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Nongovernmental Organizations in Environmental Struggles

Yale University Press

Chapter One

To the extent that NGOs are culturally resourceful, they can turn moral concerns and perceptions into a capacity to act. That they may be seen to behave altruistically arguably enhances an ability to promote a favored mission. Yet to describe NGOs thus does not help us to understand how they translate a perceived high-mindedness into action. Indeed, there may even be a tension between thinking of NGOs as "benevolent visionaries" and thinking about them as "hard-nosed pragmatists" that must compromise.

This tension resonates in the literature. A "utopian" school is epitomized by the work of Korten (1990). His argument is that the main contribution of an NGO is to facilitate "people-centered development" by coordinating locally responsive networks of actors. These organizations promote a "transformation agenda" of justice, inclusiveness, and sustainability. If their strategy has shifted over time, this is mainly in response to changing local needs rather than the demands of elites. The energy propelling NGOs to the forefront of "associational revolution" has thus beenabout "making a difference" in the lives of the downtrodden (Ekins 1992; Edwards and Hulme 1992; Salamon 1994; Fowler 1997).

A "dystopian" school dwells on the dark side of NGO experience. This perspective, seen in work by Smillie (1995) and Sogge (1996a), would puncture "myths" surrounding NGOs. They probe the compromises that organizations make with powerful elites in order to function-compromises that may even undermine NGO ideals. This bleak picture is rounded out with an assessment of how altruism and solidarity is subverted due to organizational self-interest and competition. Indeed, some argue that when NGOs get "too close for comfort" to powerful political and economic elites, "like Icarus before them, [they] may plummet to the ground when the heat of the donors melts the wax in their wings" (Hulme and Edwards 1997b: 284; see also Najam 1996; Tvedt 1998).

This summary clearly oversimplifies a complex picture. Indeed, it bears reiteration that NGOs are a diverse lot. For example, they are dierentiated by size, function, and scope of operation, let alone philosophy, ideology, or national origin (Farrington et al. 1993; Meyer 1999; Mercer 2002). Such diversity has a bearing on the possible wider applicability of the moral capital perspective-a question touched on in the introduction and one that is considered in more detail in chapter 7. Here, though, this summary helps introduce the view of NGOs as a broad "class" of actors characterized by an intermediate social position that entails much ambiguity. This is both their strength and their weakness. Yet, in general terms, many of these organizations seem "Janus-like" in that power seems to be derived from actions that sometimes appear visionary (as the utopian school believes) and other times seem "pragmatic" (as the dystopian school argues). There is rarely a hard and fast distinction here. Still, much NGO cultural resourcefulness resides in working with or against people to shift this process to their liking. Such strategic thinking and behavior is the focus of this book.

Ambiguity over behavior crops up in related debates in the social movement literature. According to resource mobilization theory (RMT), articulated notably by McCarthy and Zald (1973; see also Zald and McCarthy 1987), strategic thinking by social movement organizations (SMOs) counts most, since much of what they do is to mobilize political and economic resources to resolve social grievances. RMT has shown nuance in its argument in recent years as it emphasizes how mobilizing strategies are linked to cultural "framing." Still, its explanatory power remains linked to assessments of the practical dilemmas and choices that confront SMOs on a daily basis, even if it has been attacked thereby for being narrowly rationalist in outlook (Ferree 1992; McAdam et al. 1996; Della Porta and Diani 1999).

In contrast, new social movement (NSM) theorists like Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1989; 1996) examine cultural dynamics, focusing attention on how and why collective identity is articulated. Notice is certainly given to day-to-day realities, but the claim that movements challenge "cultural codes" through words and deeds bespeaks a literature inclined to radical interpretation of these social formations. NSM theorizing is thus concerned with the potential for transformation associated with these moral and cultural visionaries (DeLuca 1999; Schlosberg 1999). These debates draw attention to the manner in which SMO and NGO power may be linked simultaneously to visionary practices (power through moral visioning) and "pragmatic" actions (power through social maneuvering). The two aspects are certainly connected. Part prophet and part hustler, many organizations seem to derive power from an ability to "speak the truth" to different actors in different social settings. They use cultural skills to acquire the resources to act even as sometimes, through the shrewd use of those resources, they may alter cultural norms and practices (Foweraker 1995; Alvarez et al. 1998; Smillie and Hailey 2001).

Environmental struggles test that resourcefulness. As the political-ecology literature demonstrates, many NGOs rail against a world dominated by global capital and associated political practices. The ramifications here include widening income inequality and pervasive environmental disruption. The creation of winners and losers appears to be an integral part of a prevailing political economy based on social and environmental contradiction (Ecologist 1993; Harvey 1996; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Braun and Castree 1998; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003; Peet and Watts 2004). That such mayhem furnishes many NGOs with a raison d'être is inadequately emphasized in this literature. The uneven development of global capitalism leaves an ever-shifting sociospatial and biophysical imprint that has enabled the rapid rise to prominence of NGOs and social movements around the world. It is not that NGOs are inevitably rooted in an anticapitalist perspective. Rather, it is that the social and environmental issues to which they respond are notably a manifestation of capitalist and allied state practices (Yearley 1996; O'Connor 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Brosius 1999; Mercer 2003; Routledge 2003).

Environmental NGOs race to protect biodiversity "hotspots" before they are destroyed by unchecked resource extraction. This effort is often coupled with the promotion of "green" capitalist practices such as ecotourism or biodiversity "prospecting." Meanwhile, development NGOs help those who become socially marginal as a result of unequal development aided and abetted by states (McAfee 1999; Bryant 2002a; Mercer 2002; Sundberg 2003). As I document with reference to the Philippines, environmental struggles mean that NGOs are pulled in different directions as moral visions sometimes clash with more immediate dilemmas of social and political interaction (Allahyari 2000). Yet many organizations not only survive but actually prosper. That such power may be acquired even under difficult circumstances points to a strategic logic and behavior that is my main concern. To make sense of such strategizing is first to consider a chain of assumptions that links contingent NGO identities and purposes to perceptions of moral and altruistic action, and which then relates those perceptions to the question of NGO reputations and empowerment.

NGOs as Moral and Altruistic Actors

Because moral issues address crucial questions of human identity, it is not surprising that they exercise the minds and passions of many people at one time or another in their lives. Indeed, as Smith (2000: 1) argues, moral reasoning is "part of our distinctively human nature." Yet, to recognize the ubiquity of moral reflection does not detract from a key feature of many NGOs-namely, that they are created specifically to advance a moral vision. Many of them pursue that vision primarily on behalf of "others": disadvantaged people or endangered flora and fauna, for example. Here, then, is a possible basis for seeing them as altruistic. To suggest that NGOs may be seen as moral and altruistic actors, however, raises questions about the meaning of moral and altruistic conduct.

To claim that NGOs promote the "good society" does not mean they agree on its features. Their concerns are diverse and range from questions of global peace and ecology to issues of personal identity and social regulation (Anheier and Salamon 1998; Goodwin et al. 2001; Polletta 2002; Bryant and Jarosz 2004). Those concerns are also linked to an array of political ideologies and practices including conventional left-right divisions as well as deep/light green splits (A. Scott 1990; Dalton 1994; Heyzer et al. 1995; Doyle and McEachern 2001; Hart 2001; Connelly and Smith 2003; Routledge 2003). Such diversity is not surprising. To dwell too much on it, though, is to miss the point that these organizations are defined as a group in part because they often privilege moral concerns. There seems to be a moral raison d'être that tends to set them apart from other actors such as business corporations and states. Further, as many NGOs are seen to pursue moral concerns, they can acquire a good name vital to their ability to effect change.

Still, two conditions must hold if moral concerns are to be a basis for empowerment. These are (1) that a sense of morality is indispensable to society, and (2) that morality needs to be understood as a social process. Without the former, the moral basis of NGO concerns is socially irrelevant, thereby reducing this actor's ability to acquire power. The absence of a view of morality as a social process calls into question the need for an organized social response to moral issues, once again curtailing prospects of NGO empowerment. It is worthwhile, then, to briefly consider these two conditions.

Strong grounds exist for thinking that societal cohesion is possible only when basic moral principles apply. Indeed, scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds have long made this argument in linking moral issues to questions about human identity and collective practice (e.g., Wolfe 1989; Parry and Bloch 1989; Benhabib 1992; Goodin 1992; Howell 1997; Smith 1998, 2000). There are nonetheless sharp dierences over the precise role that morality ought to play in the regulation of human behavior (increasingly seen by some as linked to interaction with the biophysical environment; see Dobson 2000). A standard division here is between what is termed the domains of the Right and of the Good. Thus, one view treats morality in a narrow sense in that it links morality with the domain of the Right, understood as comprising principles of justice pertaining to rights and obligations. Here, the aim is to constrain human conduct so that basic human interests are safeguarded (Lukes 1991). The narrow view is often based on the assumption that humans are in perpetual competition and conflict due to limited resources and sympathies. In contrast, the broad sense of morality encompasses not only the domain of the Right, but also the domain of the Good. In this case, there is an "all-inclusive theory of conduct" at stake (John Mackie, cited in Lukes 1991: 21). In this book, it is not the relative merit of these views that is important-let alone the aspiration to rational self-suciency in the face of social contingency that both views reflect (Nussbaum 1986). Rather, it is that there is a consensus that some morality is essential to the operation of human society. While these (and other) views may judge a society to be more or less morally situated, the crucial point for our purposes here is that such evaluation is widely seen to be essential to social well-being even if it may raise thorny questions about the commensurability of values in the process (Radin 1996; Gudeman 2001).

However fraught and ambiguous the process might be, much of what NGOs do is nonetheless precisely concerned with moral evaluation and assertion. They seek to publicize and rectify perceived discrepancies between what they believe is Right and Good in theory and what occurs in practice. Indeed, these organizations probe how societies (or parts thereof) may not live up to even basic moral principles. Many NGOs thus promote an agenda in which moral perspectives loom large even as that eort poses an inescapable risk of slipping into unsavory and self-defeating moralism-what has been dubbed "moraline drift" (Bennett 2002; see also Fisher 1997; Brosius 1999).

While a minimum level of morality may be vital to human welfare, it does not necessarily follow that NGOs or other types of organization are the best means to attain that goal. It could be argued, for example, that it is for the individual to regulate his or her behavior in keeping with moral principles. Here, the attainment of moral goals is ensured via individual self-interest and initiative. This exaltation of the individual is, of course, at the heart of an influential if extreme variant of rational choice theory linked to the "Chicago school" of economists and policy practitioners (e.g., Becker 1981). Such thinking, in turn, has been widely attacked in the literature (e.g., Radin 1996; Zelizer 1997; Gudeman 2001).

My concern here is with the view of morality as the exclusive preserve of the utility-maximizing individual. At first glance, to specify moral action thus would be simply to acknowledge the seemingly incontrovertible fact that it is the human body that is "the irreducible basis for understanding" (Harvey 1998: 40). On closer inspection, though, there is a basic tension in this argument. Maximizing individual utility through the market is seen to guarantee a moral society because, as individuals pursue their interests, they simultaneously build collective prosperity. Yet, market "efficiency" presupposes individuals guided by moral principles inculcated outside of market relations (through religious instruction, for instance). For individuals to be otherwise inclined is to call into question the ability of buyers and sellers to trust one another. Since trust is essential to market operations, its absence would jeopardize effectiveness. Yet there are no guarantees that moral education will happen and certainly no sense of how moral behavior in the market itself is to be armed in the face of competition. Nor is there an indication of how, even in a society of moral individuals, individual moral action will add up to something that meets even minimal collective obligations. The latter may never be achievable through individual action alone. By reducing morality to individual self-interest, this form of rational choice thinking falls into a Hobbesian trap in which there is neither an adequate social mechanism nor a public-minded spirit by which the "war of all against all" can be overcome (Jordan 1989; Wolfe 1989; Plant 1992).

There is thus a need to view morality as a social process. Thinking about morality in this way views interests as socially constituted. In the process, an opportunity arises for individuals or groups (such as NGOs) to "play the role of moral entrepreneur: to draw attention to new needs and to encourage others to act together in some new combination" (Jordan 1989: 170). The need for moral entrepreneurs seems especially great when action is required on behalf of socially marginal groups or even endangered nonhuman species (Allahyari 2000; Chaloupka 2002). Yet, if many NGOs derive purpose from highlighting a perceived gap in theory and practice concerning the Right and the Good, it is only because they work in societies in which morality is defined socially that they have purchase on moral debates. "Moral limits to the market" may present NGOs with the opportunity to be-and to be seen to be-moral actors (Plant 1992).

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Excerpted from Nongovernmental Organizations in Environmental Struggles by Raymond L. Bryant Copyright © 2005 by Yale University. Excerpted by permission.
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