapter 5 Social choice and efficiency 149
5.1 The problem 149
5.2 Pareto efficiency and optimality: Definitions 153
5.3 Benevolent social dictators and social welfare functionals 156
5.4 Characterizing efficient social outcomes 164
5.5 Social choice rules and Arrow's possibility theorem 174
5.6 Bibliographic notes 181
5.7 Problems 182
Part II The price mechanism
Chapter 6 Pure exchange and general equilibrium 187
Prologue to part II 187
6.1 Pure exchange and price equilibrium 187
6.2 Why (not) believe in Walrasian equilibrium? 193
6.3 The efficiency of a general equilibrium 199
6.4 Existence and the number of equilibria 205
6.5 Time, uncertainty, and general equilibrium 216
6.6 Bibliographic notes 223
6.7 Problems 225
Chapter 7 The neoclassical firm 233
7.1 Models of the firm's technological capabilities 234
7.2 The profit function 239
7.3 Conditional factor demands and cost functions 250
7.4 From profit or cost functions to technology sets 253
7.5 Cost functions and -runs 255
7.6 Bibliographic notes 259
7.7 Problems 259
Chapter 8 The competitive firm and perfect competition 263
8.1 A perfectly competitive market 264
8.2 Perfect competition and -runs 267
8.3 What's wrong with partial equilibrium analysis? 279
8.4 General equilibrium with firms 283
8.5 Bibliographic notes 292
8.6 Problems 292
Chapter 9 Monopoly 299
9.1 The standard theory 299
9.2 Maintaining monopoly 302
9.3 Multigood monopoly 304
9.4 Nonlinear pricing 306
9.5 Monopoly power? 314
9.6 Bibliographic notes 317
9.7 Problems 318
Chapter 10 Imperfect competition 325
10.1 The classic models of duopoly 325
10.2 Bibliographic notes and discussion 340
10.3 Problems 347
Part III Noncooperative game theory
Chapter 11 Modeling competitive situations 355
Prologue to part III 355
11.1 Games in extensive form: An example 356
11.2 Games in extensive form: Formalities 363
11.3 Games in normal or stategic form 376
11.4 Mixed strategies and Kuhn's theorem 380
11.5 Bibliographic notes 384
11.6 Problems 385
Chapter 12 Solution concepts for noncooperative games 387
12.1 Opening remarks 387
12.2 Dominance and iterated dominance for normal form games 393
12.3 Backwards induction in games of complete and perfect information 399
12.4 Nash equilibrium 402
12.5 Equilibria in mixed strategies 407
12.6 Why might there be an obvious way to play a given game? 410
12.7 Refinements of Nash equilibrium 417
12.7.1 Weak dominance 418
12.7.2 Subgame perfection (and iterated weak dominance) 421
12.7.3 Sequential equilibrium 425
12.7.4 Restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs 432
12.7.5 Trembling-hand perfection 437
12.7.6 Proper equilibria and stable sets of equilibria 442
12.8 Reprise: Classic duopoly 443
12.9 Bibliographic notes 449
12.10 Problems 451
Chapter 13 Incomplete information and irrationality 463
13.1 Games of incomplete information 463
13.2 An application: Entry deterrence 468
13.3 Modeling irrationality 480
13.4 More on refinements: Complete theories 489
13.5 Bibliographic notes 496
13.6 Problems 498
Chapter 14 Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation 503
14.1 The prisoners' dilemma 503
14.2 Repeating games can yield cooperation: The folk theorem 505
14.3 Noisy observables 515
14.4 Implicit collusion in oligopoly 524
14.5 Reputation 531
14.6 Reputation redux: Incomplete information 536
14.7 Bibliographic notes 543
14.8 Problems 546
Chapter 15 Bilateral bargaining 551
15.1 Simultaneous offers and indeterminancy 552
15.2 Focal equilibria 554
15.3 Rubinstein's model 556
15.4 The experimental evidence about alternating offers 565
15.5 Models with incomplete information 568
15.6 Bibliographic notes 570
15.7 Problems 571
Part IV Topics in information economics
Chapter 16 Moral hazard and incentives 577
Prologue to part IV 577
16.1 Introduction 578
16.2 Effort incentives: A simple example 579
16.3 Finitely many actions and outcomes 586
16.4 Continuous actions: The first-order approach 604
16.5 Bibliographic notes and variations 608
16.6 Problems 616
Chapter 17 Adverse selection and market signaling 625
17.1 Akerlof's model of lemons 625
17.2 Signaling quality 629
17.3 Signaling and game theory 645
17.4 Bibliographic notes and discussion 650
17.5 Problems 654
Chapter 18 The revelation principle and mechanism design 661
18.1 Optimal contracts designed for a single party 661
18.2 Optimal contracts for interacting parties 680
18.3 The pivot mechanism 704
18.4 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 712
18.5 Bibliographic notes 713
18.6 Problems 715
Part V Firms and transactions
Chapter 19 Theories of the firm 723
19.1 The firm as a profit-maximizing entity 724
19.2 The firm as a maximizing entity 729
19.3 The firm as a behavioral entity 731
19.4 Firms in the category of markets 739
19.5 Bibliographic notes 740
19.6 Problems 740
Chapter 20 Transaction cost economics and the firm 743
20.1 Transaction cost economics and firms 743
20.2 Mathematical models of transaction cost economics 756
20.3 Bibliographic notes 769
Postscript 771
Appendix 1 Constrained optimization 775
A1.1 A recipe for solving problems 775
A1.2 The recipe at work: An example 778
A1.3 Intuition 782
A1.4 Bibliographic notes 788
A1.5 Problems 789
Appendix 2 Dynamic programming 791
A2.1 An example with a finite horizon 791
A2.2 Finite horizon dynamic programniing 796
A2.3 An example with an infinite horizon 801
A2.4 Stationary Markov decision problems 806
A2.5 Bibliographic notes and discussion 813
A2.6 Problems 814
Index 817