From the Publisher
“If objects, as Kant claims, ‘conform to our cognition’, how can his epistemology reproduce the Copernican revolution, which clearly demonstrates the contradiction between our experience and reality? This book reverses that perspective and criticizes Kant from the Copernican point of view. It radically challenges Kant scholars: are our representations of the physical world just objective illusions?” (Luca Oliva, University of Houston, USA)
“Ryall puts the case that Kant's much touted 'Copernican Revolution' in philosophy was in fact no such thing but rather just the opposite, i.e., not a progressive turn toward truth, science, and objectivity but a turn back toward just the kind of anthropocentric/subjectivist illusions that Copernicus (and Galileo after him) had striven to overcome. He argues this case with impressive determination, vigour and consistency in a prose-style which often serves well to communicate his deeply held conviction that Kant's big mistake - his way of confusing ontological with epistemological issues - has inflicted great damage on subsequent philosophy.” (Christopher Norris, Cardiff University, UK)